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Driving is a necessary, but inherently risky, daily activity. One behaviour 
exacerbating these risks occurs when drivers illegally cross amber traffic lights, 
and an improved ability to inhibit this behaviour would promote safer driving. 
This type of inhibitory control has previously been conceptualised as being itself 
under conscious control, and therefore requiring deliberate thought and 
intention. However, driving is cognitively demanding, and this is likely to reduce 
the ability to maintain the intention to inhibit the amber-crossing response. 
Recent research has demonstrated that response inhibition can become 
associatively-mediated with the right type of training and is thus not exclusively 
reliant on control processes. This finding has led to the development of 
inhibition training techniques to develop associatively-mediated inhibitory 
responses to cues that might lead to an incorrect behaviour. However, it is 
unclear to what extent this work could be generalised to driving. The first 
question addressed in this thesis centres on what kind of behaviour at traffic 
lights might be primed as a result of experiencing the contingencies produced at 
traffic light-controlled junctions. The second focuses on how training could be 
developed to change the products of this learning so that it primes safer 
behaviours. 
Chapter One introduces the theoretical background to the thesis and includes a 
discussion of dual-process models of associative learning and associatively-
mediated inhibition. Chapters Two and Three ask what is learnt at an 
associative level at traffic lights. Chapter Two begins the development of a 
laboratory paradigm that aims to capture the contingencies linked to traffic 
lights, and Chapter Three continues this by introducing sequences into the 
paradigm. Chapter Four investigates the importance of task set for associative 
learning and begins the development of a training task to change the learnt 
associative behaviour towards amber traffic lights. This work is continued in 
Chapter Five where the task is taken out of a pure associative learning context 
and applied in a real-world intervention. Finally, Chapter Six summarises the 
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1          CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
n 2017 there were 1,793 deaths on roads in the United Kingdom (UK) despite 
years of highway safety improvements and campaigns (Department of 
Transport, 2018). Road traffic collisions are estimated to cost the UK economy 
£35 billion a year (Department of Transport, 2018). Given that some estimates 
put driver error as a critical factor in 94% of road accidents (U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 2015), interventions to address the cognitive characteristics of 
drivers would seemingly be of considerable utility (Cheng, Ng, & Lee, 2012).  
One cause of road accidents is people contravening traffic light signals. 
Specifically, with 22% of urban road incidents caused by drivers ignoring a stop 
signal at traffic lights (Retting, Williams, Preusser, & Weinstein, 1995), and 38% 
of drivers rarely stopping at amber traffic lights (Thrifty, 2011), there is a need to 
reduce the crossing of amber and red traffic lights on the part of drivers (Polders 
et al., 2015). A potential solution that has been adopted in some cases is the 
use of cameras to enforce red traffic lights. While these cameras can lead to 
safer driving and increased compliance (Baratian-Ghorghi, Zhou, & Franco-
Watkins, 2017) such a reactive approach does not address the root causes of 
the behaviour.  
So, what causes this behaviour? How does one decide to stop (or not) at traffic 
lights? Such a process relies on the human ability to adjust behaviour in 
response to environmental cues, and an important component of this ability is 
an activity termed response inhibition. While this process has been studied from 
many different perspectives for a long time (Verbruggen, McLaren, & 
Chambers, 2014) this thesis explores the control of human behaviour by 
appealing to current cognitive psychology theories, that is through the use of 
executive control processes. Crucially, while these processes have historically 
been ascribed to top-down conscious thought, recent research has highlighted 
how this is not necessarily the case, demonstrating that control can become 
mediated through bottom-up associatively-mediated processes. The thesis goes 
on to explore how techniques to change cognitive behaviour might help 
ameliorate dangerous driving at traffic lights. Specifically, the work explores how 




investigates the implications of this possibility for the development of behaviour 
change techniques. 
To begin, the role of executive control in human behaviour (with a focus on 
motor control) is outlined, with an emphasis on how this can be voluntary or 
automatic. I will then highlight the current role of behaviour change techniques 
in the domain of driving, addressing the shortcomings of these approaches, and 
how more appropriate techniques could be developed by using frameworks 
already established in cognitive psychology. 
 EXECUTIVE CONTROL 
The term executive control is an umbrella term covering a variety of systems 
that allow people to modify their behaviour in response to environmental 
changes. It includes planning and monitoring as well as response inhibition 
(Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Miyake et al., 2000; Hofmann, Schmeichel, & 
Baddeley, 2012; Diamond, 2013) and is important to many aspects of human 
life, such as school success (Blair & Razza, 2007). A review of the whole 
executive control literature is beyond the scope of this thesis (for a review see 
Monsell and Driver (2000)); the focus here is on response inhibition and how 
this is important in motor control.  
 A brief history of inhibition 
Scientists and philosophers have long studied the nature of human control. As 
Bari and Robbins (2013) note, Plato's allegory of the chariot, where the human 
soul is a charioteer being driven by two horses having opposite characters, is 
symbolic of the operation of inhibition, whereby to reach the intended 
destination (in this case heaven) the horses have to be controlled with the 
opposing forces successfully balanced. Similar ideas come from Descartes 
(trans. 1989) and Diamond, Balvin, and Diamond (1963). 
In the 19th century, the study of inhibition shifted from a philosophical to a 
scientific perspective (Smith, 1992). These approaches were rooted in the field 
of psychiatry. As early as 1843 the German psychiatrist Wilhelm Griesinger was 
arguing that, in the terminology of the day, insanity was due to impaired 
inhibition (as reported by Macmillan, 1996). Sechenov (1863) and Ferrier (1886) 
began the search for a neural basis of inhibition. Such work often involved 
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patients with lesions to the frontal cortex. These patients tended to be 
unimpaired on most mental functions (e.g., vision and hearing), but had deficits 
in goal-directed behaviour and were distracted by salient but irrelevant stimuli 
(Milner, 1963; Perret, 1974; Milner & Petrides, 1984).  
A famous demonstration of the effects of lesions to the frontal cortex comes 
from Shallice and Burgess (1991). In this study three individuals with prefrontal 
brain damage were set a number of simple but open-ended tasks to complete in 
a shopping centre whilst also obeying a number of rules. For example, one of 
the tasks was to “buy a packet of throat pastilles” (p. 733), and a rule was “no 
shop can be entered other than to buy something” (p. 734). The patients were 
told to complete the task quickly. All three patients made more errors in the task 
than controls matched for age and IQ. The types of mistakes demonstrate the 
deficits in goal-direction. For example, one participant made an error when she 
entered a chemist shop to buy soap (one of the task items) but did not buy 
anything (and thus broke a rule) as she did not like the soap on sale, even 
though personal preference was irrelevant to the task at hand. In fact, all three 
patients displayed inefficiencies in the task and broke at least five rules each. 
This study demonstrates that patients with prefrontal lobe damage can 
complete basic tasks (such as remembering instructions), but that the efficient 
coordination of behaviour to do so proves difficult. These findings led to the 
development of the idea that the prefrontal cortex is not involved in a particular 
faculty (such as language) but rather is central to control and goal-directed 
behaviour (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Such work was key in the development of 
influential theories such as that of the supervisory attentional system by Norman 
and Shallice (1986) and the concept of the ‘central executive’ in Baddeley and 
Hitch's (1996, 2003) model of working memory. 
 Fractioning the executive 
With the development of the concept of an ‘executive controller’, control was 
conceived as being located in a unitary homunculus that was responsible for 
pulling the levers to regulate low-level systems (Baddeley, 1996). However, it 
has become clear that this concept is untenable as it relies on circular 
reasoning, and begs the questions Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (Juvenal, 
trans. 2014 from Watson & Watson, 2014). If the homunculus is in control, what 
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(or ‘who’, see the doctrine of divine universal causality, Grant, 2010) is 
controlling the homunculus?  
In an attempt to move beyond explaining what is controlled to how control is 
exercised, Monsell and Driver (2000) proposed the slogan “Dissolve, 
deconstruct, or fractionate, the executive! Let a hundred idiots flourish!” (p. 7). 
They argued that to fully explain executive control, the processes (“idiots”) that 
underlie the homunculus need to be defined. There is evidence against the 
concept of a unitary homunculus. While Shallice and Burgess’ (1991) patients 
all showed deficits in the task, each patient had differing impairments. For 
example, Patient 1 showed no task failures, while Patient 2 did. This suggests 
that different parts of executive control are impaired following damage to 
specific parts of the prefrontal cortex. Further examples of the existence of 
multiple control processes comes from work by Godefroy, Cabaret, Petit-
Chenal, Pruvo, and Rousseaux (1999) who showed that some individuals with 
frontal brain damage were impaired on one cognitive task but not another; while  
the opposing pattern of results were found in other patients with posterior brain 
damage, a double-dissociation implying separable processes.  
These results led to the fractioning of the executive controller into 
subcomponents. Focusing on individual differences, Miyake et al. (2000) 
developed three distinct functions of executive control: updating and monitoring 
information, switching between responses and task sets, and inhibiting 
irrelevant actions. Thus, the current prevailing view is that ‘executive control’ 
contains separate specialised components, though see Verbruggen, McLaren, 
et al. (2014) for a commentary on how the homunculus has not yet been fully 
banished. The focus of this thesis now turns to the third component of executive 
control from the Miyake et al. (2000) taxonomy: inhibition.  
 RESPONSE INHIBITION  
Inhibition is often considered to be a key facet of executive control (Baddeley, 
1996; Aron, 2007; Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2014; Nigg, 2017). While its role 
in some processes such as memory and attention is debated (MacLeod, Dodd, 
Sheard, Wilson, & Bibi, 2003; Aron, 2007), there is a large body of evidence 
suggesting that inhibition is used in motor control, specifically the ability to 
cancel an already actioned motor response (Nigg, 2000; Coxon, Stinear, & 
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Byblow, 2006; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a; Majid, Cai, George, Verbruggen, & 
Aron, 2011; Bari & Robbins, 2013). 
One issue in assessing response inhibition is task purity. By definition, response 
inhibition is a component of a wider network of executive control, and as such 
these other processes (e.g., attention) are likely to impact task performance. A 
solution around this is to focus on the inhibition of observable motor behaviours. 
Such an approach enables an objective measure of inhibition, either via a 
button press (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a) or through the direct investigation of 
motor cortex via Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (Pascual-Leone, Valls-Solé, 
Wassermann, & Hallett, 1994; Cirillo, Cowie, MacDonald, & Byblow, 2017). 
Thus, for present purposes, response inhibition, or just inhibition, will be defined 
as the “ability to supress a motor response that is no longer appropriate or 
required” (Bowditch, 2016, p. 5; adapted from Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 
2009). Accordingly, response inhibition can be studied in the laboratory by 
encouraging the development of prepotent, dominant, responses to a cue, and 
then introducing the need to suddenly inhibit this set response in reaction to a 
rarely seen stop signal (Logan, 1994).  
It is worth noting that motor response inhibition (the stopping of an action, e.g., 
not pressing a key in a laboratory experiment) and cognitive inhibition, which 
can be seen as the stopping of a mental process (MacLeod, 2007), e.g., the 
suppression of a task irrelevant memory (Anderson & Green, 2001), might not 
be distinct processes but rather represent similar constructs. For example, brain 
imaging studies have found overlapping areas of neural activity in both cognitive 
and response inhibition (Cohen & Lieberman, 2010). Further support comes 
from studies which show that deficits in response inhibition and cognition 
inhibition can be comorbid, e.g., in those suffering from Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder (Chamberlain, Fineberg, Blackwell, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2006; for 
review see Bari & Robbins, 2013). Indeed, response inhibition has been found 
to be important for normal and healthy functioning, which suggests a wider, 
more complex network of processes is at play than just the inhibition of motor 
responses. For example, poor response inhibition (and poor executive control 
more generally) has been linked to attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (Nigg, 
2001; Berryessa, 2017), the development of anti-social and criminal behaviour 
(Tremblay, Pihl, Vitaro, & Dobkin, 1994; Moffitt, 2017), and to drug use (Moffitt 
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et al., 2011). Of interest for the present thesis, poor response inhibition has also 
been linked to risky driving (Bachoo, Bhagwanjee, & Govender, 2013; O’Brien & 
Gormley, 2013; Bıçaksız & Özkan, 2016; Sani, Tabibi, Fadardi, & Stavrinos, 
2017), and those with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder have been shown 
to have an increased tendency to commit traffic violations (Groom, van Loon, 
Daley, Chapman, & Hollis, 2015). Furthermore, performing motor inhibition 
tasks has been shown to lead to a change in actual behaviour, with this type of 
training being used to reduce alcohol consumption (Houben, Nederkoorn, 
Wiers, & Jansen, 2011) and unhealthy food intake (Veling, van 
Koningsbruggen, Aarts, & Stroebe, 2014). These applications of inhibition are 
explored further in section 1.3.3. As an aside, it is worth noting that while a lack 
of inhibition certainly has negative consequences, it is not entirely without 
benefits. Dickman’s (1990) construct of functional impulsivity implies that in 
some situations lack of control is beneficial. For example, Dickman and Meyer 
(1988) found that when under time pressure individuals with high impulsivity 
were more accurate in a visual-comparison task than those with low impulsivity. 
Overall, inhibition is key for healthy functioning; yet depending on the context 
low inhibition is not necessarily bad.  
 Paradigms  
As described above, motor inhibition fundamentally reflects a person’s ability to 
stop a prepotent motor response. Attention now turns to the paradigms used to 
investigate inhibition of motor responses. The three main paradigms used in the 
literature, and that are the primary methodologies employed in subsequent 
empirical chapters of this thesis, are the go/no-go, stop-signal, and stop-change 
paradigms.  
1.2.1.1.1 GO/NO-GO 
In this paradigm, first developed by Donders (1868), participants are presented 
with stimuli and told to respond (e.g., press a key) when a go stimulus is 
presented, but to withhold their response when a no-go stimulus is presented. 
In Figure 1.1 participants would have to respond to the letter Y and withhold a 
response to letter B. Typically, trials are presented rapidly and there is a low 
probability of no-go. This design leads to a go response becoming the default, 
‘prepotent’, response and ensures that participants are withholding a response 
rather than merely deciding not to make a response (Aron, 2011). This issue is 
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discussed further in section 1.2.3. These paradigms often use mapping to visual 
cues, such as responding to different coloured circles (Nicholson, Verbruggen, 
& McLaren, 2018), or to categories of stimuli, such as responding to words 
describing living rather than non-living objects (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b). 
Experiments have also used two different auditory tones as go and no-go cues 














1.2.1.1.2 Stop-signal task 
The stop-signal task was developed by Lappin and Eriksen (1966) and Logan 
and Cowan (1984). In the task, participants have to make a choice 
discrimination (e.g., in Figure 1.2, left key response for letter A and right key 
response for letter W). If a stop signal is presented (which can be another visual 

















Figure 1.1. Schematic of a typical go/no-go task. In this task participants have 




















The delay between the presentation of a stimulus and the stop signal is varied 
and called the stop signal delay. The duration of this delay directly affects the 
probability of correct inhibition of response. If the delay is short it is likely that 
participants will be able to withhold their response, but if the delay is long then 
participants tend to be unable to cancel their response and make a commission 
error (Matzke, Verbruggen, & Logan, 2018). By linking the length of the delay to 
participants’ performance (called a staircase design) the differences between 
participants and within-participants across the experiment can be controlled for ( 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a; Coulacoglou & Saklofske, 2017). For example, the 
delay could increase by 50ms if correct inhibition occurred and decrease by 


















Stop signal  
Figure 1.2. Schematic of a typical stop signal task. In this task participants have 
to respond to letter ‘A’ with a left key press and respond to letter ‘W’ with a right 
key press. However, when the stop signal is presented (the star) participants 
must withhold their response. The SSD is the Stop Signal Delay, the time 




procedure would result in a 50% chance of inhibiting a response. An additional 
benefit of varying the delay in this way is that it becomes hard for participants to 
develop a strategy to increase the chance of correctly stopping (Logan, 1994). 
Regarding the required response in the task, while key presses are the most 
frequently used responses that participants are required to inhibit, researchers 
have also explored other modalities. These include requiring participants to 
interrupt their own speech (Ladefoged, Silverstein, & Papçun, 1973) or eye 
movements (Logan & Irwin, 2000). As Bari and Robbins (2013) note, each 
modularity has its advantages and disadvantages, with a key feature being 
experience in the primary task, for example an actor might have more difficulty 
interrupting their own speech than a normal person due to the automatic nature 
of the task and practiced behavioural sequences. Similarly to the go/no-go task, 
discrimination can be between a variety of visual (Senderecka, Grabowska, 
Szewczyk, Gerc, & Chmylak, 2012) and auditory stimuli (Manuel, Bernasconi, & 
Spierer, 2013). Naturally, stimuli that are easier to detect will result in better 
performance than stimuli that are harder to detect (Palmer, Huk, & Shadlen, 
2005), and as noted above there are likely to be individual differences in task 
difficulty. Interference from the stimulus can also affect performance, with 
emotional stimuli leading to worse performance compared to neutral stimuli 
(Verbruggen & De Houwer, 2007). Both visual (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a) 
and auditory stop signals (Van Der Schoot, Licht, Horsley, & Sergeant, 2005) 
are commonly used. The ease with which the stop signal is detected has a 
direct effect on performance in the task. For example, louder stop signal tones 
produce better inhibition than quieter tones (Van Der Schoot et al., 2005). To 
help minimise such issues, the experiments in this thesis will build upon the 
work of Bowditch, Verbruggen, and McLaren (2016) and Verbruggen and Logan 
(2008a) to use simple visual discriminations involving novel stimuli which 
require key presses as a response, a task that it is reasonable to assume that 
all participants will be equally (un)familiar with. 
1.2.1.1.3 Stop-change paradigm  
The final paradigm used in this thesis is the stop-change paradigm. Here, 
participants are told to stop their response to a go cue and make a ‘change’ 
response when an appropriate cue appears (Verbruggen, Schneider, & Logan, 
2008; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). In Figure 1.3, participants must respond to 
26 
 
letter A with a left-hand response and to the letter W with a right-hand response, 
but if this changes to a red W then it requires a left-hand response. The delay 
between the letter W appearing and changing red is called the stop-change 
signal delay and is equivalent to the stop signal delay in stop signal paradigms. 
The most typical change response is to press a different key from that of the 
first response (Logan & Burkell, 1986) or to make an opposite response, such 
as in Nachev, Wydell, O’Neill, Husain, and Kennard (2007) where participants 
pressed the key opposite to that primed by the first cue. However, studies have 
also required participants to respond depending on the identity of the stop-
change signal, e.g., word descrimintaion based on whether the signal was a 
high or low tone (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008c). The paradiagm has also been 
used in animal experiments, including with rats (Beuk, Beninger, & Paré, 2014) 
and pheasants (Meier et al., 2017). 
One issue regarding the stop-change paradigm is whether participants inhibit 
their first response before changing to the second.  In other words, is inhibition 
required to complete the task? To explore this question, Verbruggen, 
Schneider, and Logan (2008) introduced a variable delay between the stop 
signal and the second go response to distinguish between two models of 
performance. The first, the GO1-GO2 model, assumes that inhibition is not 
required for successful completion of stop-change tasks, with participants 
replacing their goal to respond to GO1 with the goal to respond to GO2 when 
instructed. In a sense STOP is achieved by the replacement of GO1 with the 
GO2 goal. The second, the GO1-STOP-GO2 model, assumes that when 
instructed to change responses, participants first stop GO1 responses and then 
make GO2 responses, with a STOP goal being required to inhibit GO1 
responses before GO2 responses can be made. Interestingly, the two models 
would predict different effects of increasing the delay between the stop signal 
and the second go response. Model 1 would predict that increasing delays 
would not impact upon performance, with reaction times to the second GO cue 
not varying with delay. This is because the GO2 processing happens 
immediately when the change signal is presented. However, model 2 would 
predict that reaction times to the GO2 cue are linked to the delay, with a longer 
delay period leading to faster GO2 reaction times. This is because the STOP 
process must be finished before a GO2 response can be made, and so a longer 
delay will increase the chance that this STOP process is completed. In their 
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experiments, Verbruggen et al. (2008) found evidence to support the model 2 
account of stop-change performance, with reaction times to the GO2 cue 
decreasing when the delay between the change signal and GO2 increased. 
This demonstrates that successful performance within stop-change tasks 
involves the use of inhibition. Such conclusions are supported by computational 
(Camalier et al., 2007) and neuroimaging (Boecker, Gauggel, & Drueke, 2013; 


















 Models of inhibition 
Performance on the above response inhibition tasks is often modelled as a 






















Figure 1.3. Schematic of a typical stop change task. In this task participants 
must respond to letter ‘A’ with a left key press and respond to letter ‘W’ with a 
right key press. However, when the change signal is presented (W turns red), 
participants must change their response to a left key press. The SCSD refers to 
the Stop Change Signal Delay, the time between the stimulus presentation and 




presentation of a go stimulus, and a stop process triggered by the presentation 
of a stop stimulus (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Logan, Van Zandt, Verbruggen, & 
Wagenmakers, 2014). On any trial, performance (that is, responding or not 
responding) depends on the relative finishing times of the two processes. If the 
stop process finishes before the go process then participants will withhold a 
response, but if the go process finishes first then participants will respond. By 
definition, the independent race model assumes that the two processes operate 
completely separately, with behavioural (Lea, Chow, Meier, McLaren, & 
Verbruggen, 2019) and neurological evidence (Schmidt, Leventhal, Mallet, 
Chen, & Berke, 2013) supporting this view. However this assumption has not 
been accepted by all, with some studies suggesting that the two processes are 
more interrelated (Özyurt, Colonius, & Arndt, 2003; Gulberti, Arndt, & Colonius, 
2014). 
 Proactive or reactive inhibition 
A key distinction in response inhibition research is between proactive inhibition 
(also referred to as action restraint) and reactive inhibition (also termed action 
cancellation). Proactive inhibition (Whitely & Blankfort, 1933) refers to the 
inhibition of motor control prior to a response being made, while reactive 
inhibition describes the inhibition of a motor response during its execution (Hull, 
1943). Braver (2012) characterised reactive inhibition as being triggered by 
contextual cues in the environment, with proactive inhibition entailing 
processing of goal-relevant information to bias behavioural responses. 
Recently this distinction has been applied to inhibition training paradigms (Aron, 
2011). It has been suggested that the go/no-go paradigm measures proactive 
inhibition, whereas the stop signal task measures the ability to cancel an 
ongoing motor response, that is reactive inhibition (Schachar et al., 2007; 
Littman & Takács, 2017). The argument is that for go/no-tasks participants must 
make response decisions based on the trial: that is, they must first select a 
response before initiating it. In comparison, in stop-signal tasks the go signal is 
presented first, and as such activates the go process, with any subsequent stop 
signal requiring the inhibition of the already active go pathway. Such a 
characterisation has found support in partially dissociable neural networks 
(Eagle, Bari, & Robbins, 2008; Swick, Ashley, & Turken, 2011).  
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However, as discussed earlier, go/no-go experiments are often designed so that 
go is the prepotent response, either by having more go than stop trials, for 
example in Adams, Lawrence, Verbruggen, and Chambers (2017) 75% of trials 
were go, or by having short response windows, as seen in Leiva, Parmentier, 
Elchlepp, and Verbruggen (2015). Given this, the argument is that as go is the 
default response, the go process is activated immediately on the presentation of 
a stimulus. Evidence from Leocani, Cohen, Wassermann, Ikoma, and Hallett 
(2000) supports this case. The study used a go/no-go task to investigate 
corticospinal excitability (by using the proxy of motor-evoked potentials induced 
by Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation). Results showed that there was inhibition 
of excitability around 200-300ms following presentation of no-go trials. This 
suggests that the prepotent response was go, and that participants inhibited a 
response rather than merely not making a response. Crucially, this effect was 
found even when there was an even ratio of stop to go trials (50:50) and the 
response window was long for such a task (6-8 seconds). Participants were 
instructed to respond “as quickly as possible” (p. 1163) to stimuli, indicating that 
this simple instruction alone can be enough to enable the formation of prepotent 
responses in go/no-go paradigms.  
While proactive control is an important facet of inhibition, it does seem clear that 
reactive inhibition is often involved in not responding during these tasks, and 
that certain design features can lead to a greater role for reactive inhibition. The 
use of instructions emphasising going, high go ratios, and quick response 
windows are likely to push participants to use reactive inhibition in both stop-
signal and go/no-go tasks. Saying this, successful performance on inhibition 
tasks requires a balance between responding to go trials but also withholding 
responses on stop trials (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b). It is likely that both 
processes are running concurrently (Duque, Lew, Mazzocchio, Olivier, & Ivry, 
2010). For example, reaction times are typically longer in blocks where there 
are stop trials, compared to blocks where there are no stop trials (Ramautar, 
Kok, & Ridderinkhof, 2004; Verbruggen, Best, Bowditch, Stevens, & McLaren, 
2014). Moreover, this effect can happen on a trial-by-trial basis when 
participants are informed about the likelihood of a stop signal occurring 
(Chikazoe et al., 2009; Jahfari, Stinear, Claffey, Verbruggen, & Aron, 2010; 
Jahfari et al., 2012; Zandbelt, Bloemendaal, Neggers, Kahn, & Vink, 2013). 
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To summarise, when participants receive instructions promoting going, and are 
responding at speed, in tasks designed with relatively high go ratios, then one 
can be confident that action cancellation is occurring, with the involvement of 
proactive inhibition being limited. With this in mind, the empirical work in this 
thesis will use the above strategies to minimise the role of proactive inhibition. 
In the next section I highlight another aspect of inhibition: how, over time, 
inhibition can become associatively-mediated rather than relying on top-down 
conscious control.  
 ASSOCIATIVELY-MEDIATED RESPONSE INHIBITION 
As discussed earlier, inhibition is often assumed to be part of a suite of 
executive control processes that are under conscious control, so that behaviour 
in stop-signal and go/no-go tasks results from goal-directed and deliberate 
actions (Diamond, 2013). Indeed, it has been argued that inhibition by its very 
nature requires conscious processing. As Parkinson and Haggard (2014) note, 
to curb a prepotent action one needs to consciously resist it and to know that 
this is the case. Furthermore, throughout history there are accounts of the 
intensity of feelings when trying to overcome prepotent urges (Augustine, trans. 
2006; Dostoevsky, trans. 2018). This can be contrasted with the position taken 
by learning theorists, who argue that with sufficient practice, responses can be 
automated (Dickinson, 1985; McLaren, Green, & Mackintosh, 1994; McLaren et 
al., 2014). Indeed, there is now converging evidence that inhibition is influenced 
by bottom-up processing and that, with appropriate training, inhibition itself can 
become driven by bottom-up rather than top-down processes.  
 Primed inhibition  
Priming effects have a long history in psychology and occur when exposure to 
one stimulus affects the response to another. For example the word ‘Mug’ is 
recognised more quickly if preceded by the word ‘Hot’ than by the word ‘Car’ 
(for review see Neely, 1991). Subliminal priming is when the priming stimuli are 
presented too quickly to be noticed so that they fall below the threshold of 
perception and so are not consciously processed (Elgendi et al., 2018). 
Work conducted by van Gaal et al. (van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Fahrenfort, Scholte, 
& Lamme, 2008; van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, & Lamme, 2009; 
van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, & Lamme, 2010; van Gaal, Lamme, 
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Fahrenfort, & Ridderinkhof, 2011) has been key in showing how inhibition can 
be triggered by subliminal primes. In a series of experiments participants were 
presented with subliminal primes in both go/no-go and stop signal tasks (van 
Gaal et al., 2008; van Gaal et al., 2011). Behavioural results showed that the 
presentation of masked no-go stimulus or stop-signals before a go or no-signal 
trial led to slower reaction times and increased the likelihood of omission errors. 
These findings were supported by functional magnetic resonance imaging 
recordings which showed that the presentation of the primes led to neural 
activity similar to that linked to top-down inhibition, indicating that inhibitory 
control functions in the brain can be triggered subconsciously (van Gaal et al., 
2010). Furthermore, the magnitude of electroencephalographic components N2 
and P3 (typically associated with response inhibition in standard go/no-go 
(Lavric, Pizzagalli, & Forstmeier, 2004) and stop signal task (Ramautar et al., 
2004)) correlated with the slowing of behavioural responses to subliminal no-go 
and stop signals (van Gaal et al., 2008; van Gaal et al., 2011). However, though 
the authors (van Gaal, De Lange, & Cohen, 2012) attribute the pattern of results 
to subconscious activation of the inhibition-related neural networks, this remains 
controversial as one cannot be sure that participants were entirely unaware of 
the subliminal stimuli, with such priming methods being shown to underestimate 
conscious perception (Newell & Shanks, 2014). 
Further evidence for the role of priming, and thus automation, in response 
inhibition comes from Verbruggen and Logan (2009c). In a series of studies, the 
role of irrelevant (but visible) primes upon stopping in a stop-signal task was 
investigated. In the experiments the words GO or STOP were superimposed 
over simple shapes (circles or squares) with participants being told to ignore the 
words and respond to the shapes unless an auditory tone was presented. 
Despite the words being irrelevant to the task they had a clear effect on 
performance, with slower responding for go trials when STOP appeared over 
the shapes compared to GO. The results were replicated in a go/no-go variant 
with the finding that the effect was dependent upon task context. That is, the 
STOP word only impacted performance when stopping was an outcome, having 
no effect when presented in a go-only condition.  
Considering these experiments in combination, it seems that inhibitory control, 
typically considered to be exclusively delivered through top-down processes, 
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can be influenced by stimulus driven processes. Indeed, it seems possible that 
awareness is not required. However, the context effects seen in Verbruggen 
and Logan (2009c) demonstrate that such priming does not necessarily override 
top-down processes and suggests that bottom-up and top-down processes 
interact (an issue I will return to in section 1.4.3). 
 Learnt inhibition: bottom-up inhibition 
In the previous section it was demonstrated how priming effects can increase 
stopping effects in response inhibition tasks. Given the evidence that shows 
how practice at responding to a cue can lead to the learnt response becoming 
automatised over time, through a process of forming stimulus–response 
mappings (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Dickinson, 
1985; Logan, 1988), it is natural to ask if the effect works the other way. Does 
repeatedly stopping (via response inhibition) to a cue lead to an associatively-
mediated stop response?  
The first experiment to explore this idea was by Verbruggen and Logan (2008b). 
In one of their experiments, participants were presented with living or non-living 
words where the category determined the required response, e.g., GO for the 
word ‘apple’ (living) but STOP for the word ‘glass’ (non-living). Following 
training, these contingencies were reversed for the test phase. If pairing stimuli 
(in this case category of words) with specific responses leads to associatively-
mediated stopping, then one would expect words that were previously paired 
with stopping to have slower reaction times than novel stimuli. Consistent with 
this hypothesis, it was found that responses were slower in the test phase to 
stimuli previously associated with stopping, compared to stimuli associated with 
going or to novel stimuli. The authors concluded that the slowing witnessed in 
the test phase was caused by the retrieval of stimulus–stop associations that 
automatically inhibited responding. Similar results were found by Noel et al. 
(2016) who paired words with consistently going or consistently stopping, and 
then at test reversed the mappings. At test, in line with Verbruggen and Logan 
(2008b), go performance was impaired for old stop stimuli. Further work by 
Verbruggen, Best, et al. (2014) confirmed the findings were not driven by 
sequential learning after-effects (repetition priming effects).  
Further support for the notion of associatively-mediated stopping comes from 
Best, Lawrence, Logan, McLaren, and Verbruggen (2016). In the experiment 
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participants had to respond to vowels or consonants superimposed on top of 
images (e.g., a bucket) for some blocks and respond to numbers bigger or 
smaller than five superimposed on top of the same images in other blocks. The 
design meant that though the go/stop signals changed over the experiment, 
participants always responded to some images (e.g., a bucket) and always 
stopped to others (e.g., a hat). At test the contingences were reversed. Analysis 
at test showed a significant difference between responding to old-go and old-
stop images such that responding was slower to old-stop compared to old-go. 
These results suggest that participants can acquire direct stimulus-stop 
associations. 
Such work led to the development of the associatively-mediated inhibition 
hypothesis (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b; Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014; 
Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014), namely that inhibitory control can be 
triggered automatically via the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations. This 
process relies on the consistent presentation of stimulus-stop trials (Logan, 
1988), or more accurately with practice of these consistent mappings, with A. 
Jones et al. (2016) showing that it is the proportion of successful stimulus-
inhibition responses that is important rather than the total number of stimulus-
stop trials. In a relevant study for the current thesis, Hochman, Henik, and 
Kalanthroff (2018) explored the effect of images of traffic lights upon going and 
stopping. The experiment used a stop-signal task, in which participants had to 
respond to a picture of either a red or a green traffic light and withhold a 
response if they heard an auditory tone. Given the ubiquitous nature of red and 
green traffic lights to mean ‘stop’ and ‘go’ respectively (which extends outside 
traffic management, for example, the use of the traffic light rating system for 
food labels (Department of Health, 2016)), the associatively-mediated inhibition 
hypothesis would predict that reaction times to going at green traffic light 
images would be faster than going to red traffic light pictures. As predicted, 
reaction times in go trials were significantly faster when paired with a green 
traffic light than a red traffic light.  
The work on priming and learnt inhibition shows how inhibition can become 
associatively-mediated through the pairing of a stimulus and a response. Such 
findings can be seen in the wider context of the associative learning literature, 
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which is mentioned in section 1.4, but now the focus of this introduction turns to 
the applications of the associatively-mediated inhibition hypothesis. 
 Applied response inhibition  
The evidence that associatively-mediated response inhibition can result from 
simple computerised tasks offers a tantalising practical application: that tasks 
could be developed to pair images (e.g., red traffic lights) to a certain response 
(e.g., stop) and so result in increased real-world braking to red traffic lights. As 
discussed previously there is some debate in the literature as to whether motor 
inhibition can bring about more general inhibition of thoughts and other mental 
processes (MacLeod et al., 2003; Berkman, Burklund, & Lieberman, 2009). 
However, the promise of the associatively-mediated inhibition hypothesis has 
led to a number of studies demonstrating that pairing images of alcohol 
(Houben et al., 2011; Houben, Havermans, Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 2012; A. 
Jones & Field, 2013) or food (Veling, Aarts, & Papies, 2011; Houben & Jansen, 
2011, 2015; Veling, Aarts, & Stroebe, 2013a, 2013b; Veling et al., 2014; N. S. 
Lawrence, O'Sullivan, et al., 2015; N. S. Lawrence, Verbruggen, Morrison, 
Adams, & Chambers, 2015; Poppelaars et al., 2018; Camp & Lawrence, 2019; 
Forman et al., 2019) with stopping (through go/no-go or stop-signal tasks) can 
lead to a subsequent reduction in consumption. Trials have also investigated 
using such training to reduce cocaine use (Alcorn III, Pike, Stoops, Lile, & Rush, 
2017) and to see if the training can be used in military contexts, such as using 
go/no-go tasks to reduce civilian casualties caused by a failure to inhibit shooter 
performance (Biggs, Cain, & Mitroff, 2015). 
A striking example of the beneficial impact such training could have is provided 
by N. S. Lawrence, O'Sullivan, et al. (2015). The study examined the ability of 
online inhibition training, in this case a go/no-go task, to lead to a reduction in 
food intake. In the study, adult participants were randomly assigned to either a 
control or active condition. The active condition had to inhibit motor responses 
to images of high-calorie food, while the control condition had to withhold 
responses to non-food items (such as socks). After four 10-minute sessions 
over a one-week period, those in the active group showed significant weight 
loss and reduced calorific intake, compared to the control group at a two-week 
follow-up. Furthermore, at the six months follow-up the self-reported weight loss 
was maintained for the active group. This study demonstrates the substantial 
35 
 
positive impact such training could have upon lifestyles. Yet, Carbine and 
Larson (2019) performed a p-curve analysis (where the distributions of 
significant p-values are plotted against different expected distributions, see 
Simonsohn, Nelson, and Simmons (2014)) to assess the overall evidential value 
of research using inhibition training to reduce food consumption. The authors 
performed four curve analyses and consistently found a ‘U’-shape distribution, 
arguing that this was evidence for a true underlying effect of the training but 
also evidence of selective reporting in the literature. Analysis also showed that 
the effect of training was not as robust as tests initially revealed and that the 
effect was dependent on a single small p-value. However, since the analysis 
was published, the first pre-registered inhibition training experiment on food 
choice has been published. Z. Chen, Holland, Quandt, Dijksterhuis, and Veling 
(2019) found clear evidence of training leading to increased preference for go 
foods compared to stop foods. An update to the p-curve analysis by Veling, 
Chen, Huaiyu, Quandt, and Holland (2019) showed that, with the addition of the 
experiments in the Z. Chen et al. (2019) paper, the p-curve now suggests that 
response inhibition training is effective in bringing about behaviour change. 
However, in some domains research has been less successful. For example, in 
a randomised controlled trial using online go/no-go training, where images of 
smoking were paired with stopping, Bos et al. (2019) found no evidence of the 
effectiveness of the training. Indeed, smoking cessation rates reduced in line 
with a control group. Additionally, research investigating the use of inhibition 
training to reduce alcohol consumption has met with mixed success, with some 
empirical work not finding any difference in alcohol intake between training and 
control groups (Smith, Dash, Johnstone, Houben, & Field, 2017; A. Jones et al., 
2018). Conversely, one recent trial by Strickland, Hill, Stoops, and Rush (2019) 
did find real-world reductions in drinking following go/no-go inhibition training. 
There is also a variable picture in the use of inhibition training to target problem 
gambling. Initial work showed how a short task that promoted cautious motor 
responses led to a reduction in betting scores in a gambling task conducted at 
least two hours after training compared to controls (Verbruggen, Adams, & 
Chambers, 2012). However, a follow-up study where the delay between training 
task and gambling was 24 hours found strong support for the null hypothesis, 
that is, there was no difference between controls and those who received the 
training (Verbruggen et al., 2013). Subsequent studies again found an effect, 
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with stop-signal training leading to people placing lower monetary bets in a 
subsequent gambling task (Stevens et al., 2015), although the effect was small. 
These mixed effects have been confirmed in several meta-analyses and 
reviews. For example, a meta-analysis by Allom, Mullan, and Hagger (2016) 
found that whilst go/no-go training was effective its effects did not seem to 
persist over time (see also Turton, Bruidegom, Cardi, Hirsch, and Treasure, 
2016). A. Jones et al. (2016) found that inhibition training led to a significant 
decrease in food and alcohol consumption compared to controls, although the 
overall effect size was small. Further analysis showed that the effect size was 
dependent on the training paradigm used, with the effect size being medium if 
only go/no-go training was included. It is worth reflecting on these results 
further. Research has found stop-signal training to be less effective than go/no-
go training (Adams et al., 2017). However, the reasons behind this difference 
are not clear. It could be that due to the inherently lower successful inhibition in 
stop-signal tasks (resulting from failures to stop), such tasks provide a lower 
amount of inhibition training and thus produce lower effects; or perhaps stop-
signal tasks, with less consistent stimulus-signal mappings (due to the delay in 
presentation of the stimuli and stop signal), encourage learning towards the 
stop cue, rather than the stimuli. Thus, without the stop cue being present in 
real-life inhibition is less successful (Veling, Lawrence, Chen, van 
Koningsbruggen, & Holland, 2017). One important factor of the go/no-go 
paradigms used in such work is that they tend to be incidental versions. By this I 
mean, that while participants categorise the images (for example as appearing 
on the left- or right-hand of the screen), stopping is signalled by another cue. 
For example in N. S. Lawrence, O'Sullivan, et al. (2015), participants had to 
stop responding when a rectangle surrounding the image turned bold. This 
differs from traditional go/no-go tasks where the images themselves determine 
the appropriate response (see Figure 1.1).  
One outstanding issue surrounds the mechanisms that enable inhibition training 
to affect behaviour change. Though a full review of this question is outside the 
scope of this thesis, broadly there are two distinct pathways. One pathway 
suggests that training strengthens top-down inhibitory control towards no-go 
foods (Guerrieri, Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 2012), while another argues that the 
training creates associations between stopping and no-go foods (Verbruggen, 
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Best, et al., 2014; Stice, Lawrence, Kemps, & Veling, 2016). In addition, 
research also supports the notion that pairing stimuli with stopping responses 
leads to devaluation of strongly reward-associated cues that drive go responses 
( N. S. Lawrence, O'Sullivan, et al., 2015; Camp & Lawrence, 2019). Indeed, it 
may be that devaluation and bottom-up processes work together at different 
stages of the training to effect behaviour change, e.g., initial training creates 
response conflict (resulting from stopping to go foods) followed by the 
development of associatively-mediated inhibition (for a discussion see Veling et 
al., 2017). As a separate issue, it is important to distinguish between the effects 
of stimulus-specific response inhibition training (i.e. such as is the case in food 
and alcohol studies) and non-cue specific inhibition training effects which are 
more applicable to gambling research. A. Jones, Hardman, Lawrence, and Field 
(2017) in their review clearly distinguish between tasks that train top-down 
general inhibition (where participants must withhold responses to arbitrary cues) 
and tasks that train bottom-up stimulus-response associations (such as the food 
literature reviewed above). Overall, non-cue specific inhibition training has 
shown minimal effects in effecting behaviour change (Verbruggen et al., 2013; 
Bartsch, Kothe, Allom, Mullan, & Houben, 2016; yet see A. Jones et al., 2018).  
To summarise, research supports the idea that pairing a stimulus with a 
stopping response can lead to slower reaction times (Verbruggen & Logan, 
2008b) when these images are subsequently presented. These effects have 
been used to improve inhibition in the real-world and have been shown to be 
effective (though with small effect sizes) in a range of behaviours. The idea of 
applied response inhibition will be explored further in Chapter 5, but I shall now 
set the associatively-mediated inhibition hypothesis into a wider research 
context that can be used to further investigate human learning and which is key 
for the early empirical chapters of this thesis.  
 DUAL PROCESS THEORIES OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR  
A popular form of theorising about human cognition is the notion of duality, that 
cognition can be divided into two distinct systems (Deutsch, 2016). One system 
is characterised as slow, effortful and deliberate, while the other is fast, 
automatic and effortless (Evans, 2008; Stacy & Wiers, 2010; Kahneman, 2011; 
McLaren et al., 2014; Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, 2014; Strack & Deutsch, 
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2015). While some suggest that learning arises as result of a single, effortful, 
propositional process (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Mitchell, De Houwer, & 
Lovibond, 2009; Shanks, 2009), others (Stanovich & West, 2000; McLaren et 
al., 2014) argue that an additional, associative, system exists. This system is 
mechanical in nature and develops through detecting the frequency of events 
and the contingencies between them (McLaren et al., 2014). The general view 
in the field of learning is that humans (and other animals) are capable of 
learning using rules and reasoning, with the existence of a purely associative 
learning route being more contentious. In this section I review the evidence for 
the role of propositional learning in human behaviour, and then the research 
that demonstrates that associative learning can operate in humans 
independently of propositional knowledge. 
 Propositional learning in humans 
Mitchell et al. (2009; see also De Houwer, 2009) argue that associative learning 
results from the operation of a single controlled reasoning process. This system 
captures the nature of the relationships between events and as such contains 
both ‘truth value’ (Strack & Deutsch, 2004) and causality. Therefore, the 
resulting hypotheses can be proved true or false, and as such this leads to 
further learning. Support for the propositional approach rests on four strands of 
evidence: 1) that verbal instructions should be sufficient to produce learning 
even in the absence of an event (and thus the absence of the formation of 
associative links); 2) awareness is key to learning, and learning should only 
occur with awareness; 3) learning will be impaired with cognitive load; and 4) 
learning should be rational and rule-based. Of course, the point here is that all 
these things can be true at various times. So, simply demonstrating that these 
principles hold, at least some of the time, is not enough to rule out a dual-
process theory.  
In support of the first claim, studies have found that verbal instructions on their 
own have been sufficient to produce learning similar to that gained through 
experience of the actual contingency. For example, in Cook and Harris (1937) 
when participants were informed that a shock would always follow a tone, 
subsequent presentations of a tone lead to increased skin conductance even 
though a shock and tone were never presented together (see Smyth, Barnes-
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Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2008). The effect of verbal instructions holds for 
complex learning such as retrospective revaluation (Lovibond, 2003). 
The second point, on the importance of awareness, finds support in work by 
Lovibond and Shanks (2002) showing that while there are many examples of 
work claiming unaware conditioning, in most cases the measures used to check 
for awareness were much more sensitive tests of learning than those used to 
assay awareness, and as such there is little evidence for learning without 
awareness.  
The third point is that learning is affected by cognitive load. The propositional 
account argues that cognitive resources are required to attend, learn, and 
deploy appropriate rules. Therefore, under conditions where resources are low, 
either through secondary tasks or diverted attention, learning should be 
impaired. For example, the work by Dawson and colleagues (Dawson, 1970; 
Dawson & Biferno, 1973) showed that the presence of a masking task could 
impair conditional learning. In the experiments a classical conditioning design, 
where tones were or were not paired with shocks, was embedded within an 
auditory perception task, whereby participants were asked questions about the 
pitch of preceding tones. As is the case in conditioning designs, one tone 
predicted a shock, and another was never paired with a shock. Awareness was 
manipulated, with one group being told that tones predicted the probability of a 
shock and another receiving no such instructions. Galvanic skin response 
measures were taken as the dependent measure and knowledge of the 
contingencies was assessed by questionnaires and online expectancy ratings. If 
learning of the contingencies arises due to a resource intensive propositional 
system those in the unaware group should have impaired learning, with the 
masking task interfering with their ability to learn the contingencies. Of course, 
those in the aware group should be able to learn the contingencies as they have 
been informed about them. As predicted by the propositional account the 
imposition of the masking tasked impaired learning of the tone-shock 
contingencies. Participants classed as unaware of the conditioning 
contingencies did not to show any difference in galvanic skin response between 
the tone paired with a shock and the tone never paired with a shock. This 
suggests that load is important to learning about contingencies, with the fact 
that an increased cognitive load impaired contingency learning suggesting that 
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learning within this task relied on propositional, rather than associative, 
processes (also see De Houwer & Beckers, 2003).  
Yet, recent work paints a more complex picture. Seabrooke, Wills, Hogarth, and 
Mitchell (2019) found that while cognitive load affected performance in a 
complex outcome-response priming task, performance was unaffected in a 
simple task. This dissociation points to two separate routes. The fact that 
performance in a simple task was unaffected by cognitive load suggests that 
control processes were not key for this task, whilst impairment of performance 
in the complex task under cognitive load indicates that here controlled 
reasoning was required. However, the results from the simple task could occur 
through, as the authors’ note, the deployment of a very simple rule. If the rule 
was very simple then it would be easily deployed and, if requiring only relatively 
little cognitive capacity, would be unaffected by the imposed cognitive load.  
The final strand of support for the propositional account of learning comes from 
evidence that learning is always rational. For example, Shanks and Darby 
(1998) found that participants learnt rules in an allergy prediction paradigm 
rationally and acted in a manner inconsistent with associative learning 
accounts. In the experiment, participants were presented with various cues and 
outcomes. Crucially the design followed a rule whereby a compound cue (e.g., 
AB-) was the reverse of the outcome of its constituent parts (A+ and B+). To 
assay learning, in training, participants were presented with cues I+, J+, M-, and 
N- and at test shown their compounds, IJ and MN, having to predict the 
likelihood of cues leading to an allergic reaction. Crucially, the propositional and 
associative accounts would predict differing learning of these unseen 
compounds. If participants had learnt the rule, then one would predict that 
participants would rate MN over IJ as more likely to induce an allergic reaction 
(as the compounds’ constituent parts did not result in a reaction). However, if 
associative learning was guiding learning, then participants should rate IJ, not 
MN, as more likely to induce a reaction, as the compounds constituent parts 
also led to a reaction. That is, seeing the cue IJ should activate representations 
of I+ and J+ summing to IJ++. Thus, the associative account would predict that 
unseen compounds would lead to the same outcome as the constituent parts, 
while propositional learning would predict the opposite outcome. In support of 
the propositional account, participants judged that the allergic reaction was 
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more likely to occur for cue MN than IJ. Therefore, there is evidence that 
participants had seemingly learnt and deployed the appropriate rule. Yet, Wills, 
Graham, Koh, McLaren, and Rolland (2011) found that learning depended on 
cognitive load; specifically when participants were under heavy cognitive load in 
a set-up similar to  Shanks and Darby (1998), participants displayed learning 
consistent with surface similarity rather than the application of the rule (also see 
continued discussion in section 1.4.2).  
 Associative learning in humans  
The dual-process route as posited by McLaren et al. (2014) does not seek to 
dismiss the existence of a propositional account for human learning. It accepts 
that people can solve problems by rational hypothesis testing and using rules, 
but argues that a simpler, associative based, system can also influence 
behaviour. Furthermore, as McLaren et al. (2014) note, in some circumstances 
one would expect the two systems to operate in parallel and both to contribute 
to behaviour. 
Before discussing examples of human learning that cannot be easily explained 
by propositional knowledge, and thus support a dual-process account, it is 
worth noting the occurrence of associative learning in other animals. For 
example, there is wide ranging evidence that the sea slug Aplysia californica 
learns by the development of increasing or decreasing strength in synaptic 
connections between neurons (Kandel, 1976; Hawkins, Clark, & Kandel, 2006) 
and can produce behaviour predicted by learning theories, such as classical 
conditioning and conditional discrimination (Jami, Wright, & Glanzman, 2007). 
Whilst it is clear that making strong claims about human learning on the 
evidence from work with sea slugs would be dangerous, if we move closer to 
our own genetic heritage there is evidence that the activity of dopamine neurons 
in primates codes for prediction-error (Schultz, 1998), and that this signal is 
similar to a teaching signal as predicted by reinforcement learning theories such 
as the Rescorla–Wagner model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Indeed, it has 
been argued that the development of associative learning marked the beginning 
of a new stage in the development of life on earth approximately 541 million 
years ago, the Cambrian explosion (Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2010). Therefore, to 
argue that human learning is solely propositional is to suggest that, despite 
common evolutionary ancestors, humans developed a separate system of 
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learning – which in evolutionary biology terms is highly improbable. It is more 
parsimonious to assume that both associate and propositional systems could 
have developed in humans.  
As well as theoretical arguments there are also examples of learning in humans 
that cannot be explained by propositional learning accounts. One such example 
is the Perruchet effect (Perruchet, 1985). In the original experiment, participants 
were presented with a partial reinforcement schedule in which a tone (the 
conditioned stimulus, CS) was played on every trial, and on 50% of trials was 
followed by a puff of air (the unconditioned stimulus, US). This schedule 
resulted in a conditioned response (CR) of an eye-blink on presentation of the 
tone. The order of trials was pseudo-randomised which led to the creation of 
varying lengths of runs. These consisted of either CS-US pairings or just CS 
trials. Thus, trials were either followed by the same type of trials (CS-US, CS-
US) or followed by the other trial type (CS-US, CS). After each presentation of 
the trials participants were asked to rate their expectancy of receiving the US 
(the air-puff) in the following trial. Whilst the chance of receiving an air puff was 
constant throughout the experiment at 50%, participants’ prediction of the 
chance of receiving the US decreased as the number of consecutive CS-US 
trials increased. Thus, participants displayed the gamblers fallacy (Burns & 
Corpus, 2004), i.e. the erroneous belief that an outcome is less likely to occur in 
the future if it has already occurred. However, their conditioned responding (in 
effect another measure of learning) displayed the opposite pattern, with more 
consecutive presentations of the CS-US leading to greater predicted probability 
of a CR. That is, participants showed an increase in CR and a decrease in 
reported predictions of the US following a run of CS-US presentations, with the 
opposite pattern being seen on non-reinforced trials, i.e. CR reducing but 
expectancies for the US increasing. Thus, there are two directly opposing 
results; one measure shows a decrease following reinforcement, while another 
shows an increase. The effect has been found using other measures of learning 
such as reaction times (Perruchet, Cleeremans, & Destrebecqz, 2006; yet see 
critique by Mitchell, Wardle, Lovibond, Weidemann, & Chang, 2010; with a 
response by Barrett & Livesey, 2010) and galvanic skin response (McAndrew, 
Jones, McLaren, & McLaren, 2012). As Mitchell et al. (2009) concede this 
double dissociation between awareness and automatic conditioning is hard to 
explain within a single learning system but is exactly the pattern predicted by 
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associative learning theory (McLaren et al., 2014). Such a model would argue 
that autonomic measures (such as the eye-blink) are governed by the strength 
of the associations between the CS and the US, while the expectancy 
predictions are a product of conscious processes falling to the gamblers fallacy 
(see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Despite close scrutiny (Weidemann, Tangen, 
Lovibond, & Mitchell, 2009; Weidemann, Broderick, Lovibond, & Mitchell, 2012)  
and greater understanding of the contribution of non-associative processes 
(Livesey & Costa, 2014; Weidemann, McAndrew, Livesey, & McLaren, 2016) 
the effect still provides robust evidence in support of a dual-process account of 
behaviour (Perruchet, 2015), suggesting a separation between awareness and 
conditioning that cannot be easily explained via a single propositional system. 
Research reviewed earlier also provides support for the notion that associative 
learning processes can influence behaviour. Previously I discussed work by  
Shanks and Darby (1998) who found evidence of rule-based learning in humans 
that cannot be readily explained by dual-process accounts. However, this was 
not the whole picture. Within the study there were a subset of participants 
whose performance was comparatively poor suggesting that they had not learnt 
the rule. In fact, the participants in question displayed performance consistent 
with an associative learning account, and at complete odds to behaviour 
predicted if one was using the task rule. Therefore, there seems to be a 
dissociation between participants who use rule-based learning and those whose 
behaviour supports an associative learning account. These results support the 
idea that once they have been learnt, rules are easy to apply to related 
problems (e.g., the novel MN compound seen in the test phase), but that in their 
absence participants fall back on associative learning processes. This is of 
course not to say that all participants would not have learnt the rules with 
enough training, nor does it dismiss rule-based learning. Indeed, the fact that 
most participants (by a 2:1 ratio) were able to learn the rules is a strong 
indication that conscious processes dominate behaviour. I return to this idea of 
a unitary account below but to summarise the current section it is my view that a 
single, propositional model cannot account for all the effects I have described 
so far, particularly the research on response inhibition. Furthermore, a dual-
process framework offers the flexibility to explain not only the research outlined 
but offers a clear theoretical anchor from which to investigate how associative 
learning underpins human learning. 
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 Association and Cognition 
In this section so far, I have presented the evidence for each pathway as if they 
worked independently. However, there is good reason to believe they operate in 
an interrelated fashion, with the associative system providing the basis for 
propositional behaviour (McLaren et al., 2014; Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 
2014; later developed in McLaren et al., 2019; similarly see Abrahamse, Braem, 
Notebaert, & Verguts, 2016, and Evans & Stanovich, 2013). This view argues 
that rather than there being two separate and competing theories of human 
learning, both processes feed into one system which mostly acts through 
propositional processes but can act via associative processes. To put this 
theory into context, as McLaren et al. (2019) p.16 state: 
“We are convinced that cognitive processes can prevent the expression of any 
associative learning. They don’t have to, but they can do so, and this is the 
default. Otherwise, we would be at the mercy of events and our environment. 
As an example of what might happen if this were not the case, if you saw a 
chair, you would inevitably sit in it because of the long-standing association 
between stimulus and response. If this is not to be the outcome, then the 
expression of associative learning has to be inhibited by cognitive control in 
most circumstances. However, associative processes do support learning in the 
background. This learning might not inevitably be expressed, but it does 
automatically take place.” 
Therefore, this account argues that behaviour is mostly consciously driven, but 
that this cognition is built on top of associative learning, which provides the 
basic building blocks for propositional learning to occur. Importantly, the 
associative learning takes place automatically in the background and can 
influence behaviour when explicit processes are weak (McLaren et al., 2019), a 
point I will return to later with regards to driving.   
A piece of evidence in support of this theory comes from a task switching 
experiment in McLaren et al. (2019). The authors wished to investigate if 
participants could change from one mode of learning to another and what 
learning would transfer. The experiment was a typical bi-conditioning design in 
which two tasks were cued by certain shapes: either categorising digits as odd 
or even, or categorising digits as higher or lower than five. Typical with these 
experiments’ participants were informed about the rules of the task. However, 
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without the rules, the design becomes more akin to associative learning 
experiments where participants must learn the cue+stimuli – response (CSR) 
mappings by trial and error. Thus, in the experiment, participants either started 
with rule based (TASK group) or associative learning (CSR group) instructions 
and then, half-way though, switched to the other type of instructions. Results 
showed that for participants in the CSR-TASK group, performance after switch 
worsened and was similar to performance in the first block for a control TASK-
TASK group. However, for those in the TASK-CSR group, performance was 
somewhat protected, and at switch their learning matched that of the second 
block of a CSR-CSR control group. Thus, those in the CSR-TASK had to ‘start 
again’ in terms of performance, while those in the TASK-CSR group did not. 
The fact that performance in the TASK-CSR group did not collapse suggests 
that whilst under task instructions participants were able to learn about the CSR 
mappings, with such learning taking place ‘in the background’, and that once 
cognition had been surrendered by the switch of instructions, such learning 
came to the fore. The results of the CSR-TASK group suggest that once 
propositional learning is engaged then the behaviour arising from associative 
learning is suppressed. It should be noted that for this group the results are 
unexpected in traditional dual-processing accounts as one would predict to see 
some effect of the learning of the CSR mappings in the CSR-TASK manifest 
itself in performance in the second block. Overall, these results support the 
notion of a ‘two processes, one system’ model.  
One consequence of the argument that associative learning is at least partly the 
basis of all behaviour is that it would be expected that the basic ability to inhibit 
a response could be associatively driven. Evidence in support of this notion 
comes from task-switching experiments. Here, participants are exposed to 
stimuli and required to categorise them based on some feature of the stimulus. 
Humans often show switch costs, longer reaction times to a stimulus when the 
feature or dimension they are asked to use is switched rather than repeated 
across trials (Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010). This is often 
ascribed to the use of rules to complete the task, with the switch costs 
representing the time required to recall a new set of rules (task set) into working 
memory (Monsell, 2003). However, there is evidence that humans can solve 
these tasks without the use of rules (Dreisbach, Goschke, & Haider, 2007; 
Dreisbach, 2012), particularly with relatively small stimulus sets (Forrest, 
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Monsell, & McLaren, 2014), with participants who complete the tasks without 
rules showing no, or relatively little, switch costs. Furthermore, even pigeons, 
who have generally been found to lack executive control functions (Lea & Wills, 
2008, but see Rose & Colombo, 2005 and Castro & Wasserman, 2016), have 
been found to complete task-switching paradigms (Meier, Lea, & McLaren, 
2016). Though, like the human participants, they show no switch costs. Similar 
findings have been found in monkeys (Smith & Beran, 2018). Thus, 
performance for pigeons, monkeys, and humans on these tasks indicate that 
response inhibition could be to be, in part, a product of associative learning. 
 BEHAVIOUR CHANGE IN DRIVING  
Having reviewed the wider literature relating to executive control, inhibition, and 
the idea of dual-processes in learning, I now turn to the applied aspect of this 
thesis, driving behaviour. Here the state of behaviour change is reviewed with a 
focus on the role that associatively-mediated processes play in driving 
behaviour. 
One of the most well-known models in road safety is Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of 
Planned Behaviour (itself an extension of the Theory of Reasoned Action; Ajzen 
& Fishbein, 1980). A core component of the theory is intention; the more intent 
an individual has to commit an action, the more likely it is that an individual will 
engage in that behaviour. The theory argues that three factors determine the 
strength of an intention (see Figure 1.4); belief about the likely consequences of 
the behaviour (attitude), perceived expectation of others (subjective norms), and 
perceived ability to perform the behaviour (perceived behaviour control). These 
three factors form an overall behavioural intention which is the immediate 
antecedent to behaviour. Taking them in reverse order, perceived behaviour 
control refers to an individual’s perception of their ability to undertake a 
behaviour. It can be seen as a superordinate construct (Ajzen, 2002a) that 
contains two separate and individual components which both impact the 
strength of the overall construct: self-efficacy (an individual’s view of the 
difficulty or not of a behaviour) and controllability (the extent to which the 
behaviour is up to an individual). However, this construct is not universally 
accepted (Kiriakidis, 2017), with some researchers adding self-efficacy as a 
separate construct to the Theory of Planned Behaviour model (Terry & O'Leary, 
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1995; Tolma, Reininger, Evans, & Ureda, 2006). The next element of the model 
is subjective norms, which refers to the societal norms around an action; the 
pressure to conform, or not, to a behaviour. The more favourable the norms to 
completing an action, the stronger the intention to carry it out will be. The final 
factor in the model is attitude toward the behaviour. This refers to a person’s 
appraisal of a behaviour. This is driven by the consequences of an action, with 
positive consequences leading to more positive appraisals, and thus a higher 
chance that the behaviour will be performed. The model also suggests that 













The model has been found to successfully predict a range of real-world driving 
violations. For example, Nemme and White (2010) found that the model 
predicted 35% of the total variance in sending texts while driving, and Elliott et 
al (Elliott, Armitage, & Baughan, 2003; Elliott, Armitage, & Baughan, 2007) 
reported that the model explained 31-39% of the variance in observed speeding 
in a driving simulator. The model has also been used to account for 33% of the 
variance in driving over the alcohol limit (Castanier, Deroche, & Woodman, 
2013) and can predict red light jumping in motorcyclists (Satiennam, Satiennam, 
Triyabutra, & Rujopakarn, 2018).  
Figure 1.4. Schematic of the Theory of Planned Behaviour. Original drawing. 










However, despite the success of the Theory of Planned Behaviour in predicting 
behavioural outcomes, there has been less success in using the theory to 
change behaviour. Poulter and McKenna (2010) evaluated a road safety course 
used in UK schools aimed at pre-drivers based on the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour. They found that the course only produced a short-term increase in 
safer driving attitudes. Glendon, McNally, Jarvis, Chalmers, and Salisbury 
(2014) found that compared to a matched control group, novice drivers reported 
riskier driving attitudes over the course of a driver education course and at a 
six-week follow-up. The authors argued that such unexpected results might be a 
result of participants using defence mechanisms (e.g., optimism bias, Weinstein 
& Klein, 1996) to help allay fears of mortality caused by the use of crash 
statistics in the driving course. Furthermore, many reviews and meta-analyses 
have found limited evidence that driver improvement courses benefit road 
safety. For example a recent meta-analysis by Steinmetz, Knappstein, Ajzen, 
Schmidt, and Kabst (2016) found an effect size of 0.26 for interventions using 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour to change traffic behaviour. For contrast, the 
effect size for interventions aimed at physical activity was 0.54 (also see 
Roberts & Kwan, 2001; Ker et al., 2005; Peck, 2011). However, some research 
has found benefits of using Theory of Planned Behaviour-based interventions, 
with Quine, Rutter, and Arnold (2001) finding that such an intervention 
increased wearing of cycle helmets and Stead, Tagg, MacKintosh, and Eadie 
(2004) finding sizeable effects resulting from an intervention aimed at reducing 
speeding. Others have argued that the effects of such education programmes 
have been underestimated in meta-analyses (af Wåhlberg, 2018). There is 
general agreement that more well-controlled studies are required to fully 
understand the benefits of such educational interventions (Beanland, Goode, 
Salmon, & Lenné, 2013). 
 Associatively-mediated behaviour in driving  
It seems that focusing on the constructs in the Theory of Planned Behaviour to 
effect behaviour change does not capture all aspects of human cognition that 
influence risky driving behaviour (Conner & Sparks, 2005). It is worth 
highlighting that the Theory of Planned Behaviour relies on an actor’s behaviour 
arising from conscious, rational decisions (the ‘economist’s perspective’ on 
decision-making) rather than behaviour that stems from automatic or routinised 
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processes (for further see Kahneman, 2011). As reviewed earlier there is 
evidence that human behaviour can be associatively-mediated, and, in part, 
cued by environmental stimuli. This next section reviews the evidence for such 
learning in a driving context.  
Before proceeding further, it should be noted that the research communities of 
road safety and associative learning are distinct from one another with relatively 
little theoretical overlap. This has led to differing language to describe similar 
constructs. In the road safety literature, behaviour which the associative 
learning literature might describe as associatively-mediated is termed habitual. 
Habits are argued to be formed through associative learning resulting from the 
regular pairing of actions and events (Wood, Quinn, & Kashy, 2002), and thus 
the activation of a habit leads to the enactment of a specific, well-defined, 
response (Wood & Rünger, 2016). However, of course, not all frequently 
enacted behaviour is habitual (Verplanken & Wood, 2006). Additionally, once 
developed, habits are held to be activated in response to an environmental 
stimuli without mediation by conscious goals (Wood & Neal, 2007; Gardner, 
2012) and are in some sense the ‘default’ setting for behaviour (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013), though this viewpoint is not without critique (De Houwer, 
Tanaka, Moors, & Tibboel, 2018). Akin to the associative learning literature, the 
prevention of habitual behaviour is dependent on cognition control (Wood & 
Rünger, 2016). A wider review of habits is outside the scope of this review, and 
rather the focus here is to highlight the conceptual overlaps between the two 
research fields relevant for this thesis.  
In support of the role of automatic behaviours in driving, Verplanken, Aarts, 
Knippenberg, and Moonen (1998) found that car use was predicted by both 
habits and the Theory of Planned Behaviour. However, the relationship between 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour and actual behaviour was moderated by habit; 
intention only significantly predicted behaviour when habit was weak. Other 
research by Lheureux, Auzoult, Charlois, Hardy‐Massard, and Minary (2016) 
explored the separate influences of habits and planned behaviour on drink 
driving. Controlling for the constructs in the Theory of Planned Behaviour, habit 
was still found to significantly predict behaviour. However, in all model’s 
intention was found to be the greatest predictor of behaviour. This led the 
authors to conclude that behaviour is a result of both intentional and habitual 
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processes. A similar conclusion was reached by Elliott and Thomson (2010) 
who found that though intent was the largest predictor of speeding behaviour 
(explaining 47% of the behaviour), habit was a significant predictor, explaining 
an additional 4% of the variance. One issue regarding the above three studies 
is that they measure real-world behaviour via self‐report measures; these have 
been found to overestimate the variance explained by the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (McEachan, Conner, Taylor, & Lawton, 2011). This is likely to explain 
the differing conclusions, as issues around social desirability are more likely to 
affect sensitive topics such as drink driving and speeding than car use. Overall, 
the research demonstrates the importance of both rational decision making and 
automatic processes in governing behaviour related to driving (see reviews by 
Ouellette & Wood, 1998 and Wood & Rünger, 2016). 
 Measuring automaticity in driving  
Characterising habitual behaviours as a distinct construct from planned 
behaviours has not been without its critics (Ajzen, 2002b; de Wit et al., 2018). 
One of the main measures of habit is the Self‐Report Habit Index, a 12-item 
index developed by Verplanken and Orbell (2003). Though popular, various 
methodological concerns have been raised. For instance, there have been 
questions surrounding the operationalisation of habit in the scale (Sniehotta & 
Presseau, 2011; Gardner & Tang, 2014) and the difficulty in asking individuals 
to assess awareness of supposedly automatic processes (Hagger, Rebar, 
Mullan, Lipp, & Chatzisarantis, 2015). Labrecque and Wood (2015) suggest 
future research should use cue–response association tests (that address the 
relationship between a context, goals, and a behaviour) rather than self-report 
measures to provide more valid measures of automaticity. As Gardner (2015a) 
notes, more work is required to develop reliable measures of automatic 
behaviours.  
 Controlling associatively-mediated behaviours 
The research reviewed thus far supports the argument that ‘habits’ are a key 
predictor in driving behaviour, and that they can promote unsafe practices. 
Given the notion that habits are the default behaviour option it is likely that the 
behaviours primed by driving habits will dominate driving, unless cognitive 
control can be brought to bear. Unfortunately, research has shown that driving 
is a cognitively demanding activity. For example, Wadley et al. (2009) found that 
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those with cognitive impairments, that effected executive control, showed lower 
driving performance, such as poor lane control, compared to healthy controls. 
Briggs, Hole, and Turner (2017) compared behaviour on a hazard perception 
test between one group who had to complete the task (low load condition) and 
another who simultaneously had a conversation with the experimenter on a 
hands-free mobile phone (high load condition). Findings showed those in the 
high load condition detected fewer unexpected events and took longer to react 
to events than those in the low load condition. 
Given the nature of driving interventions that rely on cognition control are 
unlikely to be successful. For example, Elliott and Armitage (2006) explored the 
use of implementation intentions (an if-then plan, Gollwitzer, Sheeran, 
Trotschel, & Webb, 2011), to increase compliance with speed limits. Comparing 
self-reported compliance at a one-month follow-up, participants in the 
experimental condition, who had formed implementation intentions, showed 
significantly increased compliance with speed limits compared to a control 
condition who did not form implementation intentions. However, further analysis 
found that the intervention was only effective for participants who had a goal not 
to speed. Additionally, there is evidence that these implementation intentions 
are not completely automatised and that the deployment of such intentions is 
impaired under heavy cognitive load (McDaniel & Scullin, 2010). 
There have been growing calls for a greater focus on ‘habits’ when designing 
health interventions (Marteau, Hollands, & Fletcher, 2012; Sheeran, Gollwitzer, 
& Bargh, 2013). In his review Gardner (2015b) found only 38% of interventions 
directly addressed habitual behaviour, and in a recent review of behaviour 
change techniques in road safety and Fylan (2017) emphasised the need to 
establish ‘good’ habits. Changing associatively-mediated processes is arguably 
the Holy Grail in designing an intervention that will deliver a new behavioural 
‘default’. Earlier evidence highlighted the fact that there had been some success 
in using associatively-mediated inhibition training with regards to food and 
drinking consumption – could such approaches benefit driving behaviours? 
 Inhibition in driving  
Given that driving frequently involves cancelling an already actioned motor 
response, e.g., the traffic light suddenly turns red, this suggests that inhibition 
training that targets the prepotent response to a cue could lead to safer driving. 
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Supporting the importance of inhibition in driving, studies have found that poor 
impulse control leads to more risky driving (Jongen, Brijs, Komlos, Brijs, & 
Wets, 2011; Bachoo et al., 2013; O’Brien & Gormley, 2013; Bıçaksız & Özkan, 
2016; Sani et al., 2017), and that those with attention deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder (Barkley & Cox, 2007; Groom et al., 2015) are more likely to commit 
traffic violations. Results inconsistent with these findings have also been found. 
For example, Mäntylä, Karlsson, and Marklund (2009) explored the role of 
cognitive control in driving behaviour (also see Renner & Anderle, 2000). They 
measured participant’s performance on tasks requiring mental shifting, working 
memory updating, and response inhibition, as well as behaviour in a simulated 
driving scenario. Only the correlation between driving performance and working 
memory updating was found to be significant. However, compared to other 
studies, the participants in Mäntylä et al. (2009) had minimal driving experience, 
with only 4% of the sample holding a driving licence compared to 100% in Sani 
et al. (2017). 
To date there has only been one experiment investigating whether inhibition 
training could improve risky driving. Hatfield et al. (2018) compared 
performance (e.g., average speed) in a driving simulator scenario pre- and post-
training between a control group and a group that received inhibition training. 
The experimental group received five consecutive days of go/no-go training 
against a control group who received a filler task for the same amount of time.  
The inhibition task required participants to respond to images of computer-
generated junctions. In the experimental group, participants had to respond if it 
would be safe to turn right, and withhold a response if not safe to do so, while 
those in the control group had to press SAFE if they felt it would be safe to turn 
right, and to press ‘UNSAFE’ if they did not. Compared to the pre-training 
driving, the results showed there was little evidence of transfer, with no 
significant difference in driving behaviour between groups. However, there was 
a tendency for increase stopping at red traffic lights in the experimental group 




 CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
This introduction began by highlighting the dangers inherent in driving, 
specifically behaviour at traffic lights. We have seen how associatively-mediated 
behaviours play an important part in driving, and how traditional education-
based interventions have not addressed such associative processes. In terms 
of developing road safety-related interventions it is essential to explore the role 
of associative processes in the target behaviour. If associative learning supports 
the development of safe driving, then efforts should be made to enhance 
existing interventions. If, on the other hand, associative processes promote 
risky driving then a new type of intervention will be needed. Therefore, the initial 
focus of this thesis will be to develop a laboratory paradigm that allows for the 
exploration of associative learning based on the contingencies at UK traffic 
lights. Chapter 2 will build on the work of Bowditch et al. (2016) in doing this, 
with Chapters 3 and 4 developing the paradigm further to take into account the 
role of sequences and task sets experienced at traffic lights.  
The last empirical chapter of this thesis will consider the application of inhibition 
training to driving. The evidence presented here suggests that by changing the 
response associated with a cue (e.g., from go to stop) one can change 
behaviour (e.g., a reduction in eating of chocolate). In a similar vein as Hatfield 
et al. (2018), I wish to test if the associatively-mediated inhibition hypothesis 
can be applied to traffic lights: could response inhibition training reduce crossing 
of amber traffic lights? The development of this training will be informed by the 
results from the early chapters. Thus Chapter 5 will apply the associatively-
mediated inhibition hypothesis to a novel domain of human behaviour (driving) 




































2 CHAPTER 2 
ASSOCIATIVE PROCESSES I: BASIC CONTINGENCIES 
EXPERIENCED AT TRAFFIC LIGHTS 
s outlined in Chapter 1 there is a need to develop interventions that  
address what might be termed associatively learnt behaviours at traffic 
lights. However, exactly what is learnt at an associative level is yet to be 
established. This chapter explores the learning of contingencies experienced at 
traffic lights and what effect they might have on behaviour. Additionally, the final 
two experiments in the chapter investigate the influence of the effective 
outcome on the learning, both as an issue in its' own right, and as evidence that 
associative processes are producing the effects. 
 CONTINGENCIES AT TRAFFIC LIGHTS  
The UK traffic light signal changes from green to amber to indicate drivers 
should prepare to stop; then to red meaning stop; then to a conjunction of red 
and amber to tell drivers to get ready to start, and finally back to green (which, 
of course, means go). The rules governing the responses that should follow at 
each stage of this sequence are clearly laid out in the Highway Code, yet they 
are not always observed in practice. One possible reason for this not a 
deliberate lack of compliance on the part of the driver, but rather the effect that 
the experience of the contingencies which occur at traffic lights whilst driving 
will, in time, have on the individual. Could it be that the experience leads to 
learning that captures these contingencies via association, and this then leads 
to behaviour that does not respect the explicit rules that apply to these 
situations? In other words, does the combination of rules, signals and typical 
driving behaviour lead people to learn stimulus-response reactions that then 
quite naturally predispose them to break those same rules? Previous research 
exploring the contingencies between traffic lights and behaviour has focused on 
engineering solutions to bring about safer driving, from altering the timings of 
the light pattern (Jason, Neal, & Marinakis, 1985) to adding countdown timers to 
the traffic light sequence (Felicio, Grepo, Reyes, & Yupingkun, 2015). Other 
research has looked from the perspective of understanding how personal 




lights (Palat & Delhomme, 2016), rather than how experience of the 
contingencies between lights and responses may come to cue a certain 
behaviour. 
 LEARNING ABOUT AN OUTCOME 
Bowditch et al. (2016) provides a framework to explore the learning of 
contingencies. They developed an incidental go/no-go task, whereby shapes 
appeared in the middle of the screen followed by a circle on the left or right. If 
this circle was white participants had to respond, and if it was coloured 
participants had to withhold a response. While the shapes in the middle were 
predictive of the response required this was not revealed to participants, and as 
such, any learning about the shapes was hypothesised to be associatively 
driven (see Yeates, Jones, Wills, Aitken, & McLaren, 2013). In the training 
phase one shape was paired with stopping (75% stop) and another with going 
(25% stop), while at test all shapes were 50% stop. If participants were 
developing stimulus–response associations during training it would be expected 
that performance at test would differ for the two shapes, with the 75% stop 
shape having longer reaction times and less commission errors compared to 
the 25% go shape. Results supported this hypothesis, with significantly longer 
reaction times and marginally significantly less commission errors for the 75% 
stop shape than the 25% go shape. Thus, the study demonstrates how 
participants can learn the contingencies between shapes and stopping in a 
relatively quick and practicable experiment.  
Another feature of the experiment was the use of multiple stop signals. 
Analyses comparing performance with shapes paired with just one stop signal 
(that is one colour) against shapes paired with more than one coloured stop 
signal found enhanced learning in the multiple-signal group. That is, reducing 
the contingences between cues and specific signals resulted in more robust 
slowing of reaction times between stop and go cues. The authors argue that this 
enhancement was due to the development of cue–stop associations, rather 
than cue–signal associations, with the use of multiple-signals causing learning 
to shift to the consistent cue, rather than the inconsistent stop signal. The exact 
nature of the learning and the balance between a direct cue–stop association or 
an indirect cue-signal pathway is not the focus of this thesis (see Verbruggen, 
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McLaren, et al., 2014; Best et al., 2016). It is sufficient to note that the 
experiments in this, and subsequent, chapters will use multiple stop signals 
simply as a way of creating more effective learning, and thus clearer results (in 
terms of reaction times) between shapes with different contingencies.  
 PRESENT EXPERIMENTS 
The work by Bowditch et al. (2016) provides the departure point for this chapter. 
Their results showed that the incidental go/no-go task enabled the development 
of associative learning of the contingencies between cues and responses and, 
as such, is ideal for the exploration of contingency learning at traffic lights. As 
seen in Chapter 1, the framework by McLaren et al. (2019) hypothesises that 
when control is weak, underlying associative processes come to affect 
behaviour. Whilst, other work has shown that driving is cognitively demanding 
(Wadley et al., 2009). Therefore, it seems sensible to begin to understand the 
nature of associative learning at traffic lights. In the three experiments in this 
chapter I present an adapted version of the incidental go/no-go task, where 
arbitrary shapes are paired with various degrees of stopping to reflect the 
contingencies experienced at traffic lights. The experiments aimed to capture 
the contingencies between traffic light signals and the typical responses made 
to them in a task that superficially was quite unlike driving so as to be able to 
study them in a pure form, without the deployment of the rules used in driving. 
In summary, in this chapter I will investigate the effect that the contingencies 
experienced between traffic lights and permitted responses (stopping/starting) 
have upon driving behaviour.  
 EXPERIMENT 1 
To begin, it is necessary to decide what the contingencies experienced at UK 
traffic lights are. While a singleton green light (G) always means go and red (R) 
always means stop, the contingencies around red and amber (RA) and amber 
(A) are less clear. Taking amber first, while the Highway Code specifies that 
drivers should stop when they see this light, it is not always the case that a stop 
is required 100% of the time. The Highway Code allows drivers to go at amber 
lights if the stop line has already been crossed or if the driver is too near the 
stop line to stop safely. In practice, these provisions have afforded drivers some 
leeway and a solo amber light is not seen as a strong stop cue, with eight out of 
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ten drivers admitting to crossing amber lights, and nearly four out of ten drivers 
saying they rarely stop at amber lights (Thrifty, 2011). Accordingly, it could be 
argued that the Highway Code affords amber a fairly neutral contingency (and it 
is certainly experienced as such on the road), thus A will be treated as a 50% 
stop cue. In terms of red and amber lights in combination, while the Highway 
Code states that drivers should not cross the stop line while this light is 
showing, it is acceptable to get ready to move away, e.g., drivers might release 
their handbrake in order to move away when the green light shows. Therefore, 
to encompass this, RA will be a go cue rather than a stop cue. These 
contingencies mean that whilst red on its own signals stop, in conjunction with 
amber it cues readiness to start, while amber on its own is a neutral cue. 
Overall, ignoring the sequence information inherent in the typical experience of 
UK traffic lights, this leads to the following set of contingencies, where ‘+’ 
denotes ‘stop’, ‘±’ indicates ‘50/50 stop’, and ‘-’ denotes ‘go’, and R, A, and G 
stand for red, amber and green respectively: R+, G-, A±, RA-. 
As well as deciding the appropriate responses to each of the cues, the 
experiment needs to capture the task set drivers are experiencing at traffic 
lights. When approaching lights, drivers could be in either a ‘go’ task set - that 
is, looking for signals that indicate permission to continue - or in a ‘stop’ task 
set, looking for signals to stop. In line with the work by Bowditch (2016), 
Experiment 1 used a procedure that should cause stopping to be the effective 
outcome from what is learnt. It was felt that making the outcome stop rather 
than go better reflected drivers’ decision-making when approaching traffic lights, 
where one is looking for a stop signal in case the brake needs to be applied. 
Therefore, given that stop is the outcome and ‘+’ is typically used to denote the 
outcome of a task this means that ‘+’ will indicate a stop response and ‘-’ a go 
response. 
What would one expect to be learnt? Based on standard associative theories 
(for review see Pearce & Bouton, 2001) clearly cue R will become associated 
with stopping to some extent, and cue G with not stopping. The RA- 
contingency may tend to cause A± to become a go cue, while the A± 
contingency itself might promote a weak stop or go association to amber. 
Therefore, one question for Experiment 1 is: does experience of the 
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contingencies experienced at traffic lights while under a stop task set lead to 
amber becoming a stop or a go cue? 
 Method 
 Participants 
Fifty participants participated in exchange for payment of £5 or one course 
credit (see Results section for details on the outlier removal process). Of these 
50 participants, 41 were female with an overall mean age (with one missing 
data point) of 21.02 (SD = 5.43). The inclusion criteria were that participants 
had to be 18-65 years old, have normal or corrected vision, and not be colour 
blind. Given the use of mixed-effects models analysis, traditional power 
techniques were inappropriate (Johnson, Barry, Ferguson, & Müller, 2015). 
Therefore, the decision was made to use a sample size of 50 in line with similar 
past research (Bowditch et al., 2016). A post hoc power analysis using the R 
package SIMR (Green & MacLeod, 2016) found the study had a power of 
91.40% to detect a difference of 18ms between a go vs. stop cue, where a priori 
one would expect to find an effect. Specifically, this test was run on G vs. B, see 
section 2.4.1.2 for details.  
 Design 
The experiment used a within-participants design to compare performance to 
cues over time (see Table 2.1 for design1). Overall, there was 1 calibration 
block, 8 training blocks, and 2 test blocks with a 10 second break between each 
block.  
 
1 A comment on the notation used in Table 2.1 and throughout. The tables use 
+ and - to denote what type of response (go or stop) participants are most likely 
to make to a cue. Other notations were considered, such as subscript ‘g’ and ‘s’ 
or ‘go’ and 'stop’. However it was decided that using + and - to denote the 
required response best suited this work, given that + and - not only help to 
convey the appropriate response but also the task set of the experiment (as + is 
used to denote that the response to the cue is the desired outcome). As will be 
clear later, the task set and changes to it form a key part of the experimental 
design. Whilst the use of + and - means that in some experiments - represents 
going counter to normal expectations, this usefully serves to highlight the 




The task was designed to mimic the contingencies around traffic lights with cue 
G being a go cue (analogous to a green traffic light) and cue R being a stop cue 
(corresponding to a red traffic light). However, to reduce the likelihood of 
participants explicitly realising the relationship between cues and required 
responses (as I was interested in the associative learning arising from  
experience rather than rule-based performance), and to obtain commission 
data, cues G and R were not 100% go and stop respectively but rather set at 
75%. Cue A was designed to have contingencies equivalent to an amber traffic 
light and cue RA equalled a red/amber traffic light (i.e. a 75% go cue). Of 
course, this partial reinforcement, while helping to keep learning incidental, 
does affect the mapping of the task onto traffic lights as there are no instances 
where green traffic lights signal stop or red signals go (this issue is addressed in 
later chapters). Cues B, I, P, IP were control cues for G, R, A, RA respectively 
and were set at 50% stop. These cues were designed to provide a baseline to 
compare learning to the traffic light cues against. It is important to note that 
while the cue G was capturing the contingences experienced at a green traffic 
light, it did not in not in any way physically resemble a green traffic light (see 
Figure 2.1 for examples of this).   
Table 2.1. Summary of Experiment 1 design. Letters represent coloured cues. 
Trials were go 75% of the time (-), stop 75% of the time (+), or stop 50% of the 









Design   




Training 8 144 16 
 





Test 2 144 16 G, R, A, RA, B, I, P, IP J±  
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Figure 2.1. Traffic lights to cues in Experiment 1. This figure illustrates how 
each cue (and thus shape) represented a different traffic light but were not 
related visually to the traffic light in question. It also shows how RA combined 
both the cues R and A to form a compound cue. Traffic light images taken from 
The Highway Code. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open 














 Procedure  
The task required participants to press a key or to withhold a response 
depending on the colour of a presented circle stimulus (see Figure 2.2 for a trial 
schematic). Each trial started with two coloured shape cues being presented, 
one above the other, for 250ms, on a 50% grey background. Participants were 
informed that these cues indicated that the trial was beginning but, in fact, some 
of them were stochastically predictive of whether or not a response was 
required. Throughout the task a white horizontal bar measuring 19mm by 4mm 
was displayed in the centre of the screen. Coloured shape cues measuring 
19mm were presented in vertical alignment above and below and equidistant 
from this horizontal bar. The same seven coloured shape cues were used 
throughout the experiment and were randomly assigned to a cue for each 
participant. On single cue trials (e.g., G-) the cue appeared in both the top and 
bottom positions, while on compound trials (e.g., RA-) each cue was 
randomised to appear in either the top or bottom position. Following 
presentation of the cues on go trials, a 19mm diameter white circle appeared to 
the left or right of the central bar (separated by 22m edge-to-edge). This 
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indicated to participants that they needed to make a spatially congruent 
response, e.g., a left side response (‘x’ on a standard QWERTY keyboard) if a 
left-side circle was displayed (right-hand circles will require a ‘.>’ key press). On 
no-go trials the circle displayed was coloured, informing participants that they 
needed to withhold their response. For both singleton and compound cues the 
white circle appeared equally often on either side of the screen as did the four 
coloured circles used as stop signals. The colour of each cue and stop signal 
was randomised for each participant and sampled from the HSB colour-space 
(Joblove & Greenberg, 1978) by selecting equally spaced hues whilst 
constraining saturation (75-100%) and brightness (50-100%). The colour of the 
stop signals differed from those used in the cues.  
 
Figure 2.2. Schematic of a single cue stop trial for Experiment 1.  
Cue J was used for tracking purposes only, i.e. performance to this cue was 
used to set the response window duration. This tracking procedure for the task 
applied to both go and no-go trials involving the cue J and was a 3-down/1-up 
procedure (for similar procedures see Leiva et al., 2015; Elchlepp & 
Verbruggen, 2017), so that for every three correct trials the maximum response 
window (from signal onset, i.e. when a circle appeared) shortened by 50ms, 
whilst an error resulted in the window being increased by 50ms. The window 
started at 750ms and the calibration phase helped determine a reasonable 
starting window for each participant, with the maximum response window 
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capped at 2000ms, and the minimum 100ms. The tracking was applied to all 
blocks of the experiment. The idea was to ensure speeded responses 
throughout the experiment, and prevent people being too cautious because of 
the possibility of a no-go signal appearing. 
Participants received on-screen feedback to errors. For commission errors, 
regardless of congruency of response or incorrect keypress, the feedback was 
‘No response required!’. For omission errors participants received feedback of 
‘You should have responded’. On go trials participants received feedback on 
incorrect key presses (‘'Incorrect key pressed, use X or .>’) and wrong direction 
key presses (‘'Press the key that matches the side the white circle appears on'). 
All feedback was displayed for 500ms and accompanied with a 400Hz tone for 
150ms delivered through closed headphones. Participants received no 
feedback at the end of each block. There was a variable inter-trial interval of 
250ms to 500ms, throughout which the white bar remained on screen. As in 
Bowditch (2016) the experiment was designed so that participants’ focus was 
on stopping. This was achieved in two ways. Firstly, coloured circles were stop 
trials, with white (in some way the default colour) being go. Secondly, the 
instructions promoted going as the default by mentioning it first. These 
manipulations were designed to encourage people to be looking for coloured 
circles as a signal to stop, that is, to employ a stop task set (this is further 
discussed in Chapter 4). 
 Analysis 
Data was processed and analysed using R v.3.5.1 (R Core Team, 2018). Due 
to the need for participants to respond at least once per cue to obtain reaction 
time measurements, data was averaged for each cue by each block (data from 
the calibration block was not analysed) with reaction times on error trials being 
excluded. To prevent excessive data loss, trials immediately following an error 
trial were retained. As the focus of the experiment was on performance to each 
cue, rather than the development of learning over training, training data was 
further summarised into grand means per cue per participant. For test data, only 
the first test block was analysed following Bowditch et al.'s (2016) observation 
that extinction can be a problem if testing is overly prolonged. 
To take into account individual differences in reaction times and error rates, 
linear mixed-effects models were developed using lme4 (Bates, Mächler, 
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Bolker, & Walker, 2015). I used the Akaike Information Criterion Corrected 
(AICc; Akaike, 1974; Burnham & Anderson, 2002) to compare the models. The 
corrected criterion was used due to small sample size and so prevents 
overfitting of models. Model selection was undertaken by comparing the 
difference between AIC score of model i against the best model (the model with 
the lowest absolute AIC score), with a difference score greater than 2 indicating 
that difference was meaningful, and that the best model was the most 
appropriate (Burnham & Anderson, 2004). 
Homoscedasticity and normality of the residuals were explored using a 
graphical approach. Contrasts were corrected using a Bonferroni procedure 
(where the standard alpha level of .05 was divided by the number of test run; 
see Frane, 2015). Contrasts were undertaken by changing the baseline 
category of the chosen models. Using mixed-effects models, as opposed to 
standard pairwise comparisons, allows for data from all groups to be pooled and 
used to estimate the global variance, this can lead to be more powerful tests 
(reflected in the higher degrees of freedom; Harrison et al., 2018). To confirm 
that variances between cues were similar, and thus pooling variances was 
justified, I used the (conservative) criterion outlined in Fox (2008), where a ratio 
of less than 1:4 between the largest and smallest variance indicates 
comparable variance. In instances where the variance ratio for a measure was 
greater than 1:4 standard t-tests were conducted. It should be noted that due to 
the use of inverse gamma models for the analysis of commission errors the 
variances for these models are in fact the negative reciprocal of the original 
values (−1/μ) rather than the data presented in the descriptive statistics tables.  
Confidence intervals were calculated using the Wald method (for details see 
Pek & Wu, 2015). Conditional R2 values were estimated using the Nakagawa 
approach (Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013; Nakagawa, Johnson, & Schielzeth, 
2017). The significance of effects was assessed using through the lmerTest 
package (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2016).  
Outlier replacement was undertaken with a view to removing atypical responses 
while maximising power and efficient use of resources. To this end, the process 
for identifying outliers for reaction times and commission and omission errors 
was different. For commission and omission errors (which represent failures to 
perform the task) participants with errors greater than two whiskers (i.e. 
65 
 
1.5IQR*2 = an IQR of 3) from the upper and lower quartiles were replaced. This 
process was undertaken until there were no outliers for these two measures. In 
Experiment 1 six participants were replaced, five for having high omission 
errors, and one for having high commission errors. For reaction times a more 
nuanced approach was undertaken, using a combination of a priori screening 
followed by model criticism of the mixed-effect models (see Baayen & Milin, 
2010). This approach was used because long reaction times do not necessarily 
indicate lack of engagement with the task, or failure to understand the task, but 
could be due other factors such as age (Der & Deary, 2006). Furthermore, the 
experiments here are concerned with differences between cues rather than 
overall reaction times. Initially, reaction time data was screened for participants 
with response times greater than two whiskers (i.e. 1.5IQR*2 = an IQR of 3) 
from the upper and lower quartiles with these participants being replaced. Box-
and-whisker plots were then run on this new sample. Any participants that 
would have also been outliers in the original sample were replaced, while 
participants that were outliers in the new sample but would have not been in the 
original sample were retained. Next, I used the sigtest function in the 
influence.ME package (Nieuwenhuis, te Grotenhuis, & Pelzer, 2012) to assess 
if the presence of these ‘sub’ outliers influenced the results of the mixed effects 
models. In this case the single ‘sub’ outlier present in reaction time data did not 
significantly influence the results and so full models are reported for Experiment 
1. 
Due to non-normal data, commission errors were analysed using a Gamma 
model through the glmmTMB package (Brooks et al., 2017). These models 
were performed using the standard inverse links and model the negative 
reciprocal of the mean, i.e. −1/μ (where μ is the expected mean). As the data 
included 0, prior to analysis the data transformation (y * (n − 1) + 0.5)/n was 
applied, where y was commission errors and n the sample size (Smithson & 
Verkuilen, 2006; Cribari-Neto & Zeileis, 2010). Transformed data is reported 
throughout. For reaction times, Cohen’s d was calculated using the lme.dscore 
function in the EMAtools package (Kleiman, 2017). Due to the models used it 




I first present a model comparing G vs. B performance to show that the task is 
experienced as expected (i.e. as a manipulation check), followed by the key 
‘traffic light’ contrasts: A vs. an average of I and P (hence-forth referred to as 
I/P), R vs. I/P, and RA vs IP. Omission data is presented but not analysed as 
due to the low error rate any conclusions drawn are likely to be spurious. As the 
G vs. B contrast was the manipulation check, the standard alpha level was 
used. For the other contrasts, to control for multiple comparisons, the alpha 
level was corrected to 0.017 (for means see Table 2.2). As I averaged cue’s I 
and P this meant that the models I ran included the variance of cue I, cue P and 
cue I/P. To correct for this, cues I and P were removed from the models and 




















Phase Reaction Time p(respond) p(miss) 
Training Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
A-/+ 371.75 54.22 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
B-/+ 372.24 51.66 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
G- 367.85 53.20 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
I-/+ 372.75 51.17 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 
IP-/+ 376.50 54.66 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
J± 370.82 51.39 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
P-/+ 375.23 55.96 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
R+ 370.10 46.34 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
RA- 373.29 50.87 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
       
Test       
A 375.99 68.61 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 
B 383.94 68.26 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 
G 366.38 62.28 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
I 384.59 71.30 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 
IP 390.36 79.90 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 
J 374.19 54.71 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 
P 383.25 88.06 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
R 375.36 57.20 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 
RA 378.58 64.97 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics for Experiment 1. Reaction time means are 
calculated using raw data, but mean p(respond) and p(miss) use transformed 
data.  
 Reaction times  
For the training data, the best fitting model (see Table 2.3) was a model that 
included the main effects of cue with random intercepts (conditional R2 = 0.95). 
The G vs. B contrast approached significance, t(343) = 1.91, p = .057, 95% CI [-
0.12, 8.90], d = 0.21. The difference between R vs. I/P was marginally 
significant at a standard alpha level, t(343) = 1.69, p = .092, 95% CI [-0.62, 
8.41], d = 0.18, hinting at a trend for R to have faster responses to than I/P, 
suggesting R was a go cue. The A vs. I/P contrast was not significant, t(343) = 
0.97, p = .330, 95% CI [-2.27, 6.76], d = 0.11. The contrast between RA and IP 
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was non-significant, t(343) = 1.39, p = .164, 95% CI [-1.30, 7.72], d = 0.15. The 
results suggest that participants were not particularly successful at learning the 
contingencies related to the cues, but there is some evidence of learning as the 
G vs. B contrast would be significant using a one-tailed test.  
At test, the best fitting model was the main effects of cue with random intercepts 
(conditional R2 = 0.78). The G vs. B contrast was now significant, t(343) = 2.77, 
p = .006, 95% CI [5.14, 29.98], d  = 0.30, with faster reaction times to G 
suggesting that by the end of training some learning of the contingencies had 
taken place. The A vs. I/P contrast was not significant, t(343) = 1.25, p = .212, 
95% CI [-4.49, 20.35], d = 0.14. The R vs. I/P contrast was also not significant, 
t(343) = 1.35, p = .178, 95% CI [-3.86, 20.98], d = 0.15. The contrast between 
RA and IP was marginally significant at the standard alpha level, t(343) = 1.86, 
p = .064, 95% CI [-0.64, 24.20], d = 0.20, with faster reaction times to RA than 
IP, suggesting that RA was a go cue at test.  
 p(respond) 
Training data models were run with a Gamma family to better fit the shape of 
the data. The final model (see Table 2.3) was a model with a Gamma family 
and inverse link and included the main effects of cue with random intercepts. 
Currently, it is not possible to calculate R2 for such models. The G vs. B 
contrast was marginally significant at the standard alpha level, z = 1.69, p = 
.091, suggesting that this difference was not learnt well during training. The A 
vs. I/P contrast was not significant, z = 0.37, p = .714. The R vs. I/P contrast 
was also not significant, z = 0.12, p = .901. The RA vs. IP contrast was not 
significant, z = 0.87, p = .383. Overall, it seems that learning was weak for this 
measure at training.  
At test, the G vs. B contrast was significant, z = -3.52, p = < .001. However, the 
results were not in the expected direction with significantly more errors for cue B 
(a 50% go cue) than cue G (a 75% go cue). The A vs. I/P contrast was not 
significant at the reduced alpha, z = -2.21, p = .027, though there was a trend 
for more errors for I/P than A, tentatively suggesting that A was something of a 
stop cue. The R vs. I/P contrast was also not significant at the corrected alpha 
level, z = 2.05, p = .040, though there was a trend for more commission errors 
to R than I/P, suggesting R was a go cue. The RA vs. IP contrast was not 




In summary, the reaction time data for Experiment 1 supports past work in 
demonstrating how pairing a stimulus to a go response (cue G) can lead to 
faster reaction times than to a stimulus associated with stopping (cue B), with 
significant differences at test for reaction times. However, for p(respond) at test 
the direction of the effect is unexpectedly reversed, with significantly more 
errors for B than G, suggesting that cue B primed a go response more than cue 
G for this measure. Given this, I cannot unequivocally say that I have 
demonstrated learning of the contingencies implemented in the design. This is 
an interesting finding in terms of the wider literature, yet, as discussed below, 
this finding is likely explained by reference to the experimental design as 
opposed to providing evidence against associatively-mediated learning in such 
tasks.   
The learning to the cues A and R is not overly clear. The fact that there were no 
significant reaction time contrasts does indicate that learning was weak with 
Model Training Test 
Reaction time models   
Main effects of cue 4305.68 4505.84 










Main effects of cue with Gamma family and 
inverse link and random intercept 
-2769.68 -2631.96 
Table 2.3. AICc scores for models run for Experiment 1 on reaction time and 
p(respond) data at training and test. Bold are the models chosen. Note that for 
both DVs the models with main effects of cue with random intercept and 




regards to response times, yet the marginally significant (at a standard alpha 
level) contrast for R vs. I/P does present a slight trend for participants 
expressing cue R was a go cue in training. For commission errors, only results 
at test suggested any (weak) learning to the cues, and at face value the 
marginally significant results suggest a weak trend for cue A to prime a stop 
response (having more errors than cue I/P), and for cue R to promote a go 
response (with R having more errors than I/P). On their own these results would 
be troubling, with people learning at an associative level that R is a go cue! 
However, there are strong reasons to assume that there are issues with the 
experimental design which question the internal validity of the experiment. 
There is a large body of evidence suggesting that participants can learn 
incidentally about the contingencies linked to cues (Best et al., 2016; Bowditch 
et al., 2016). However, this does not seem to be the case here, with cue B (a 
50% stop cue) having more errors at test than cue G (a 75% go cue). Appealing 
to Occam's razor it seems the experiment is not being experienced in the 
manner expected. One suggested reason behind these findings is that the 
design is flawed. While the design mimicked the contingences of traffic lights, 
the control cues (B, I, IP, P) did not balance the contingencies implemented by 
the traffic light cues, and so the overall experimental design means that 
participants were more likely to ‘go’ than to ‘stop’. While there were two go 
cues, there was only one outright stop cue with the rest being 50/50. This might 
have led people to feel the task was pushing them to respond, while the task 
outcome was in fact geared to stopping – this could explain the unusual results.  
 EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 1 was the first attempt, as far as I am aware, to investigate the 
learning that occurs incidentally at UK traffic lights. However, there are two 
issues to note. Firstly, as discussed above, there was the unbalanced design. In 
Experiment 2 a slight change to the contingencies associated with the control 
cues rectified this issue (see Table 2.4) so that the overall incidence of stopping 
was now 50%. The second issue to address is the assertion that participants 
are learning to stop with this being the outcome. This issue arises from the fact 
that when one describes a design as R+ and RA-, the designation of what is + 
and what is - is to some extent arbitrary. One may have a particular outcome in 
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mind that is labelled +, but is this the psychologically real outcome experienced 
by people doing the task? To investigate this, it is possible to make use of the 
feature-positive effect (Lotz, Uengoer, Koenig, Pearce, & Lachnit, 2012) to 
confirm that stopping was the outcome. This is the effect that learning is 
generally faster to excitatory than inhibitory cues. Thus, according to Rescorla 
and Wagner (1972), a discrimination between X and XY is easier to solve if XY 
denotes the presence of an outcome, i.e. X-, XY+; rather than if the compound 
denotes the absence of an outcome, X+, XY-. This is because the first, feature-
positive discrimination, requires the simultaneous excitatory learning to Y and 
the extinction of X, whereas the second, feature-negative discrimination 
requires a participant to first learn that X is an excitatory cue before learning 
that Y is an inhibitor, which takes longer. The feature-positive effect is robust, 
being found in pigeons (Jenkins & Sainsbury, 1970), rats (Reberg & Leclerc, 
1977), honey bees (Abramson et al., 2013) and humans (Newman, Wolff, & 
Hearst, 1980; Richardson & Massel, 1982). The effect can also be found when 
comparing a difference in magnitude of an outcome rather than its presence or 
absence (Todd, Winterbauer, & Bouton, 2010). 
A key piece of evidence for the feature-positive effect in humans comes from 
Lotz et al. (2012). This was the first experimental evidence that the effect could 
be found in humans using simple discriminations (i.e. similar to the current 
procedure) rather than complex discriminations used previously (see Newman 
et al., 1980). The Lotz experiments entailed participants completing a predictive 
learning task in which they were shown a letter or pairs of letters and asked to 
respond if they thought a green circle would follow, or not respond if they 
thought the circle would not be presented. In support of the feature-positive 
effect, participants were able to learn that the presence of another letter (AB) 
compared to a single letter (A) predicted the occurance of a green circle better 
than when the presence of another letter predicted the absence of the outcome.  
Crucially, it is possible to use this effect to learn what the outcome of a task is. If 
the outcome of a task is stop (+), then the discrimination between cues that 
signal an outcome X- vs. XY+ (a feature-positive discrimination) will be acquired 
more readily than a discrimination which signals absence of an outcome C+ vs. 
CD- (a feature-negative discrimination). If, instead, the effective outcome is 
going, then the C vs. CD discrimination should be learnt faster than X vs. XY, 
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because the former is now the feature-positive discrimination, i.e. C-, CD+, 
where + now denotes go. Using this logic, Bowditch (2016) was able to provide 
good evidence that using similar procedures to the ones presented here, 
participants were in fact looking for occasions when they needed to stop, with 
this being the outcome. The technique used by Bowditch was to compare the 
rate of acquisition of the two discriminations, and then use this to diagnose 
which was the feature positive discrimination, and hence deduce what was the 
effective outcome. Bowditch based his claim that stop was the effective 
outcome on the fact that a discrimination, X-, XY+, where + denotes stopping, 
was learnt significantly faster than another discrimination, C+, CD-, which, with 
this notation, is the standard feature-positive effect. 
Noting that in Experiment 1 + represented stop, the pair R+, RA- is a feature-
negative pair (if one ignores A±), thus in order to replicate the analysis 
implemented by Bowditch to assay the task outcome a feature-positive 
discrimination pair is needed, therefore I±, IP± becomes I-, IP+, a feature-
positive discrimination if the outcome is indeed stop. If stop is the outcome then 
this new pair should be learnt more readily than R+, RA-. To equate conditions 
more precisely, I also include P± to allow for A±. This helps the design to be 
more balanced and allows me to assay the effective outcome using these 
procedures. 
Of course, the discriminations present in the current design vary somewhat from 
the feature-positive discrimination described in Lotz et al. (2012). In the Lotz 
experiments (as is typical in the feature-positive literature) the compound cue is 
never seen separately, that is, participants never experience each part of the 
compound cue independently. In contrast, in the design employed here, the A in 
RA is experienced as a separate cue (as is cue R). The discrimination therefore 
is not R- RA+ but rather R- A± RA+, and thus is not a true feature-positive 
discrimination. Of course, it may be that cue A± (which is a 50/50 cue) does not 
convey any response tendency and is therefore irrelevant to the discrimination. 
In which case the discriminations become more like the traditional feature-
positive discrimination. 
However, given that the experiments (through the instructions) assume a 
certain task set it could be that cues come to be learnt as holding percentage 
outcomes. By this I mean that, if the outcome is stop, cue A will not be seen as 
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a 50/50 cue, but rather as a 50% stop cue. In these circumstances, the 
discriminations can be solved without reference to the feature-positive effect. 
The expected difficultly of learning a ‘feature-negative discrimination’ could arise 
from the fact that it requires configuration. Focusing on the R- RA+ 
discrimination, it involves cue R (a 75% stop cue), A (a 50% stop cue), and RA 
(a 25% stop cue). Therefore, combining R and A (both cues with moderate stop 
tendencies) leads to a cue (RA) that has weaker stop tendencies. In this 
instance the logic of Rescorla and Wagner (1972) does not hold, as R and A 
cannot easily summate to a weaker contingency. Therefore, to solve this 
discrimination participants would need to form a configural unit of RA. Such 
configuration is resource intensive and thus necessarily slow (Sutherland & 
Rudy, 1989). Conversely, the feature-positive discrimination does not require 
configuration. This is because the two stop cues summate to a greater stop cue, 
with cue I (a 25% stop cue) and cue P (a 50% stop cue) summating to IP (a 
75% stop cue). Therefore, the feature-positive discriminations can be learnt 
though the logic of Rescorla and Wagner (1972), a quicker process when 
compared to the ‘feature-negative discrimination’. 
Ultimately, the experiments were not designed to provide evidence for or 
against competing learning accounts. However, it is assumed that participants 
come to learn both excitatory and inhibitory responses in the experiments (see 
section 2.8.1 for further). In this case, 50% cues (e.g., cue A or cue P) will not 
be seen as cuing 50% of a specific outcome but will be seen as 50/50 neutral 
cues - being equally likely to cue either outcome. Such learning could result in 
the 50/50 cues being somewhat irrelevant to the discriminations and so the 
discriminations come to be experienced in the tradition of a feature-positive 
discrimination design. As such, language appropriate to the feature-positive 
model will be used throughout. Yet the discussion above should serve to 
highlight that that other explanations could be generated to explain the 
witnessed learning.  
 Method 
 Participants 
Fifty-five participants participated in exchange for payment of £5 or one course 
credit (see Results section for details on the outlier removal process). Of these 
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55 participants, 41 were female with an overall mean age of 19.84 (SD = 3.47). 
The inclusion criteria and outlier removal process were identical to those used 
in Experiment 1. A power analysis using SIMR (Green & MacLeod, 2016) 
indicated that a sample size of 55 would give sufficient power (96.80%) to 
detect a 18ms difference in reaction times between a go vs. stop cue in test 
block 1, where a priori one would expect to find an effect. Specifically, this test 
was run on G vs. B, see section 2.5.1.2 for details. 
 Design  
A number of changes were made to the design (see Table 2.4 for summary of 
the experimental design), 1) B± became B+ to reduce the tendency to go to this 
cue, and 2) I±, IP± became I-, IP+, and thus a feature-positive discrimination.  
  Procedure  
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1.   
 Analysis 
The data was processed and analysed as described in Experiment 1. Six 
participants were replaced for having high mean omission errors. There were no 
outliers for commission errors. As with Experiment 1 there was one ‘sub’ outlier 
in the reaction time data, but this did not significantly affect the results and so 







Design   
Calibration 1 48 48  J±  
Training 8 144 16 
 
G-, R+, A±, RA-, B+, I-, P±, IP+ 
 
J±  
Test 2 144 16 G, R, A, RA, B, I, P, IP J±  
Table 2.4. Summary of Experiment 2 design. Letters represent coloured cues. 
Trials were go 75% of the time (-), stop 75% of the time (+), or stop 50% of the 




out the overall design rather than act as baseline cues the previous analyses 
are no longer appropriate. Therefore, a different set of contrasts were 
conducted. I still conducted the G vs. B contrast (which is still the manipulation 
check, but I then performed contrasts aimed at understanding to what extent 
cues A and R primed going or stopping. Thus, the key ‘traffic light’ contrasts 
are: A vs. B, A vs. G, A vs. R, R vs. B and R vs. G. These will be presented in 
text if significant or informative. Once again, omission data is presented but not 
analysed due to the low error rate. This time the standard alpha level was used 
for the G vs. B contrast and a corrected alpha level of .010 was used for all 
other ‘traffic light’ contrasts (for means see Table 2.5). To analyse the feature 
positive effect, paired t-tests comparing the differences between the feature-
positive and feature-negative contrasts were also conducted. In this instance 
due to the assumed outcome being stop, R+ RA- is the feature negative 
contrast, with I- IP+ being the feature positive contrast. As these tests were 
also, in effect, a manipulation check, a standard alpha level was used. It should 
also be noted that t-tests rather than multilevel modelling were used for these 
















Phase Reaction Time p(respond) p(miss) 
Training Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
A-/+ 385.95 42.79 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
B+ 392.57 43.26 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
G- 378.19 38.38 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 
I- 383.47 41.52 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
IP+ 394.27 48.1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
J± 385.01 40.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
P-/+ 389.99 40.28 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
R+ 389.77 42.94 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
RA- 390.91 39.9 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 
       
Test       
A 392.47 70.06 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 
B 412.14 65.79 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 
G 394.40 61.35 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
I 382.25 55.88 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 
IP 401.15 54.7 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 
J 400.04 59.46 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
P 404.69 73.9 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 
R 401.45 62.91 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 
RA 400.45 54.4 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Table 2.5. Descriptive statistics for Experiment 2. Reaction time means are 
calculated using raw data, but mean p(respond) and p(miss) use transformed 
data.  
 Reaction times  
For training data, the best fitting model (see Table 2.6) was one that included 
the main effects of cue with random intercepts (conditional R2 = 0.91). The G vs. 
B contrast was highly significant, t(432) = 5.86, p = < .001, 95% CI [9.57, 
19.19], d = 0.56, with G being faster than B, thus confirming that participants 
were learning the contingencies present in the design. In terms of the 
experimental contrasts, A vs. B was significant, t(432) = 2.70, p = .007, 95% CI 
[1.81, 11.43], d = 0.26, with faster responses to cue A. The contrast A vs. G 
was also significant, t(432) = -3.16, p = .002, 95% CI [-12.57, -2.95], d = -0.30, 
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with slower responses to cue A. These results suggest that while cue A was 
more of a go cue than B, it was not such a strong go cue as G and thus neutral 
overall. The contrast for A vs. R was non-significant, t(432) = 1.56, p = .120, 
95% CI [-0.99, 8.64], d = 0.15. In terms of the R contrasts, the R vs. B contrast 
was not significant, t(432) = 1.14, p = .255, 95% CI [-2.01, 7.61], d = 0.11, 
though the R vs. G contrast was significant, t(432) = -4.72, p = < .001, 95% CI [-
16.39, -6.77], d = -0.45, with responding in the presence of R being slower. This 
pattern of results suggests that cue R was overall a stop cue, or at least 
certainly not a go cue. There was a significant positive difference between the 
differences of IP+ vs. I- (M = 10.80, SD = 19.65) and R+ vs. RA- (M = -1.14, SD 
= 18.20), t(54) = 3.23, p = .002, 95% CI [4.54, 19.35], d = 0.44, confirming that 
the feature-positive discrimination was easier to acquire than the feature-
negative discrimination, if the effective outcome of the task is taken to be stop. 
To put this another way, the significant feature-positive effect in the data 
confirms that the effective outcome was stop. 
At test, the best model was one that included the main effects of cue with 
random intercepts (conditional R2 = 0.66). The G vs. B contrast was again 
significant, t(432) = 2.54, p = .011, 95% CI [4.05, 31.45], d = 0.24, confirming 
that the participants had learnt about the contingencies in the experiment. In 
terms of the experimental contrasts, A vs. B was significant, t(432) = 2.81, p = 
.005, 95% CI [5.98, 33.38], d = 0.27, with faster responses in the presence of 
cue A indicating that cue A primed a go response. The A vs. G contrast was not 
significant, t(432) = 0.28, p = .783, 95% CI [-11.77, 15.63], d = 0.03. The A vs. 
R contrast was non-significant, t(432) = 1.29, p = .200, 95% CI [-4.72, 22.69], d 
= 0.12. For the contrasts against R, R vs. B was not significant, t(432) = 1.53, p 
= .127, 95% CI [-3.01, 24.39], d = 0.15. The R vs. G contrast was also non-
significant, t(432) = -1.01, p = .313, 95% CI [-20.76, 6.64], d = -0.10. There was 
a marginally significant difference (at a standard alpha level) between the 
differences of IP+ vs. I- (M = 18.90, SD = 41.13) and R+ vs. RA- (M = 1.01, SD 
= 57.59), t(54) = 1.78, p = .081, 95% CI [-2.28, 38.08], d = 0.24, reinforcing the 






For commission data I used Gamma models to analyse the results (see Table 
2.6 for best fitting model). The G vs. B contrast was significant, z = 3.88, p = < 
.001, with more errors for cue G, thus confirming that participants were learning 
the contingencies present in the design (as they were more likely to go if G was 
presented). The A vs. B contrast was not significant, z = 1.37, p = .166, nor was 
the A vs. R contrast, z = 1.24, p = .215. However, the A vs. G contrast was 
significant, z = -2.60, p = .009, with more errors for cue G, suggesting that A 
was not a strong go cue. Focusing on the R contrast, R vs. B was not 
significant, z = 0.15, p = .881, yet the R vs. G contrast was, z = -3.75, p = < 
.001, with more errors for G than R, suggesting that R was not a go cue and 
overall seems to be rather like B on this measure. There was no significant 
difference between the differences of IP+ vs. I- (M = -0.003, SD = 0.02) and R+ 
vs. RA- (-0.004, SD = 0.02), t(54) = 0.29, p = .773, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.01], d = 
0.04, and the direction of the effect was not in line with the hypothesis. 
Model Training Test 
Reaction time models   
Main effects of cue 5116.26 5508.14 










Main effects of cue with Gamma family and 
inverse link and random intercept 
-3545.54 -3447.99 
Table 2.6. AICc scores for models run for Experiment 2 on reaction time and 
p(respond) data at training and test. Bold are the models chosen. Note that for 
both DVs the models with main effects of cue with random intercept and 




However, the difference was not significant, and the effect size was small. For 
clarity it should be noted that for p(respond) the contest IP+ vs. I- is expected to 
be negative (i.e. more errors for I than IP) as is R + vs. RA- (i.e. more errors for 
RA than R). Thus, if the difference, in terms of its absolute size, is bigger for IP+ 
vs. I-, then the t statistic will be negative. However, it was positive which means 
that the difference between R+ vs. RA was the bigger.  
For test, the G vs. B contrast was not significant, z = 1.34, p = .180. The A vs. B 
contrast was significant, z = 3.18, p = .002, with more errors for A than B, 
indicating that compared to B, cue A was a go cue. The A vs. G contrast was 
not significant at the reduced alpha, z = 1.97, p = .049, although there is a trend 
for more errors to cue A than G, suggesting that cue A was more of a go cue 
than G. The A vs. R contrast was not significant, z = -0.76, p = .446. Focusing 
on cue R, the R vs. B contrast was significant, z = 3.78, p = < .001, with more 
errors for R than B, suggesting that cue R was experienced as more of a go cue 
than B. The R vs. G contrast was also significant, z = 2.65, p = .008, with, 
unexpectedly, more errors for R than G. This suggests that cue R was a strong 
go cue, more so than the 75% go cue. There was no significant difference 
between the differences of IP+ vs. I- (M = 0.004, SD = 0.04) and R+ vs. RA- 
(0.007, SD = 0.04), t(54) = -0.28, p = .784, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.01], d = -0.04, with 
I- and R+ showing greater learning in their pairs.  
 Summary 
Experiment 2 found compelling evidence that participants were learning that G 
was a go cue and cue B a stop cue, giving confidence that participants were 
experiencing and learning from the incidental go/no-go task as expected. This 
contrasts with the mixed results in Experiment 1 and suggests that those 
findings were due to that particular experimental design. 
In terms of the learning of the traffic light contingencies, there is some evidence 
that cue A was priming a weak go response. During training for reaction times, it 
was significantly slower than G, but significantly faster than B. Regarding 
commission errors during training, there was a significant difference between A 
and G (with more errors for G) and a non-significant difference between cue A 
and B (though A had numerically more errors). At test, cue A had significantly 
faster responses than cue B, and there were also significantly more errors for A 
than for B, which is consistent with a tendency to want to respond to A rather 
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than withhold a response (indeed, the contrast for A vs. G was not significant at 
the correct alpha for each measure at test, with cue A having numerical faster 
reaction times and more errors than G). So, in training cue A seems to be less 
go than cue G, but certainly not stop, while at test cue A is numerically more go 
then G. Looking at cue R, at training it seemed rather like cue B. The cue was 
significantly slower than G (like B), and not significantly faster to B, though 
numerically cue B seemed to prime more of a stop response. There were 
significantly fewer errors for R than for G, and the mean errors were identical for 
R and B. At test, it did not differ from B (or G this time) in terms of response 
times, with a mean reaction time midway between the two, but there were 
significantly more errors made to R than to both B and G. There is evidence that 
cue R was promoting a going response to some extent in the p(respond) data 
for test, but otherwise it is best described as a weak stop cue. The contrasts 
between cues A and R were never significant, and that though cue A seemed to 
prime a go response and cue R stopping, it should be noted that going and 
stopping are relative terms. 
The results regarding cue R do suggest that in a stop task set red traffic lights 
only become associated with a weak stop response. Considering that the task 
has stopping as the effective outcome, this result is rather surprising. One might 
think that when the default is to go, and one is looking out for a stop signal this 
is when learning about red will be optimal, but the evidence suggests that this is 
not necessarily the case. This is certainly an avenue worth further exploration 
as it indicates that the contingences of UK traffic lights prevent strong learning 
of stop cues, at least in a stop task set. 
The significant feature-positive effect found in the reaction time training data 
(and the marginally significant result at test for reaction times) supports the idea 
that the effective outcome is stop as a result of the manipulation of task set. 
Following Bowditch (2016), it is believed that the task instructions and the use 
of a number of differing coloured stop signals are what promote this task set, 
and result in the feature-positive discrimination based on the outcome being 
stop being learnt more easily than the feature negative. The obvious test of this 
proposition is to change task set by changing these parameters, and that is one 
purpose of the next experiment. In both Experiments 1 and 2 stopping was the 
designated task outcome as this was felt to be the more plausible scenario in 
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modelling behaviour approaching traffic lights. However, there is a case to be 
made that the other task set which has going as the effective outcome also 
plays a role in driving behaviour. If the driver is stationary at the lights, then they 
will be looking for a go signal. Accordingly, this situation was explored in 
Experiment 3. 
 EXPERIMENT 3 
The purpose of this experiment was firstly to demonstrate that it was possible to 
manipulate the effective outcome during training, (i.e. go vs. stop), thus 
confirming that the technique used to achieve this was valid. Secondly, to see 
what effect this change of task set, to one where the effective outcome was 
going, had on learning based on experience. In order to change the focus of 
participants from a stop to a go task set two changes were made following 
Bowditch (2016): 
1) the go/no-go signals were reversed, with coloured circles now being go 
signals and white circles being stop signals, and 
2) the order of the instructions was changed so that stopping was mentioned 
first (making it the ‘default’ behaviour).  
The net effect of these changes should be to change the participant’s task set 
from learning when to stop, to learning when to respond.  
 Method 
 Participants 
The sample size, payment, and inclusion criteria and outlier removal process 
were the same as Experiment 2 (see Results section for details of those 
removed). Of the final sample, 38 were female, with an overall mean age of 
21.29 (SD = 6.38). 
 Design  
The design was similar to Experiment 2. However, as going was expected to be 
the effective outcome, + was now go rather than stop, and this is reflected in the 
summary of the design in Table 2.7. 
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Table 2.7. Summary of Experiment 3 design. Letters represent coloured cues. 
Trials were go 75% of the time (+), stop 75% of the time (-), or stop 50% of the 
time (±). At test all trials were 50% stop and so the cues were now non-
predictive. 
 Procedure  
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 2, except for the two changes 
made to shift the demands of the task from looking to stop to looking to 
respond. Coloured circles now required a go response and white circles 
required a stop response – so that the singleton colour was now a stop 
response. The order of instructions was changed so that stopping was 
mentioned first (making it the default) and responding second.     
 Analysis 
The analysis followed the same approach as in Experiment 2. For Experiment 
3, four participants were replaced: three for having high mean omission errors 
and one for withdrawing from the experiment. There were no outliers for 
commission errors or reaction times. As in Experiment 2 paired t-tests were run 
to analyse the feature positive effect. In Experiment 3 due to the assumed 
outcome being go, R- RA+ is the feature positive contrast, with I+ IP- being the 
feature negative contrast (for means see Table 2.8). The standard alpha level 
was used for the G vs. B contrasts and for the feature-positive contrasts, with a 









Design   




Training 8 144 16 G+, R-, A±, RA+, B-, I+, P±, 
IP- 
J±  
Test 2 144 16 G, R, A, RA, B, I, P, IP J±  
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Phase Reaction Time p(respond) p(miss) 
Training Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
A-/+ 405.61 39.87 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
B- 411.47 39.56 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
G+ 397.06 36.40 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
I+ 403.00 39.22 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
IP- 408.04 42.49 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
J± 400.53 37.29 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
P-/+ 407.73 38.44 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
R- 408.64 42.68 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
RA+ 401.95 40.11 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
       
Test       
A 408.79 58.66 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 
B 414.91 74.26 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 
G 409.33 70.58 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 
I 399.43 55.56 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 
IP 412.37 69.64 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
J 404.22 54.51 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 
P 401.03 58.81 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 
R 407.09 60.84 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 
RA 407.55 63.62 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.02 
Table 2.8. Descriptive statistics for Experiment 3. Reaction time means are 
calculated using raw data, but mean p(respond) and p(miss) use transformed 
data.  
 Reaction times 
For the training data, the best fitting model (see Table 2.9) had a conditional R2 
of 0.88. The G vs. B contrast was highly significant, t(432) = 5.44, p = < .001, 
95% CI [9.22, 19.59], d = 0.52, with faster responses for cue G, thus confirming 
that participants were learning the contingencies present in the design. In terms 
of the experimental contrasts, A vs. B was not significant at the reduced alpha, 
t(432) = 2.21, p = .027, 95% CI [0.67, 11.05], d = 0.21, but hints at participants 
experiencing cue A as distinct from cue B, i.e. not a strong stop cue. The 
contrast A vs. G was significant, t(432) = -3.23, p = .001, 95% CI [-13.73, -3.36], 
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d = -0.31, with faster responses for cue G, indicating that cue A was not 
experienced as a strong go cue. The A vs. R contrast was not significant, t(432) 
= 1.15, p = .218, 95% CI [-2.15, 8.22], d = 0.11. In terms of the R contrasts, the 
R vs. B contrast was not significant, t(432) = 1.07, p = .286, 95% CI [-2.36, 
8.01], d = 0.10, and the R vs. G contrast was significant, t(432) = -4.38, p = < 
.001, 95% CI [-16.77, -6.40], d = -0.42. This indicates that cue R was not seen 
as a go cue, with slower responses than cue G (a 75% cue go). The difference 
between R- vs. RA+ (M = 6.70, SD = 24.37) and IP- vs. I+ (M = 5.04, SD = 
21.39) was non-significant (but numerically in the right direction for a feature-
positive advantage), t(54) = 0.38, p = .707, 95% CI [-7.16, 10.47], d = 0.05.  
At test, the best model was one that included the main effects of cue with 
random intercepts (conditional R2 = 0.64). The G vs. B contrast was not 
significant, t(432) = 0.77, p = .439, 95% CI [-8.53, 19.68], d = 0.07. None of the 
other contrasts were significant either (see Appendix A for full results).  
 p(respond) 
In the best fitting Gamma model (see Table 2.9), the G vs. B contrast was on 
the threshold of significance, z = 2.56, p = .010, suggesting that learning was 
occurring as expected, with more errors for cue G than cue B. The A vs. G 
contrast was marginally significant at the standard alpha level, z = -1.85, p = 
.064, and hints at a trend for more errors to G than A, suggesting that A was not 
a strong go cue and supports the findings in response times. The A vs. B 
contrast was not significant, z = 0.75, p = .453, nor was the A vs. R contrast, z = 
1.05, p = .293. Focusing on the R cues, the R vs. B contrast was not significant, 
z = -0.30, p = .763. Yet, the R vs. G contrast was significant, z = -2.84, p = .004, 
with more errors for cue G than R indicating that cue R was not experienced as 
a go cue. The difference between R- vs. RA+ (M = -0.01, SD = 0.02) and IP- vs. 
I+ (M = 0.0004, SD = 0.02) was significant, t(54) = -2.08, p = .043, 95% CI [-
0.01, -0.0002], d = -0.28, demonstrating that participants were able to learn the 
feature-positive contrast more readily than the feature-negative, consistent with 
the effective outcome being go. For clarity, it should be noted that the negative 
mean score for the R- vs. RA contrast indicates more commission errors for 
RA+ than R, which is in the right direction to learn this discrimination. Thus, the 
negative t statistics means that the feature-positive discrimination was better 
learnt than the feature-negative. 
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At test the G vs. B contrast was not significant, z = 0.00, p = 1.00. The 
difference between R- vs. RA+ and IP- vs. I+ was also non-significant, t(54) = -
1.15, p = .255, 95% CI [-0.03, -0.01], d = -0.16, supporting the notion that 
learning at test was weak. The rest of the contrasts were also not significant 
(see Appendix B for full results).  
Table 2.9. AICc scores for models run for Experiment 3 on reaction time and 
p(respond) data at training and test. Bold are the models chosen. Note that for 
both DVs the models with main effects of cue with random intercept and 
random slope failed to converge.  
 Summary 
Experiment 3 aimed to investigate the learning of traffic light contingences when 
go was the effective task set. The changes made between Experiments 2 and 3 
appear to have affected the task set, with the feature-positive effect for 
commission errors during training providing some evidence that ‘go’ was now 
the task outcome. There was also good evidence that participants learnt that 
cue G was a go cue and cue B a stop cue during training, indicating that the 
participants were still learning about the task as expected, despite the changes 
made. There can be little doubt though that learning was somewhat weaker in 
this experiment, and hence the generally non-significant results at test. 
Model Training Test 
Reaction time models   
Main effects of cue 5058.42 5522.40 
Main effects of cue with random intercept 4219.96 5120.98 
p(respond)   
Main effects of cue with Gamma family and 
inverse link 
-3056.96 -3002.98 
Main effects of cue with Gamma family and 




The change in task set has affected the learning of traffic light contingencies. 
While Experiment 2 suggested that A primed a weak go cue, the results for 
Experiment 3 are somewhat different. Here A has significantly slower reaction 
times against G in the training phase, and is numerically closer to B, but the 
contrast does indicate it is not the same as cue B (being significantly faster at a 
standard alpha level). On test, none of the contrasts are significant, though 
numerically cue G and A are similar. Looking at errors, during training 
numerically there is a tendency to commit more errors for G than A (with the 
difference being marginally significant at a standard alpha level), whilst the 
difference between A and B is small. At test there is no significant difference, 
yet numerically cue A does have more errors than either B or G. The overall 
impression is that A has become a bit less like G and a bit more like B and was 
experienced as a neutral to weak stop cue in Experiment 3. For cue R, as in 
Experiment 2, during training it seems to be a stop cue, being significantly 
slower to G and numerically like B on both measures, in fact error rates were 
lowest in R than B. However, at test performance seems to have collapsed for 
all cues, with reaction times and commission error rates being similar for cues 
G, B and R. Indeed, it is notable that in contrast to Experiment 2 there is not the 
large difference in p(respond) between cue R and cue G or B. Overall, the result 
suggest that R seems to be a stop cue.  
 JOINT ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT 2 AND EXPERIMENT 3 
As Experiments 2 and 3 are opposites (in the sense they use the same cue 
contingencies but with opposite outcomes) it is possible to combine the two 
experiments and undertake a between-participants analysis to investigate 
changes across the studies. First, I present an analysis that demonstrates that 
the changes between Experiment 2 and 3 were successful in swapping round 
the feature-positive effect between the two experiments. This analysis was 
conducted on training data where this effect should be most obvious and is 
where Bowditch (2016) observed the effect.  
The second analysis is an attempt to address an issue in the design of 
Experiments 2 and 3 in that while they investigated a single task set, traffic 
lights are likely to be experienced in different task sets. For example, a red 
traffic light is clearly not going to lead to the same effective outcome as a green 
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traffic light. Combining the two experiments allowed for the effect of both tasks 
sets together to be explored. Though it should be noted that the effects in 
Experiment 2 are bigger and this task set is likely to influence results to a 
greater extent than the go task set in Experiment 3. The analysis was 
undertaken on the test data as this is where learning about the cues is likely to 
be clearest, i.e. following acquisition, and therefore gives an indication of what 
learning has developed. Of course, this analysis is imperfect as the task set 
changes between, rather than within, traffic lights. By this I mean that the while 
the joint analysis allows me to see what sort of behaviour cue G (the cue 
representative of a green traffic light) might promote in a combined task set 
situation, green lights are likely to be mostly experience in a go task set (where 
the effective outcome is stop). This line of reasoning is continued and 
developed further in Experiment 6 in Chapter 4. The standard alpha level was 
used for the G vs. B contrasts (the go vs. stop manipulation check) and for the 
feature-positive contrasts, with a corrected alpha level of .010 being applied to 
all other contrasts. 
 Joint feature-positive analysis 
An analysis comparing Experiments 2 and 3 found that the outcome of the tasks 
had been successfully manipulated as far as the training reaction times were 
concerned, with the feature-positive effect swapping round from Experiment 2 to 
Experiment 3. There was a significant difference for the ‘difference between the 
differences’, that is, taking the difference for (IP-I) and (R-RA) for each 
experiment and comparing these difference, t(108) = 2.37, p = .019, 95% CI 
[2.22, 24.99], d = 0.45. This demonstrates that the changes made between the 
two experiments successfully changed the nature of the discriminations 
experienced by participants, such that the effective outcome changed from 
stopping to going. Though the effect was stronger in Experiment 2 than 3: 
Experiment 2 difference is M = 11.95, SD = 27.41, Experiment 3 difference is M 
= -1.66, SD = 32.61. The same analysis for training commission errors was non-
significant, t(108) = -1.06, p = .291, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.01], d = -0.20. 
 Joint traffic light cues analysis 
Adding ‘experiment’ as a between participant factor to the models allowed me to 
investigate overall learning for the key contrasts in the test phase. Otherwise 
analysis was conducted as described in Experiment 2 (see Table 2.10 for AICs 
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and Table 2.11 for descriptive statistics). For reaction time data, while the 
interaction with random intercept model had the lowest AICc (see Table 2.10), 
these interaction effects merely reflect the results found individually for the two 
experiments and do not represent overall effects. Therefore, the analysis 
reported is the model with the main effects of cue with random intercepts 
(conditional R2 = 0.65). In this model there was a main effect of G vs. B across 
the experiments, t(872) = 2.32, p = .020, 95% CI [1.83, 21.49], d = 0.15, with 
faster response times for G compared to B. This indicates that participants were 
able to learn the contingencies present in the designs. There was a just 
significant (right on the threshold) difference between A and B, t(872) = 2.57, p 
= .010, 95% CI [3.07, 22.73], d = 0.17, with faster responses for cue A, 
indicating that cue A was not as much of a stop cue overall as B. The A vs G 
contrast was not significant, t(872) = 0.25, p = .805, 95% CI [-8.60, 11.07], d = 
0.02, nor was the A vs R contrast, t(872) = 0.73, p = .468, 95% CI [-6.19, 
13.48], d = 0.05. In terms of R, the contrast against B was marginally significant 
at the standard alpha level, t(872) = 1.84, p = .065, 95% CI [-0.58, 19.09], d = 
0.12, suggesting a weak trend for faster responses to cue R than B. The 
contrast against G was non-significant, t(872) = -0.48, p = .631, 95% CI [-12.24, 
7.42], d = -0.03. 
For p(respond), as with reaction times, the interaction with random intercept 
model had the lowest AICc (see Table 2.10), yet for the reasons noted above I 
used a main effect of cue with random intercepts model. The G vs. B contrast 
was not significant, z = 0.68, p = .499. The A vs. B contrast was significant, z = 
2.74, p = .006, with more errors for A than for B, indicating that A was not a 
strong stop cue. The A vs. G contrast was not significant at the reduced alpha 
level, z = 2.11, p = .035, with more errors for A than G tentatively suggesting A 
was a go cue. The A vs. R contrast was not significant, z = 0.00, p = 1.00. The 
contrast for R vs. B was significant, z = 2.74, p = .006, with more errors for R 
than B, demonstrating that R was not a strong stop cue. The R vs. G contrast 
was significant at a standard alpha level, z = 2.11, p = .035, with more errors for 
R than G. The results indicate that cues B and G primed similar responses, 




Table 2.10. AICc scores for models run for joint analysis on test reaction time 










Reaction time models  
Main effects of cue and experiment 11014.80 
Interaction effects of cue and experiment 11028.52 
Main effects of cue and experiment with random intercept 
 
10251.55 




Main effects of cue with Gamma family and inverse link - 6229.28 
Interaction effects of cue with Gamma family and inverse link 
 
-6281.57 




Interaction effects of cue with Gamma family and inverse link 




Cue Reaction Time p(respond) p(miss) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
A 400.63 64.84 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 
B 413.53 69.84 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 
G 401.86 66.25 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 
I 390.84 56.13 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 
IP 406.76 62.59 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 
J 402.13 56.82 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 
P 402.86 66.50 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 
R 404.27 61.66 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 
RA 404.00 59.03 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 
Table 2.11. Descriptive statistics for the joint analysis. Reaction time means are 
calculated using raw data, but mean p(respond) and p(miss) use transformed 
data.  
 Summary 
The joint analysis confirms that participants were learning about the task in the 
expected manner with G having significantly faster response times than B. The 
analysis also clearly showed the change in relative acquisition of the R vs. RA 
and I vs. IP discriminations across the two experiments at training for reaction 
times, indicating that the task set manipulations were successful. This 
demonstrates that the changes in the experimental design changed the 
effective outcome (an issue I will return to in Chapter 4).  
In terms of the traffic light contingencies, the just significant difference for A vs. 
B for response time indicates that cue A (a 50% cue) primed a significantly 
faster go response than a 75% stop cue (cue B), suggesting that this was not a 
stop cue. The reaction time data suggests that cue A primed a similar response 
as cue G. Indeed, the p(respond) data indicates that it was more of a go cue 
than cue G, though the difference was only significant at a standard alpha level. 
This leads to the conclusion that cue A is a go cue. For cue R, the evidence 
suggests overall it was a weak go cue. The cue was marginally significant at a 
standard alpha level to cue B (with faster response to R), and while not 
significantly slower than cues G and A did have numerically slightly slower 
response times. For error rates, Cue R had significantly more errors than cue B, 
and significantly more errors at a standard alpha level than cue G. The fact that 
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R is not a stop cue is surprising. It may be the case that RA is such a strong go 
cue that some of the go association transfers to the singleton R cue. However, 
looking at the descriptive statistics, RA does not seem to be a strong go cue. 
This suggest a more complex interaction between cues A, R, and RA, one that 
results in both cue A and cue R becoming go.  
 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Experiment 1 aimed to provide initial evidence that the contingencies learnt 
under a stop task set at traffic lights might not be in line with the rules of the 
Highway Code. However, the experimental design meant it was not possible to 
reach conclusions about learning towards key cues. Fortunately, Experiment 2 
was able to provide evidence of learning, finding that cue A was experienced as 
a weak go cue and cue R as a weak stop cue. Experiment 2 made use of the 
feature-positive effect to confirm that the design was indeed inducing a stop 
task set with the feature-positive contrast (I- vs. IP+) being more readily learnt 
than the feature-negative discrimination (R+ vs. RA-) during training. This 
suggests that participants were looking to successfully withhold rather than 
respond. Experiment 3 demonstrated how swapping the response signal colour 
and changing the instructions can affect task outcome, in this case from stop to 
go. There was support for a feature-positive effect in commission errors during 
training, providing limited evidence of the feature-positive contrast being better 
learnt than the feature-negative contrast, suggesting that participants were now 
learning to respond. Under a go task set it seems that cue A primed a 
neutral/weak stop cue, and cue R a stronger stop response. Joint feature-
positive analysis of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 found that the outcome of 
the tasks had been successfully manipulated as far as training reaction time 
measures were concerned. The analysis showed that the feature-positive effect 
swapped around from Experiment 2 to Experiment 3, with a significant 
difference between the differences capturing this effect in each experiment (i.e. 
(R-RA)-(IP-I)), though the magnitude of the effect was higher in Experiment 2 
than in Experiment 3. 
In terms of the traffic light contrasts, the joint analysis suggests that, in a 
situation when both go and stops task sets are in play, cue A promotes going 
(faster and more errors than B), while cue R is best described as a weak go 
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cue, though it should be noted that there is relatively little difference between 
these cues. The findings will now be considered in terms of implications for the 
associatively-mediated stopping theory, the feature-positive effect, as well in 
terms of future experimental designs. 
 Implications for the associatively-mediated stopping 
hypothesis 
Firstly, it should be noted that across Experiments 2 and 3 I found good 
evidence that participants learnt to discriminate between a go and a stop cue, 
with the G vs. B contrast being significant at test for reaction times in 
Experiment 2 and the joint analysis. This indicates that participants were able to 
learn about the contingencies for the cues at an associative level. The results 
also suggest that, in line with the associatively-mediated inhibition hypothesis 
(Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014; McLaren & Verbruggen, 2016), pairing an 
arbitrary stimulus with withholding a response leads to the stimuli having slower 
reaction times when a response to it is required (the reasons why I believe cue 
B to be a stop cue are explored below). 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there is good reason to ask if go/no-go paradigms 
require action cancellation. If go/no-go tasks are measuring strength of action 
initiation this undermines the claim that, using such tasks, inhibition can be 
developed through pairing stimuli to stop responses. To increase the likelihood 
of action cancellation occurring within go/no-go tasks they are typically 
designed so that go is the prepotent response. The assumption is that with go 
being the default response the go process is activated immediately on the 
presentation of a stimulus. However, this approach is not suitable for studies 
investigating human learning which, like Experiment 2 and 3, require an overall 
50:50 go likelihood ratio so as not to bias overall learning. Does this in fact 
mean that the tasks here are simply measuring action initiation? One aspect of 
the design suggests this is not the case: the adaptive staircase ensures that 
participants are always responding as quickly as they can and keeps response 
times under 2000ms. The reaction time means for the experiments reported 
here were mostly around 400ms. This is a short latency, especially when 
considering that reaction times are unlikely to be quicker than 150ms, therefore 
I am reasonably confident that action cancellation is being measured by the 
go/no-go task in these experiments. This is, because the sheer speed of 
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responding suggests that the go response is initiated very rapidly, implying that 
responding would then have to be modulated by inhibition. This argument is 
further bolstered by the low omission errors seen across the experiments. This 
indicates that go responses are prepotent, as one would expect high omission 
errors if cues caused the absence of an action rather than inhibition of action. 
One feature of the experiments presented here is the mix of 25%, 50%, and 
75% cues. Throughout that chapter it has been held that cue B (75% stop) 
represents stopping and cue G (75% go) represents going. But can a 75% stop 
cue be used as evidence for associatively-mediated inhibition? Might it rather 
be called a weak go cue? If the terms of the experiments are reframed from 
inhibition to excitation, then the results could be phrased as the 25% cue 
becoming an excitatory cue, leading to more commission errors and faster 
reaction times. A similar concern was raised by Bowditch et al. (2016), who 
made the case that it is possible to use the 50% cues as a baseline as these 
cues are neither associated with going or stopping. This logic does not fully hold 
for the experiments presented here, as the 50/50 cues (ignoring Experiment 1) 
are either involved in other compounds (e.g., cue A is also seen in cue RA) or 
involved in tracking (cue J). While the contingency for J is 50/50 the cue 
receives additional training on its own at the start of the experiments and so is 
treated differently. Furthermore, due to the tracking procedure there is a positive 
feedback loop on cue J, with responses to J directly affecting the outcome of 
the next response. Yet, analysis by Bowditch et al. (2016) found evidence of 
differences between 25% stop and 50% stop cues and 50% stop and 75% stop 
cues, indicating that 75% stop cues can lead to inhibition and that 25% stop 
cues can become excitatory, suggesting that both excitatory and inhibitory 
effects can occur. Other research also supports the notion that cues requiring 
stop responses can become associated with inhibition. For example, imaging 
studies have found increased activation in areas linked to inhibition on 
presentation of cues previously linked to stopping even when a go response 
was required (Lenartowicz, Verbruggen, Logan, & Poldrack, 2011). 
Furthermore, Leocani et al. (2000) found that on presentation of no/go cues 
motor output fell below resting levels, suggesting that performance on no/go 
trials cannot just be inaction but rather involve active action cancellation.  
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 The Feature-positive effect 
The research presented here further supports the notion that not all 
discriminations between singletons and compounds are equal, and that those 
that signal the absence of an outcome (R+ RA-) are, in some instances, harder 
to learn than compounds that signal the presence of an outcome (R- RA+). 
Building on the work of Bowditch (2016) the research reaffirmed that this can be 
learnt in an incidental procedure and, that depending on the task at hand, what 
would be the traditional feature-negative discrimination can have an advantage 
– quite at odds with past work in this field (Lotz et al., 2012) – but easily 
explained in terms of the effective outcome interpretation. 
 Variability of the effect 
The findings suggest that the feature-positive effect is not consistent. This could 
be because the effect itself is relatively weak or that overall learning is weak. In 
Experiment 2, the results from training reaction times indicated that the feature-
positive discrimination was easier to learn than the feature-negative. However, 
the effect was only marginally significant at test and the difference was not 
found in the commission error data. While in Experiment 3, none of the critical 
differences in reaction time data were significant (although the training contrast 
was in the right direction), and only the discrimination for commission errors 
during training supported the feature-positive effect.  
It is worth noting the commission error results might reflect the induced 
changing task priorities for participants. When participants are looking to stop 
(Experiment 2) then the measures that relate to ‘going’ seem to be less 
sensitive than when participants are looking to go (Experiment 3). Similar 
results were found by Bowditch (2016), and past work (Verbruggen, Stevens, & 
Chambers, 2014) suggests that stimulus detection is a limited resource with a 
balance needed to be struck between ignoring irrelevant information and 
monitoring for occasional but highly relevant signals. Thus, when participants 
are in a stop task set, more attention is directed to focusing on stop cues and 
therefore they are less likely to respond incorrectly, whilst when in a go task set 




 The effect of task set  
The results do suggest that a participant’s task set is key to the learning that 
takes place at traffic lights. When participants are in a ‘go’ task set (perhaps 
when waiting at traffic lights) then they are in a better position to learn that red 
traffic lights means stop, but when participants are in a ‘stop’ task set (perhaps 
when approaching traffic lights) learning is modified and red traffic lights are 
seen as a more neutral cue and now amber lights may even come to signal go. 
This has a number of implications. First, and counter-intuitively, it appears that 
drivers may learn that red and amber cues mean ‘stop’ best when the effective 
outcome is going. I can re-phrase this to say that it is when they are looking for 
signals that allow them to make progress, but the default is to stop, or at least 
proceed with caution, that red and amber lights will act as stop cues. This is 
rather surprising, as one might have thought that when the default is to go, and 
one is looking out for a stop signal, then this is when learning about stop will be 
optimal, but the evidence suggests that this is not the case. Instead, it may be 
that establishing a task-set in drivers that has the default as stopping coupled 
with and an active search for signals that denote permission to proceed will be 
most effective in curbing running red lights and jumping amber ones. Secondly, 
the current model of contingency learning at traffic lights used in the three 
experiments reported here is inadequate. Task set seems to be a key factor in 
participant’s learning. However, when driving it is likely that different task-sets, 
and hence outcomes, are effectively in play for different contingencies. By this I 
mean that some lights are experienced by their very nature in a stop task set 
(when approaching lights; Green, Amber, and Red lights) and some lights will 
be experienced in a go task set (when stationary at lights; Red, Red and Amber, 
and Green), thus the approach taken thus far is, at best, incomplete. I will return 
to this idea in Chapter 4 where I design a task that more accurately captures the 
contingencies in play in these scenarios.  
 Modelling the contingencies  
It has been argued that the incidental go/no-go task provides a model for 
exploring the learning of contingencies experienced at traffic lights. However, 
the model needs refinement. Firstly, the model does not contain the sequential 
information that traffic lights provide. That is, in the real-world a red traffic light is 
always preceded by an amber, yet in the experiments here it could be preceded 
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by a ‘green’ light. Secondly, the contingencies used in the designs did not 
match exactly those of traffic lights in the real-world, for example cue G was 
predicting of going 75% of the time, whereas in the real-world green always 
signals go. Thirdly, traffic light changes are timed, e.g., red and amber is only 
displayed for a short while before being followed by green, whereas in the 
current design the ‘lights’ are not participant to any intentional timing effects. 
These design issues are all addressed in further chapters, but it is worth 
highlighting here how substantial the jump from the current design to actual 
experience of the contingencies at traffic lights is.  
Additionally, this chapter started with the aim of exploring what learning is 
primed by associatively-mediated processes in order to inform development of 
later interventions. However, while the data suggests what is being learnt, the 
expression of this learning is less clear. It might be the case that the 
contingences highlighted in the task are not reflective of the decision-making 
processes drivers make in the real-world. A driver's response to traffic lights is 
likely heavily influenced by context, prior experience, and initially explicit 
instruction. Therefore, while it seems that at an associative level learning in this 
task does not support the rules in the Highway Code, the expression of this 
learning, and thus its effect on behaviour, will be tempered by a variety of 
factors.  
 Conclusion 
To conclude, the experiments presented here mark the initial development of a 
laboratory-based paradigm that tries to capture the experience of contingencies 
at UK traffic lights and its impact on associative learning of those contingencies. 
Caveats about the design limitations aside, the experiments demonstrated that 
cue A was experienced as weak go cue in a stop task set and a neutral or weak 
stop cue in a go task set. The joint analysis which was intended to capture more 
realistic experience of task set at traffic lights indicated that amber was 
experienced as a go cue. Thus, in situations when control processes are weak, 
the evidence suggests that associative processes could lead people to commit 
traffic violations. These findings also suggest that the development of 
interventions to target these stimulus-response associations could be useful in 
addressing dangerous behaviour at traffic lights. Finally, the results also 
demonstrate how small changes in the experimental design can lead to shifts in 
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task demands, and how task set could be an important factor in what is learnt at 
traffic lights.  
So far, the task has presented each cue independently (i.e. cue G could be 
followed by cue R), but within UK traffic lights there is a set sequence and it 
possible that this sequence impacts upon learning. Therefore, the following 




































3 CHAPTER 3 
ASSOCIATIVE PROCESSES II: THE EFFECT OF SEQUENCES 
UPON CONTINGENCY LEARNING  
his chapter discusses the effects of sequences upon the learning of cues. 
Chapter 2 highlighted how the learning that takes place in response to 
cues at traffic lights does not necessarily mirror the rules of the road. However, 
the experiments did not incorporate the sequences experienced at traffic lights. 
This chapter rectifies this and shows the effect sequences have upon the 
associative learning resulting from the contingencies experienced at traffic 
lights. 
 THE IMPORTANCE OF SEQUENCES 
The importance of sequences in human cognition cannot be overstated. As 
Ashe, Lungu, Basford, and Lu (2006) note, sequences are key to language, 
episodic memory, and motor movements. A sequence is a list of cues, events, 
or digits that follow an order, e.g., an area code for a telephone number such as 
01392. Sequences may be rule based, but these rules can operate at a specific 
level (such as ‘1’ must be the second digit within the sequence for the above 
example) or the rule can be more abstract, with a particular set of items 
preceding a different class of items. For example, in the telephone number 
01392 661000 the first set of digits would be the area code, with the succeeding 
digits being the specific number for the person you wish to call (in this case the 
University of Exeter main switchboard). Crucially, the area code needs to be 
entered first for the call to connect.  
Research on sequence learning in humans has focused heavily on the study of 
motor sequences due to the ease in which learning effects can be found in a 
short period of time (Ashe et al., 2006). Many of these experiments use the 
serial reaction time task by Nissen and Bullemer (1987). In this task a single 
visual cue can appear in any one of four locations within a trial. When the cue 
appears, participants must press the appropriate key for the location of the cue; 
the reaction time between the appearance of the cue and the participant’s 
response to it is the primary measure of performance. Unbeknown to the 




2-4-2-1-3-3-2-1 occur in that order. These sequence trials are then followed by 
random trials where the cue is presented on the screen but without the 
sequence. Typically it is found that learning to the cue becomes enhanced, that 
is faster reaction times and fewer errors, when it is presented within sequence, 
compared to learning in the random order blocks (Willingham, Nissen, & 
Bullemer, 1989; for a review see Robertson, 2007). 
While there are several types of sequences (for a review see Conway and 
Christiansen, 2001) this chapter will concern itself with fixed sequences. These 
are sequences where the pattern is pre-set. For example, the phrase ‘It was a 
dark and stormy night’ is a fixed sequence. The operation of traffic lights is 
another example. These sequences are generally easy to learn, with young 
human children (aged between two and 4 years old), capuchin monkeys, and 
chimpanzees all being shown to be able to learn them (Custance, Whiten, & 
Fredman, 1999; Whiten, Custance, Gomez, Teixidor, & Bard, 1996). Indeed, the 
chimpanzee Ai, who received training in numbers and symbols has been found 
to be able to learn a sequence of up to five numbers in line with young human 
children (Kawai & Matsuzawa, 2000). In general, the main point from this brief 
discussion of sequences is that they are important to human daily life and easy 
to learn (Clegg, DiGirolamo, & Keele, 1998), with cues in sequences showing 
enhanced learning compared to randomly ordered stimuli.  
 ASSOCIATIVE LEARNING OF SEQUENCES 
One area of contention in the field of sequence learning, especially relevant to 
this thesis, is the question of whether sequences can be learned through 
associative systems. Early evidence in support of this argument came from 
work by Nissen and Bullemer (1987) who found patients with amnesia were still 
able to learn the sequence contained within a serial reaction time task. Using a 
similar approach Cohen, Ivry, and Keele (1990) asked participants to complete 
a serial reaction time task while also reporting on the pitch of a presented tone. 
The idea here is that if sequence learning is not reliant on propositional learning 
then learning in the experimental group should be better than in the control 
group who received random sequences, despite the cognitive load induced by 
the tone task. Results demonstrated that those in the sequence group showed 
an improvement in performance (as measured by a reduction in reaction times) 
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compared to the control group. In order to assess awareness, participants 
completed a generation task at the end of the experiment. In this task 
participants were required to press the key indicating where the position of the 
next cue would be, rather than responding to the position of the current key. 
The results showed a non-significant difference in accuracy of predictions 
between the two groups. Thus, there was a dissociation between response 
times and awareness which was claimed to indicate that participants were 
learning the sequence associatively (Willingham et al., 1989; Reed & Johnson, 
1994) 
Work in the mid-1990’s cast doubt on the appropriateness of the generation 
task to assess awareness. The seminal work of Shanks and St. John (1994) 
argued that such tests failed to establish that learning is occurring outside 
propositional routes. The authors argued that such awareness tests often do not 
provide feedback thus running the risks that participants might be forgetting the 
sequence and therefore be unable to report it. The authors also argued that lack 
of awareness could be due to participants not transferring knowledge from one 
task to another, that is, participants could have seen the two tasks as distinctly 
separate and so not apply knowledge learnt in the reaction time task to the 
awareness task. In support of this transference argument Perruchet and 
Amorim (1992) used an adapted generation task whereby participants were 
directly instructed to form sequences similar to those they had seen in the 
training blocks. The authors found evidence that successful reporting of the 
sequences matched the enhanced response times to these sequences. That is, 
participants were able to report explicit knowledge of the sequences and this 
corresponded to shorter response times, indicating a shared process for 
performance and conscious knowledge (but see Cohen & Curran, 1993; 
Willingham, Greeley, & Bardone, 1993). 
However, there are two strands of evidence that suggest learning of sequences 
can occur separately from explicit processes. The first strand comes from the 
field of clinical psychology, while the second derives from laboratory-based 
experiments. It has been argued that reading deficits associated with dyslexia 
are, in part, caused by impairment in incidental learning of sequences (Lum, 
Ullman, & Conti-Ramsden, 2013). Therefore, in tasks where sequences are not 
made explicit it would be expected that dyslexic individuals would learn the 
102 
 
sequence to a lesser extent than healthy controls. This is what Jiménez-
Fernández, Vaquero, Jiménez, and Defior (2011) found. The authors compared 
performance between dyslexic children and good readers in both intentional 
and incidental versions of a sequence learning task. Results showed that in the 
incidental version, normal controls exhibited typical learning patterns, with 
reaction times shortening over time, while dyslexic participants showed no such 
pattern. In contrast, when the task was intentional, in that participants were 
informed about the sequences, both controls and dyslexic participants showed 
the typical pattern of learning. 
The second strand of evidence supporting the notion that sequences can be 
learnt through associative process comes from work by McLaren and 
colleagues over several years. For example, F. Jones and McLaren (2009) 
conducted two experiments looking at the differences between incidental and 
intentional learning within a serial reaction time task. Experiment 1 explored 
learning under incidental conditions. The experimental group was exposed to 
four sub-sequences (XXX, XYY, YYX, and YXX) while the control group only 
saw pseudo-random sequences. In a subsequent test phase, both groups 
received the same trial order of pseudo-random sequences. Performance was 
measured on occurrences of the experimental sub-sequences within the 
pseudo-random test block. Overall, there was evidence that sequence learning 
had occurred, with better performance (less errors, faster response times) in the 
experimental group at test compared to the control. Further analysis revealed 
the effects were driven by differences in sub-sequences YYX and XYX. 
Strikingly, a structured interview conducted after the test phase found that the 
experimental group were not able to verbalise knowledge of the sequences to 
explain their performance on the task. In a separate experiment where 
participants were informed of the sequences, the XXX sequence showed the 
greatest evidence of learning. Therefore, it seems there is a dissociation of 
learning, with enhanced learning of sequences YXY and YYX under incidental 
conditions, while under intentional conditions learning is best to the XXX 
sequence. These results lend weight to the view that propositional knowledge is 
not necessarily key to sequence learning, and that learning can occur at an 
associative level (Spiegel & McLaren, 2006; McLaren, Jones, McLaren, & 
Yeates, 2013; Yeates, Jones, Wills, McLaren, & McLaren, 2013). However, it 
should be noted that associative learning and propositional learning are 
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perhaps more closely interlinked than the discussion here suggests (Spiegel & 
McLaren, 2001), and it is likely that sequence learning occurs under something 
like the framework proposed by McLaren et al. (2019). 
 PRESENT EXPERIMENTS 
So far in my research on associative learning at traffic lights no account has 
been taken of the role of sequences. That is, in the previous experiments, a 
green traffic light could be followed by a red traffic light whereas, in the UK at 
least, it is followed by an amber light. Research has shown the advantage that 
sequences confer to learning of cues (Willingham et al., 1989) and how 
sequences can be learnt at an associative level (F. Jones & McLaren, 2009). 
Therefore, it is fair to assume that the current experimental design is lacking a 
key source of learning that is not only in play in the real-world but is also likely 
to have a large effect on the learning of the cues. Thus, to ensure that the 
laboratory experiments reflect real-world learning, the design will need to 
employ the relevant sequences. 
 EXPERIMENT 4 
Experiment 4 is a replication and extension of Experiment 2, in that it uses a 
stop task set, but with the addition of (some of) the sequences experienced at 
traffic lights. I have already talked about the main sequence at UK traffic lights, 
which is green-amber-red-red and amber-green, and so it would be easy to 
imagine that simply having Experiment 4 follow this pattern would be sufficient. 
However, while this is the main sequence, a driver can enter this at any point 
and thus there are several sub-sequences that might be experienced. For 
example, red and amber together followed by green – with this sequence not 
containing a singleton red or amber. Therefore, it was important that the 
sequences employed in the experimental design captured the range of potential 
sequences experienced at traffic lights in the real-world. Table 3.1 outlines the 
sequences that participants experienced in the experiment. 
The sequences were chosen to not only reflect the various start points possible 
but also to capture some of the contextual experience of traffic lights. For 
example, in Green 1, G is go in both cases, mimicking the situation when the 
lights have recently changed to green, and thus it is likely a driver would have 
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time to cross the junction. Whereas in Green 2 G is stop, modelling the situation 
where a driver has not been able to cross a junction on a green light, or has 
entered the junction when the lights have been green for some time and so 
could be expecting them to change and hence might be more cautious. There is 
an argument for having a preceding go G before the stop G to mimic the shift in 
driver’s perception of G being a go cue to a prepare to stop cue, but there was a 
limit to the number of sequences that could be included in order to keep the 
experiment relatively quick. More generally, it is worth highlighting that it is 
evident that the sequences employed here are not going to capture all 
experiences in the real-world. The use of double G and double R served to 
model the fact that traffic lights often display red or green, with amber and 
red/amber being transitional signals.  
Table 3.1. Sequence runs for Experiment 4 ‘+’ is 100% stop, ‘-’ is 100% go. 
 
To balance the number of singleton ‘-’ and ‘+’ cues, the number of 50/50 cues, 
and compound ‘-’ and ‘+’ cues, a more complex array of filler cues were used 
than in previous experiments (see Table 3.2). Whereas the designs in Chapter 
2 used 75% going and stopping, in this chapter due to the wish to focus more 
on the experience at traffic lights the overall going or stopping to a cue is 
determined by the sequences, for example cue R has a go ratio of 1:6, and cue 
G a go ratio of 8:1 (for comparison in Experiment 2 the ratio for R was 1:3, and 
cue go was 3:1). Therefore, cue B is no longer a 75% cue but now directly 













G- -> G- 
G+ -> A+ ->R+ ->R+ ->RA- ->G- 
 
A- ->A- 
A+ ->R+ ->R+ -> RA- ->G- 
 
R+ ->R+ ->RA- ->G- 





balances out cue G (i.e. has a 8:1 stop ratio). I also introduced a new cue, YZ± 
which was a compound cue to balance the experience of other compound cues, 
RA and IP. Of course, these and other filler cues were not experienced 
identically to the experimental cues, as they are not themselves in a sequence. 
Given that learning to cues in sequences has been shown to be enhanced 
compared to cues not in sequences (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987), to ensure that 
any filler cues were of equal status (in terms of learning) to the traffic light cues 
it would have been necessary to have them in the same sequence runs as the 
traffic light cues, i.e. Blue 1 would have been the opposite of Green 1, so B+ -> 
B+. However, given the ubiquitous nature of the traffic light sequence, it was felt 
best to have single filler cues so as to break up the runs of sequences. This 
aimed at helping to prevent participants focusing too much on the sequences, 
and thus guess the nature of the task (this decision does influence the analysis 
undertaken which is discussed in the Results section). Furthermore, including 
the ideal control sequences in the design would have substantially increased 
the length of an already long experiment, exacerbating participant fatigue.  
Table 3.2. Filler sequences for Experiment 4. ‘+’ is 100% stop, ‘±’ is 50/50 go, ‘-’ 
is 100% go. Each letter in the cue column represents a shape drawn randomly 
from a set pool. 
This design does leave the experiment open to issues of repetition priming 
(which were not an issue in my earlier experiments). This is a separate issue 
from sequence learning and arises from the influence of past trials in the 
sequence on responses to the current trial, potentially producing shorter 
response times if the cue signals the same position/response previously 
Filler type Cue 
Occurrences per 
block 
Cue G filler 
 
Cue R filler 
 






















experienced/required (Soetens, Boer, & Hueting, 1985). Therefore, differences 
in performance could be driven not only by sequence learning but also by 
repetition priming effects (F. Jones & McLaren, 2009). However, aspects of the 
design are likely to minimise any such effects. Firstly, the experiment is within-
participants. This means that all participants receive both filler cues and 
sequence cues helping to dilute repetition priming effects. Additionally, the 
direction of response and, to some extent, the colour of the cue, are 
randomised. Even so, there is evidence that repetition priming effects can still 
occur even in simple designs such as that employed here (M. Jones, Curran, 
Mozer, & Wilder, 2013). I will use specific analyses to check that there are the 
associative effects above and beyond any repetition priming effects in my 
results section, but note that the emphasis now is not so much on what the 
basis of a speeded or slow response is, but on how people perform on the task 
under the conditions that prevail during training. Put another way, the emphasis 
shifts from an interest in mechanism to an interest in the analogy with real-world 
performance in these experiments. 
In the introduction to this chapter, the issue of associative learning to 
sequences was raised. There is good reason to assume that the work 
presented here will support the view that sequence learning can occur 
associatively. Given that the basic design used here is similar to that of 
Experiment 1 in F. Jones and McLaren (2009), in that it is a two-choice reaction 
time task and participants will not be informed of the sequences beforehand, it 
is not a leap of logic to assume the lack of explicit knowledge found in that study 
will also hold true for the current work. As a check on this assumption, an 
awareness measure was introduced (see Procedure for details).  
 Method 
 Participants 
The inclusion criteria and outlier removal process were the same as Experiment 
2 (see Results section for details of those removed). A power analysis using the 
R package SIMR (Green & MacLeod, 2016) was conducted on detecting an 
effect between a go vs. stop cue (G vs. B, see section 3.4.1.2 for details) at test 
in reaction times. The effect size for this difference was set at 14.21ms 
(calculated by averaging the difference in the G vs. B contrast at test across 
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Experiments 1-3). Overall, the analysis indicated that a sample size of 80 would 
give sufficient power (82.30%) to detect the effect. However, in view of the 
stronger learning typically observed when sequences are involved it was 
decided to test 55 participants and run a new power analysis. The post-hoc 
power analysis for first sequence trial data at test (which is comparable to 
Experiments 2 and 3) gave the final sample size of 56 participants a power of 
56.30% to detect a difference of 14.21ms between the go vs stop cue (G vs. B) 
at test. Though, of course, given the use of sequences in the current study, it 
would be expected that the difference between G and B at test would be greater 
than in Experiments 2 and 3. This was the case, with the difference being 
22.35ms, with the study having a power of 89.30% to detect a 22ms difference. 
Participants received payment of £5 or one course credit. 
 Design  
Overall, there was one calibration block, six training blocks, and one test block 
(see Table 3.3 for summary of design) with a 10 second break between each 
block and a 10 second break halfway through each block (excluding the 
calibration block), with the proviso that these breaks did not disrupt a sequence. 
This was achieved by randomly setting the middle trial to be one of the filler 
cues, with the sequences being randomly ordered around this fixed point. As 
seen in Table 3.3 each sequence appeared more than once, e.g., the sequence 
Amber 2 appeared four times. This was in order to give participants enough 
experience of the sequences to encourage learning. In training, the 
contingencies for each sequence were those outlined in Table 3.1. For test, all 
contingencies were 50/50, for example Green 1 was no longer G- -> G- but 
rather G± -> G±. This 50/50 split was achieved by having half go and half stop 
sequences, so there were two G- -> G- and two G+ -> G+ in the test block 
which overall created the G± -> G± contingency. This mean that the sequences 
of responses over the block were no longer predictive. This approach enabled 
me to collect enough data on go and nogo trials to analyse both reaction time 
and commission errors. It should also be noted that due to the total length of the 





Table 3.3. Summary of Experiment 4 design. Letters represent a sequence. The 
numbers in parentheses indicate how often the sequence will occur per block. 
At test the contingencies will all be ±. 
 Procedure  
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 2 except that there was only 
one test block and there were breaks halfway through the training and test 
blocks. In the study any sequence randomly followed on from another, thus a 
run of trials could be RA- G-/ B-/ G+ A+ R+ R+ RA- G- which would be 
comprised of three sequences, ‘Red/Amber’, ‘Go singleton filler’ and ‘Green 1’. 
At the end of the experiment participants were asked to complete an awareness 
task.  
3.4.1.3.1 Awareness measures 
The awareness measure was taken from Bowditch (2016). In the task 
participants were shown the coloured shape cues used in the experiment and 
asked to rate on a scale of 1-9 (from ‘Definitely Not’ to ‘Definitely’) a) How much 
would you expect to RESPOND to this shape configuration? and b) How much 
would you expect to WITHOLD your response from this shape configuration? 
The order of questions was counterbalanced, and the cue order was 
randomised with the caveat that compound cues (e.g., RA) were always 
presented first followed by singleton cues (e.g., G). The shapes were presented 
at the same location and at the same size as in the previous blocks.  




Calibration 1 24  J 
Training 6 232 G1(4), G2(4), A1(4), A2(4), 
R1(4), R2(4), RA(8), B(36), 
I(28), IP(24), P(16), YZ(16) 
 
J(8) 
Test 1 232 G1(4), G2(4), A1(4), A2(4), 
R1(4), R2(4), RA(8), B(36), 




 Analysis and results 
In terms of the statistical approaches, Experiment 4 was conducted in much the 
same manner as the analysis of training for Experiment 2. In terms of outliers, 
three participants were removed and replaced for having high omission errors, 
while two participants were removed and replaced for having high commission 
errors. Two participants failed to complete the experiment. There were no 
outliers for reaction times. 
However, due to the complexity of the experimental design the analyses differ 
from that of Chapter 2. For ease the analysis of the training and test phases, as 
well as the awareness test will be discussed separately, with the results of each 
section following presentation of each analysis plan. 
 Training phase  
One issue with the experimental design was that comparisons between the 
cues in the sequences and filler cues are likely to be affected by sequence 
learning and repetition priming effects. As discussed in the introduction there is 
evidence to indicate that learning involving sequences is enhanced compared to 
learning without sequences (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). Such effects mean it 
would be inappropriate to conduct tests exploring learning of the feature-
positive effect due to the fact that R vs. RA is a sequence contrast, while I vs. IP 
is not, and as such the feature-positive effect is explored separately in a later 
section. Furthermore, the effects might also impact the contrasts involving cues 
G, A and R against B, with the latter not being in the traffic light sequence. 
However, it was decided to retain these contrasts as the only way to provide 
contrasts against a clear stop cue, as there is no such cue in the experimental 
sequence (with R being also involved in RA, a go cue). This approach also fits 
with the need to try and capture more of the real-world behaviour when 
experiencing these contingencies at traffic lights, as they will be embedded in 
sequences like these. A further issue is the repetition priming effects in play for 
the traffic light sequences, thus findings between cues could be explained by 
referring to this effect, rather than an associative learning account. However, it 
is possible to run contrasts in the training phase that control for repetition 
priming and provide evidence that associative learning is taking place in this 
phase.   
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To summarise, contrasts were run on both training reaction time and 
commission error data to demonstrate that learning had taken place within the 
training phase. These contrasts were followed by the traffic light analysis (as in 
Experiment 2) to explore what responses cues might promote when the 
sequences experienced at traffic lights (and thus the inherent sequence 
learning and repetition priming) are considered (see descriptive statistics in 
Table 3.4). 
3.4.2.1.1 Reaction times  
For the training data, the best fitting model had a conditional R2 of 0.87 (see 
Table 3.5 for AICs).  
3.4.2.1.1.1 Evidence of associative learning 
To provide evidence of associative learning for reaction times at training it is 
possible to compare performance between R vs. I and R vs. B. In effect, these 
contrasts are a manipulation check (and separate from the main analysis), and 
thus the alpha level was only corrected to .025. In Table 3.1 the only occurrence 
of R- (a go R cue) is in the sequence Red 2. Therefore, given that reaction 
times are calculated by averaging correct responses times for a cue, the only 
data that will be considered for the average reaction time for cue R will come 
from this trial. Crucially, R- is the first trial of the Red 2 sequence, and thus will 
not be affected by repetition priming effects (assuming that the preceding cue 
was 50% stop across all participants). Cue I is the filler cue for cue R and so it 
is a natural comparison cue for this contrast. Noting that cue R is overall a stop 
cue, and cue I a go cue, if participants were learning about the contingencies it 
would be expected that cue R would have significantly slower reaction times 
than cue I. The R vs. I contrast was significant, t(440) = -3.22, p = .001, 95% CI 
[-15.27, -3.72], d = -0.31, with I being faster than R, confirming that participants 
were indeed learning the contingencies present in the design. The contrast R 
vs. B enables me to compare cue R to an out and out stop cue, with this 
contrast also being significant, t(440) = 3.74, p = < .001, 95% CI [5.23, 16.78], d 
= 0.36, with faster reaction times to cue R than B, suggesting cue R did not 
promote as much a stopping response as cue B.  
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3.4.2.1.1.2 Traffic light contrasts 
Noting the above, I can be confident that the following results arise as a 
consequence of associative learning as well as repetition priming. As G vs. B is 
no longer a pure manipulation check, the alpha level was corrected to .008. The 
G vs. B contrast was highly significant, t(440) = 11.64, p = < .001, 95% CI 
[28.52, 40.07], d = 1.11, with G being faster than B, thus confirming that 
participants were responding in accordance with the contingencies present in 
the design. In terms of the experimental contrasts, A vs. B was also highly 
significant, t(440) = 9.35, p = < .001, 95% CI [21.77, 33.32], d = 0.89, with faster 
responses to cue A. The contrast A vs. G was not significant at the reduced 
alpha, t(440) = -2.29, p = .023, 95% CI [-12.52, -0.97], d = -0.22, but there was 
a trend for slower responses to cue A than to cue G. The contrast for A vs. R 
was highly significant, t(440) = 5.61, p = < .001, 95% CI [10.76, 22.31], d = 0.54, 
with faster reaction times to cue A. In terms of the R contrasts, the R vs. B 
contrast was significant, t(440) = 3.74, p = < .001, 95% CI [5.23, 16.79], d = 
0.36, with cue R having faster responses, suggesting it was not as much of a 
stop cue as B. The R vs. G contrast was highly significant, t(440) = -7.90, p = < 
.001, 95% CI [-29.06, -17.51], d = -0.75, with responding in the presence of R 
being slower, indicating that R was not as go as cue G.  
3.4.2.1.2 p(respond)  
For this measure, the best model was a model that included the main effects of 
cue with a Gamma family and inverse link and random intercept (see Table 
3.5).  
3.4.2.1.2.1 Evidence of associative learning 
Using the same logic outlined for the training reaction time data, contrasts for 
commission errors for G vs. B and G vs. I were run to provide evidence of 
associative learning for this measure. Looking at Table 3.1, Cue G is the only 
traffic light cue that has a stop contingency that only occurs at the start of a 
sequence (Green 2). Given that cue B is a stop cue, from an associative 
learning perspective it would be expected that cue G would have more errors 
than cue B and this was the case, z = 4.84, p = < .001, with more errors for cue 
G, thus confirming that the participants were learning the contingencies present 
in the design. The G vs. I contrast was run to establish if cue G was a go cue of 
similar power to a filler go cue. The contrast was not significant, z = 0.88, p = 
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.379, indicating that learning was similar between these cues (supported by the 
numerical values in Table 3.4).  
3.4.2.1.2.2 Traffic light contrasts 
Given the result for G vs. B, I can be confident that the following results arise 
through associative learning as well as repetition priming. For this set of 
analyses, the alpha level was corrected to .008. The G vs. B contrast was 
significant, z = 4.84, p = < .001, with more errors for cue G, thus confirming that 
the participants were learning the contingencies present in the design. The A 
vs. B contrast was not significant, z = 0.85, p = .396. However, the A vs. R 
contrast was significant, z = 3.39, p = < .001, with more errors for A than R, 
suggesting that A was more of a go cue than R. The contrast for A vs. G was 
also significant, z = -4.16, p = < .001, with more errors for cue G suggesting that 
A was not as strong a go cue as G. Focusing on the R contrasts, the R vs. B 
contrast was nearly significant, z = -2.60, p = .009, with more errors for cue B 
than cue R, suggesting that cue R was a strong stop cue. The R vs. G contrast 
was highly significant, z = -6.69, p = < .001, with more errors for G than R, 
suggesting that R did not prime a go response in a similar fashion to G.  
Cue Reaction Time p(respond) p(miss) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
A-/+ 358.43 40.77 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
B+ 385.98 42.93 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
G- 351.69 38.57 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 
I- 365.48 39.54 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 
IP+ NA NA 0.02 0.01 NA NA 
J± 369.23 40.22 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
P-/+ 381.92 43.85 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
R+ 374.97 41.35 0.01 0.005 0.01 0.01 
RA- 377.26 41.78 NA NA 0.01 0.01 
YZ-/+ 379.59 45.39 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Table 3.4. Training descriptive statistics for Experiment 4. Reaction time means 





3.4.2.1.3 Training phase summary 
Overall, the training data for reaction time and p(respond) analysis suggest that 
when considering some of the sequences experienced at traffic lights, in 
addition to associative learning, cue G is a go cue, cue A is being experienced 
as a weak go cue (with the commission error result suggesting it promotes 
significantly less of a go response than G), and cue R is experienced as a weak 
stop cue, being significantly faster than cue B for reaction times, but almost 
prompting a significantly greater stopping response for p(respond). 
Of course, the fundamental question is whether associative learning is involved. 
For example, it is quite possible that the speeded reactions to G on go trials 
owe something to G being preceded by another go trial most of the time. This 
will not as often be the case for B, and so some of the advantage can be 
explained in terms of the facilitation in responding brought about by not having 
to stop on the preceding trial. However, the comparison of R vs B for reaction 
times is not susceptible to this explanation. The only go trials for R occur at the 
start of a sequence, and so the preceding trial for R and B are, on average, 
matched, and hence it can be trusted that R is actually faster than B (and 
slower than I), and so is not as good a stop cue when evaluated in this way. 
The point is, of course, that it may well do better when it is embedded in the 
sequences it is part of, and the p(respond) data hint at that, but it is impossible 
to disentangle the effects of sequence learning from the effects of repetition 
priming there. Turning now to G vs. B for p(respond), it is clear that there are 
more errors to G than to B (and about the same as to I) which establishes that it 
is a go cue, because once again stop trials for G only occur at the beginning of 
a sequence and so are not contaminated by repetition priming. Again, this is 
possibly underestimating how effective G is as a go cue when encountered ‘in 
sequence’. Nevertheless, the conclusion must be that the associatively-








Table 3.5. AICc scores for models for Experiment 4 run on reaction time and 
p(respond) data at training and test. Bold are the models chosen. 
 Test analysis  
Due to the design of the test phase whereby, overall, the phase had 50/50 
contingencies, but this occurred through runs of certain responses, it is likely 
that repetition priming effects were having a sizeable impact upon performance. 
Therefore, it was not possible to undertake the analysis performed in 
Experiment 2. This is because repetition priming effects on their own could lead 
to cue G (almost always at the end of a sequence) being faster than R and A, 
which tend to occur at the start or middle of a sequence. The solution is to 
undertake two separate analyses. The first focuses on performance on the first 
trial of every sequence and as such is free from repetition priming effects (the 
trials just before these trials will, on average, have the same distribution of go 
and no-go responses). Given the lack of sequential information this is similar to 
the test analyses conducted in Experiments 2 and 3. The second will focus on 
performance to cues contained within a sequence (that is cues in any nth 
position bar the 1st), and allows for the benefit of learning arising from cues 
being embedded in sequences to be explored. Therefore, the first set of 
Model Training 1st Sequence Other sequence 
Reaction time models    
Main effects of cue 5200.76 6108.90 5987.15 
Main effects of cue with 
random intercept 
 
4404.53 5674.90 5453.67 
p(respond) 
 
   
Main effects of cue with 
Gamma family and inverse 
link 
 
-3283.32 -3417.62 NA 
Main effects of cue with 
Gamma family and inverse 
link and random intercept 
-3336.36 -3670.07 NA 
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analyses are immune from repetition priming effects, whilst the second will, 
inherently, be affected, but equally for each of the cues embedded in these 
sequences (see Table 3.6 for descriptive statistics).  
3.4.2.2.1 First trial analyses 
The analyses conducted on the first trial of each sequence were a G vs. B 
contrast (which is once again a manipulation check) and A vs. B, A vs. G, A vs. 
R, R vs. B and R vs. G. The alpha level for these analyses was corrected to 
.010 (see Table 3.5 for AICc’s).  
3.4.2.2.1.1 Reaction times 
The model chosen had a conditional R2 of 0.63. The G vs. B contrast was 
significant, t(495) = 3.44, p = .001, 95% CI [9.61, 35.09], d = 0.31 indicating that 
associative learning had taken place by the test phase. The A vs. B contrast 
was significant, t(495) = 3.12, p = .002, 95% CI [7.54, 33.03], d = 0.28 
suggesting that cue A was not a stop cue. The A vs. G contrast was not 
significant, t(495) = -0.32, p = .751, 95% CI [-14.81, 10.67], d = 0.03. The R vs. 
B contrast was not significant, t(495) = 0.36, p = .722, 95% CI [-10.43, 15.06], d 
= 0.03, and cue R had significantly slower reaction times than cue G, t(495) = -
3.08, p = .002, 95% CI [-32.78, -7.29], d = -0.28 suggesting that cue R was not 
a go cue. The contrast A vs. R was also significant, t(495) = 2.76, p = .006, 95% 
CI [5.22, 30.71], d = 0.25 suggesting that cue A primed more of a go response 
than cue R.  
3.4.2.2.1.2 p(respond) 
For commission errors there was a non-significant difference for G vs. B, z = 
0.67, p = .500. The contrast A vs. B was marginally significant at a standard 
alpha level, z = 1.78, p = .076, and hints at a trend for more errors to A than B. 
The difference between A vs. G was not significant, z = 1.15, p = .251. For cue 
R, the contrast against cue B was not significant, z = 0.67, p = .500, as was the 
contrast against G, z = 0.00, p = 1.00. The contrast for A vs. R was not 
significant, z = 1.15, p = .251. 
3.4.2.2.2 Other sequence trial analyses 
These focused on comparing the traffic light cues within the sequences. 
Therefore, contrasts undertaken were A vs. G, A vs. R, and R vs. G. The alpha 
level was corrected to .017. Due to unequal variances between cues for 
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commission errors the use of mixed-effects models was inappropriate and 
instead standard t-tests were run for this performance measure. However, to 
increase ease of comparability between experiments these contrasts were run 
on the transformed data.  
3.4.2.2.2.1 Reaction times 
The model chosen had a conditional R2 of 0.72. The A vs. G contrast was not 
significant, t(495) = 0.20, p = .839, 95% CI [-9.20, 11.32], d = 0.02, nor was the 
A vs. R contrast, t(495) = 0.77, p = .444, 95% CI [-6.25, 14.27], d = 0.07, and 
neither was the R vs. G contrast, t(495) = -0.56, p = .574, 95% CI [-13.21, 7.31], 
d = -0.05.  
3.4.2.2.2.2 p(respond) 
The A vs. G contrast was not significant, t(55) = -0.12, p = .903, 95% CI [-0.01, 
0.01], d = -0.02. Due to the variance of R being equal to 0 it was not possible to 
conduct the A vs. R or R vs. G contrasts. This lack of variance needs 
explaining, especially considering the data presented in Table 3.6. How can the 
mean error for R be 0.01 but the variance 0? This suggests that all participants 
made the same amount of error to cue R which seems unlikely. The strange 
results can be explained by reference to the transformation applied to the data 
to enable the mixed-effects models to be run. These models cannot deal with 
data of zero, and so as discussed in Chapter 2 I applied a transformation to the 
data to shift all data from zero. This has the effect of shifting all error rates by 
the same amount whilst leaving variance unaffected, and so leads to the ‘on 
paper’ results of cue R having an error rate of 0.01, when in fact the true error 
rate for the cue was 0 (and hence why zero variance). 
3.4.2.2.3 Test phase summary 
The first sequence trial analyses indicate that at a purely associative learning 
level, participants had learnt that G was a go cue (having significantly faster 
reaction times than cue B), cue A was a go cue (having similar reaction times to 
G and marginally significantly more commission errors than B) and that cue R 
was a stop cue, having similar reaction times to B and priming significantly less 
going behaviour for reaction times compared to G. The other sequence trial 
analyses indicate weaker effects overall and suggests that learnt behaviour for 
traffic light cues within sequences was weak. One explanation for this could be 
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that performance is being overwhelmed by repetition priming effects and 
expectancies generated by sequences of trials of a given type. By this I mean 
that if one experiences a run of go trials than one would learn to expect another 
go trial. Conversely if exposed to a run of stop trials then one would learn to 
























Type of cues Reaction Time p(respond) p(miss) 
Filler cues Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
B+ 384.06 51.09 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
I- 368.22 47.19 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
IP+ 388.23 60.23 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 
J± 364.88 50.80 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.05 
P-/+ 369.14 48.98 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 
YZ-/+ 375.09 50.37 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 





      
A 363.77 59.28 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.03 
G 361.71 63.90 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.06 
R 381.74 62.56 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.03 
RA 365.51 61.70 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.03 





      
A 342.25 51.58 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 
G 343.32 47.12 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
R 346.26 50.19 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 
RA 335.85 42.45 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 
Table 3.6. Test descriptive statistics for Experiment 4. Reaction time means are 




Awareness scores were calculated by subtracting a participants’ expectancy to 
withhold a response from their expectancy to respond for each cue. Thus, 




To assess evidence of awareness the analysis undertaken for the reaction time 
data was repeated on the awareness questionnaire (see Table 3.7 for summary 
statistics). For this analysis the alpha level was corrected to .008. The best 
fitting model included the main effects of cue with a random intercept of 
participant (R2 = 0.40). The G vs. B contrast was highly significant, t(605) = 
5.64, p = < .001, 95% CI [2.47, 5.10], d = 0.46, with participants more likely to 
rate G as a go cue than B. The A vs. B contrast was not significant, t(605) = 
1.17, p = .242, 95% CI [-0.53, 2.10], d = 0.10. The A vs. G contrast was 
significant, t(605) = -4.47, p = < .001, 95% CI [-4.31, -1.69], d = -0.46, with 
participants more likely to rate cue G as a go cue than cue A. The A vs. R 
contrast was not significant, t(605) = 0.64, p = .523, 95% CI [-0.89, 1.74], d = 
0.05. Focusing on cue R, the contrast for R vs. G was highly significant, t(605) = 
-5.11, p = < .001, 95% CI [-4.74, -2.11], d = -0.42, with participants more likely 
to rate cue G as go than cue R. The R vs. B contrast was not significant, t(605) 
= 0.53, p = .595, 95% CI [-0.96, 1.67], d = 0.04. Overall, this analysis shows 
that participants had some awareness of the required response for certain cues. 
This seems to focus on cue G, with participants showing consistent awareness 
that this cue was more likely to involve responding than others. 
Contrasting the two 50/50 filler cues that were completely neutral (that is, not 
involved with any other cues) against G and B enabled me to see if B was 
indeed a neutral cue as Table 3.7 would suggest, or if there was bias in the 
ratings. By this I mean the bias inherent in the use of scales, for example, the 
tendency of people to avoid giving extreme scores (Albaum, 1997) or 
differences between people in how they construe the scale. I contrasted J 
against G and B, and YZ against G and B. This analysis was separate from that 
conducted above and so an alpha level of .013 was applied. The J vs. B 
contrast was not significant, t(605) = 0.00, p = 1.00, 95% CI [-1.31, 1.31], d = -
0.00. The J vs. G contrast was highly significant, t(605) = -5.64, p = < .001, 95% 
CI [-5.10, -2.47], d = -0.46, with participants more likely to rate G as go than J. 
The contrast YZ vs. B, was not significant, t(605) = -0.45, p = .651, 95% CI [-
1.62, 1.01], d = -0.04. The YZ vs. G contrast was highly significant, t(605) = -
6.09, p = < .001, 95% CI [-5.40, -2.77], d = -0.50, with participants more likely to 
rate G as go than J. These results suggest that participants expected to make 
very similar responses to cue B (a stop cue) and cues J and YZ (neutral cues). 
This suggests that cue B seems to be somewhat neutral in terms of awareness. 
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This neutrality is dissociated from the response time results which indicate that 
B is certainly not a neutral cue, but is in fact a stop cue in comparison to a 
certain go cue, cue G. Of course, it might seem desirable to compare the 
reaction times for cue B against those of the neutral cues J and YZ, but such 
comparisons would be invalid. This is because YZ is a compound cue, and J 
the tracking cue and so receives special treatment during the learning phase. 
Cue Expectancy Rating 
 Mean SD 
A-/+ 1.16 4.32 
B+ 0.38 4.21 
G- 4.16 3.75 
I- 2.07 4.36 
IP+ -1.66 3.94 
J± 0.38 4.24 
P-/+ 0.32 4.1 
R+ 0.73 4.44 
RA- 2.2 4.01 
Y-/+ -2.16 4.26 
YZ-/+ 0.07 4.24 
Z-/+ -2.29 4.65 
Table 3.7. Descriptive statistics for expectancy ratings for Experiment 4. 
 Correlational analysis  
To investigate whether it is the awareness of cues that is causing the 
differences in performance, one can analyse the correlations between learning 
and expectancy scores (the zero correlation criterion, see Dienes, Altmann, 
Kwan, & Goode, 1995; Dienes & Scott, 2005). If awareness is impacting upon 
performance then I would expect a correlation between the two measures, such 
that cues rated with a higher likelihood to respond should have faster reaction 
times. However, if the correlation is zero this would indicate that awareness was 
not linked to performance.  
This analysis was undertaken using the expectancy and performance measure 
scores from each pair to create two difference scores. These were calculated by 
subtracting the score for the stimulus most often paired with stopping from that 
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most often paired with responding, e.g., RA-R. Thus, if a participant’s 
awareness of the contingencies and task performance were related, I would 
expect the degree of awareness to correlate with greater response time 
differences and greater commission error differences. This analysis was only 
performed where there was evidence from the expectation scores that 
participants were aware of the differences between the cue, so G vs. B, G vs. A, 
and G vs. R. For training the whole dataset was used, whilst for test only data 
from first sequence trials was included.  
Focusing on training correlations, as seen in the top three panels for Figure 3.1, 
all three correlations for reaction times and expectancy scores were not 
significant (even at the standard alpha level before correction). For commission 
errors, only the G - R correlation was significant, but this became non-significant 
when a Bonferroni correction was applied, although this result does hint at a 
trend for awareness to influence performance. The same analysis was 
performed for reaction times and p(respond) for first sequence trials (see Figure 
3.2), where once again there were no significant results (even at a standard 
alpha level).   
Generally, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that there was no relationship, or only a 
weak correlation, between awareness and performance measures at training 
and test. Although the result for G – R might be taken to indicate that 
awareness is likely to be involved at some level in performance, it is not reliable 
after adjustment for multiple comparisons. Overall, the results suggest that 
awareness did not play a significant role in creating the difference in 
performance between cues, and that learning was occurring though associative 
processes. Of course, one caveat is that perhaps there is a small causal link 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Experiment 4 investigated associative learning at traffic lights under conditions 
when some of the sequences involved at traffic lights were in play. During 
training on both measures the data showed that cue G primed more of a go 
response than cue B. Additionally, there was evidence to suggest that the 
resulting effects were due to a combination of repetition priming effects and 
associative learning. 
For cue A the reaction time data at training suggests it primed a reasonably 
strong go response, being significantly faster than cue B and not significantly 
slower (at the corrected alpha level) than cue G. However, the result from the G 
vs. A contrast does suggest that cue A did not prime as much going as cue G 
and numerically this is borne out. The results for commission errors indicate that 
cue A was a stop cue. Errors were not significantly greater than cue B (though 
numerically it had more errors than B) and A had significantly less errors than 
cue G. Overall it seems that cue A was experienced as something of a weak go 
cue at training. Focusing on cue R, the fact that at training it was significantly 
slower and had significantly less commission errors compared to cue G 
indicates that R was not a go cue. For reaction times it does not seem to be that 
strong a stop cue either, having significantly faster reaction times than cue B. 
However, R had almost significantly fewer commission errors than B so it 
seems that R was a weak stop cue, being slightly more go than cue B based on 
the reaction time result.  
For the first sequence test trials, as expected the contrast G vs. B was 
significant for reaction times suggesting that learning had occurred. The results 
suggest that cue A primed a go response. Cue A was significantly faster than 
cue B at reaction times, but for commission errors cue A only primed marginally 
significantly more errors at the standard alpha level. Cue A was also similar in 
performance to cue G for reaction time data. For cue R, the data indicates it 
was somewhat of a stop cue. It had significantly slower response times than 
cue G but was similar in performance for cue B.  
In summary, when in a task set that has stopping as the effective outcome and 
sequences are in play cue A seemed to prime a weak go response, with cue R 
seeming to promote a weak stop response. At test, in an analysis where 
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repetition priming effects were controlled for, cue A seemed to be linked with a 
go response and cue R a stop response. 
The pattern of results is not dissimilar to those found in Experiment 2, where R 
was a weak stop cue and cue A a weak go cue. This suggests that the basic 
effects already established for stop task sets hold true, despite the slight 
change in go/stop ratio for the cues. Of course, overall R is now perhaps more 
of a stop cue, and A more of a go cue. This shift for both cues could arise 
because they were embedded within sequences at training. It could be that the 
exposure to traffic light sequences enhanced the learning to the cues that 
seemed to occur in the ‘base’ version of the design in Experiment 2. Another 
aspect of the results that should be highlighted is that the cues embedded in 
sequences have produced markedly enhanced effects compared to those 
observed in Experiment 2. This is evidenced by the bigger difference in reaction 
times between G and B, in fact the difference is more double that of Experiment 
2 for training. This confirms the well-known sequence learning effect (Nissen & 
Bullemer, 1987). The results here do not show the unexpected result seen in 
Experiment 2, where R had significantly more commission errors than G at test, 
suggesting that this was random noise rather than a true effect.  
One issue touched on in the discussion of the design of Experiment 4 is that of 
comparing cues within sequences to those outside (e.g., G vs. B). Cue G might 
be expected to be faster than B, both due to the beneficial nature of sequences 
to learning and because of repetition priming. While it is true that G is more of a 
go cue than it was in Experiment 2 (with faster reaction times to it) this logic 
would also hold for cue B, in that if it was in a sequence then one would expect 
it to become even more of a stop cue than it is now. Thus, the current contrasts 
between G vs. B (and more generally sequence cue vs. non-sequence cue) are, 
in some sense, likely to be conservative. Nevertheless, even with repetition 
priming effects controlled for, the comparison of G and B on p(respond) at 
training and the results for the first sequence trials analysis makes it clear that 
G is a strong go cue even without additional help from being tested within a 
sequence. 
While the experiment provides clear evidence of learning, it also speaks to the 
debate surrounding the nature of this effect and whether it can ever be 
associatively driven. The lack of significant correlations between awareness and 
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task performance satisfies the zero-correlation criterion of Dienes et al. (1995), 
suggesting that the observed performance derived from an associative system 
that captured the contingencies between cues and outcomes, rather than an 
explicit system. Of course, this conclusion is not uncontroversial (see Newell & 
Shanks, 2014) and will be considered further in the general discussion.   
 EXPERIMENT 5 
Having seen how the inclusion of sequences impacts the learning of traffic light 
cues under a stop task set, the question now becomes what is learnt under a go 
task set. Therefore, Experiment 5 introduces the sequences described above 
into the methodology of Experiment 3. That is, the task set was go, with 




The sample size, inclusion criteria and outlier removal process were the same 
as in Experiment 4 (see Results section for details of those removed). Of the 
final sample, 47 were female, with an overall mean age of 20.34 (SD = 3.19). 
 Design  
The design was identical to Experiment 4. However, as going is expected to be 
the effective outcome, + is now go and – stop. This means that the sequence 
Green 1 is now G+ -> G+, and the sequence Red 1 is now R- ->R- ->RA+ ->G+ 











The filler cues were also amended to reflect the change in task set between 
Experiment 4 and 5, e.g., IP is now IP- rather than IP+ (see Table 3.9 for full 
design of filler cues).  
Table 3.9. Filler sequences for Experiment 5. ‘-’ is 100% stop, ‘±’ is 50/50 go, ‘+’ 
is 100% go. Each letter in the cue column represents a shape drawn randomly 
from a set pool. 
 Procedure  
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 4.   













G+ -> G+ 
G- -> A- ->R- ->R- ->RA+ ->G+ 
 
A+ ->A+ 
A- ->R- ->R- -> RA+ ->G+ 
 
R- ->R- ->RA+- ->G+ 
R+ ->RA+ ->G+ 
 
RA+ ->G+ 
Table 3.8. Sequence runs for Experiment 5 ‘-’ is 100% stop, ‘+’ is 100% go.  
Filler type Cue 
Occurrences 
per block 
Cue G filler 
 
Cue R filler 
 






















 Analysis and results  
The analysis for Experiment 5 was conducted in the same manner as for 
Experiment 4. In terms of outliers, nine participants were removed and replaced 
for having high omission errors, while three participants were removed and 
replaced for having high commission errors. There were no outliers for reaction 
times.   
 Training phase  
Descriptive statistics for this phase are contained in Table 3.10. 
3.5.2.1.1 Reaction times  
For the training data, the best fitting model had a conditional R2 of 0.87 (see 
Table 3.11 for AICs).  
3.5.2.1.1.1 Evidence of associative learning 
As in Experiment 4 it was possible to provide evidence of associative learning 
by comparing performance between R vs. I and R vs. B. In effect, these 
contrasts are a manipulation check (and separate from the main analysis), and 
thus the alpha level was only corrected to .025. The R vs. I contrast was 
significant, t(440) = -2.41, p = .017, 95% CI [-12.23, -1.25], d = -0.23, with I 
being faster than R, confirming that participants were indeed learning the 
contingencies present in the design. The contrast R vs. B enables me to 
compare cue R to an out and out stop cue, with this contrast being significant,  
t(440) = 4.63, p = < .001, 95% CI [7.47, 18.45], d = 0.44, with cue R having 
faster responses, suggesting it was experienced as less of a stop cue than B.  
3.5.2.1.1.2 Traffic light contrasts 
Noting the above results, I can be confident that the following results arise 
because of associative learning as well as repetition priming effects. As G vs. B 
is no longer a pure manipulation check, the alpha level was corrected to .008. 
The G vs. B contrast was highly significant, t(440) = 11.01, p = < .001, 95% CI 
[25.34, 36.32], d = 1.05, with G being faster than B, thus confirming that 
participants were learning the contingencies present in the design. In terms of 
the experimental contrasts, A vs. B was highly significant, t(440) = 8.57, p = < 
.001, 95% CI [18.52, 29.50], d = 0.82, with faster responses to cue A. The 
contrast A vs. G was not significant at the reduced alpha, t(440) = -2.44, p = 
.015, 95% CI [-12.31, -1.33], d = -0.23 but there was a trend for slower 
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responses to cue A than to cue G. The contrast for A vs. R was significant, 
t(440) = 3.94, p = < .001, 95% CI [5.56, 16.54], d = 0.38, with faster reaction 
times to cue A. In terms of the R contrasts, the R vs. B contrast was significant, 
t(440) = 4.63, p = < .001, 95% CI [7.47, 18.45], d = 0.44, with cue R having 
faster responses, suggesting it was experienced as less of a stop cue than B. 
The R vs. G contrast was highly significant, t(440) = -6.38, p = < .001, 95% CI [-
23.36, -12.38], d = -0.61, with responding in the presence of R being slower, 
indicating that cue G was being seen as more of a go cue.  
3.5.2.1.2 p(respond)  
For this measure, the best model was a model that included the main effects of 
cue with a Gamma family and inverse link and random intercept (see Table 
3.11).  
3.5.2.1.2.1 Evidence of associative learning 
Using the same logic outlined in Experiment 4, contrasts for commission errors 
for G vs. B and G vs. I were run to provide evidence of associative learning for 
this measure. Given that cue B is a stop cue, from an associative learning 
perspective it would be expected that cue G would have more errors than cue B 
and this was the case, z = 4.98, p = < .001, confirming that the participants 
were learning the contingencies present in the design. The G vs. I contrast was 
run to establish if cue G was a go cue of similar power to a filler go cue. The 
contrast was almost significant, z = 2.23, p = .026, with more errors to cue G 
than cue I indicating that cue G was certainly a go cue.  
3.5.2.1.2.2 Traffic light contrasts 
Given the result for G vs. B, I can be confident that the following results arise 
through associative learning as well as repetition priming effects. For this 
analysis, the alpha level was corrected to .008. The G vs. B contrast was 
significant, z = 4.98, p = < .001, with more errors for cue G, thus confirming that 
participants were learning the contingencies present in the design. The A vs. B 
contrast was significant, z = 3.47, p = < .001, with more errors for A than B, 
indicating that A was not responded to as a stop cue. The contrast for A vs. G 
was not significant at the reduced alpha level, z = -2.04, p = .041, but 
numerically there were more errors for cue G than cue A, suggesting a 
tendency to experience cue A as not a strong go cue. The A vs. R contrast was 
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significant, z = 4.50, p = < .001, with more errors for A then R, suggesting that A 
prompted more of a go response than cue R. Focusing on R, the R vs. B 
contrast was not significant, z = -1.26, p = .208, but the R vs. G contrast was 
highly significant, z = -5.81, p = < .001, with more errors for G than R, 
suggesting that R is not a go cue.  
Cue Reaction Time p(respond) p(miss) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
A-/+ 377.00 38.83 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 
B- 401.01 43.49 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 
G+ 370.18 39.59 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.00 
I+ 381.31 41.53 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 
IP- NA NA 0.02 0.01 NA NA 
J± 388.07 43.42 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 
P-/+ 392.68 37.82 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
R- 388.05 34.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
RA+ 381.04 41.67 NA NA 0.01 0.00 
YZ-/+ 386.44 41.7 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Table 3.10. Training descriptive statistics for Experiment 5. Reaction time 
means are calculated using raw data, but mean p(respond) and p(miss) use 
transformed data. 
3.5.2.1.3 Training phase summary 
Experiment 5 allowed for the exploration of associative learning in an 
experiment that used a go task set and considered some of the sequences 
experienced at traffic lights. The analysis suggests that cue G primed a go 
response, cue A was somewhat of a go response (seemingly promoting more of 
a go response than cue B on both measures but not as strong a go response as 
cue G), and cue R somewhat of a stop cue, having slower reaction times and 
less errors than cue G but also faster reaction times than cue B. Additionally, 
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the results for the associative learning contrasts demonstrate that associative 
learning is occurring in this phase.  
 Test analysis  
Similarly, to Experiment 4, two separate analyses were undertaken for the test 
phase. The first focused on first trials of the sequences in conjunction with filler 
cues, while the second only focused on cues within sequences (see Table 3.12 
for descriptive statistics). 
3.5.2.2.1 First trial analyses 
The analyses conducted on the first trial of each sequence were a G vs. B 
contrast (which is now once again a manipulation check) and A vs. B, A vs. G, 
A vs. R, R vs. B and R vs. G. The alpha level for these analyses was corrected 
to .010 (see Table 3.11 for AICc’s).  
Model Training 1st Sequence Other 
sequence 
Reaction time    
Main effects of cue 5168.32 6050.18 6004.79 
Main effects of cue with 
random intercept 
 
4356.62 5704.71 5572.67 
p(respond)    
    
Main effects of cue with 
Gamma family and inverse 
link 
 
-2923.04 -3174.77 -3538.25 
Main effects of cue with 
Gamma family and inverse 
link and random intercept 
-3061.52 -3277.10 -3636.21 
Table 3.11. AICc scores for models run for Experiment 4 run on reaction time 
and p(respond) data at training and test. Bold are the models chosen. 
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3.5.2.2.1.1 Reaction times 
The model chosen had a conditional R2 of 0.56. The G vs. B contrast was 
significant, t(495) = 2.71, p = .007, 95% CI [5.09, 31.67], d = 0.24 indicating that 
learning had taken place by the test phase. The A vs. B contrast was significant, 
t(495) = 3.88 p = < .001, 95% CI [13.03, 39.62], d = 0.35, suggesting that cue A 
was not a stop cue. The A vs. G contrast was not significant, t(495) = 1.17, p = 
.242, 95% CI [-5.35, 21.24], d = 0.11. The R vs. B contrast was not significant, 
t(495) = -0.02, p = .982, 95% CI [-13.45, 13.14], d = -0.002, and cue R had 
significantly slower reaction times than cue G, t(495) = -2.73, p = .006, 95% CI 
[-31.83, -5.24], d = -0.25 suggesting that cue R was not a go cue. The contrast 
A vs. R was also significant, t(495) = 3.90, p = < .001, 95% CI [13.19, 39.78], d 
= 0.35 suggesting that cue A primed more of a go response than cue R.  
3.5.2.2.1.2 p(respond) 
For commission errors there was a significant difference for G vs. B, z = 3.16, p 
= .002, with more errors for G than B suggesting that learning had occurred for 
this measure. The contrast A vs. B was not significant, z = 0.63, p = .526. The A 
vs. G contrast was significant, z = -2.67, p = .008, with more errors for cue G 
than A indicating that cue A was not a go cue. For cue R, the contrast against 
cue B was marginally significant at a standard alpha level, z = 1.67, p = .077, 
with a trend for more errors to cue R than B. The contrast of R vs. G 
approached being marginally significant at a standard alpha level, z = -1.65, p = 
.100, with a trend for more errors to cue G than R. This suggests that cue R for 
commission errors was a neutral or weak go cue. The contrast for A vs. R was 
not significant, z = -1.17, p = .244. 
3.5.2.2.2 Other sequence trial analyses 
These focused on comparing the traffic light cues within the sequences. 
Therefore, contrasts undertaken were A vs. G, A vs. R, and R vs. G. The alpha 
level was corrected to .017 (see Table 3.11 for AICc’s). 
3.5.2.2.2.1 Reaction times 
The model chosen had a conditional R2 of 0.66. The A vs. G contrast was 
marginally significant at a standard alpha, t(495) = -1.71, p = .088, 95% CI [-
21.75, 1.47], d = -0.15, with faster reaction times to cue G than A. The contrast 
A vs. R was not significant, t(495) = -0.79, p = .432, 95% CI [-16.27, 6.96], d = -
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0.07. The comparison between R vs. G was also not significant, t(495) = -0.93, 
p = .355, 95% CI [-17.09, 6.13], d = -0.08.  
3.5.2.2.2.2 p(respond) 
The A vs. G contrast was not significant, z = -0.31, p = .760, as was the contrast 
between A and R, z = 1.47, p = .143. The R vs. G contrast was marginally 
significant at a standard alpha level, z = -1.76, p = .079, with a trend for more 
errors to cue G than cue R.  
3.5.2.2.3 Test phase summary 
The first sequence trial analyses indicate that at a purely associative learning 
level, participants had learnt that G was a go cue (having significantly faster 
reaction times and more errors to cue G than cue B). Cue A seemed to prime 
an overall neutral response, priming a go response for reaction times 
(significantly faster than B but similar to G) but a stop response for commission 
errors (significantly less errors than G and similar levels to B). Cue R seemed to 
prime a weak stop response overall, being roughly neutral for commission 
errors but significantly slower than cue G in terms of response times.  
The other sequence trial analyses show weaker effects overall. The limited 
evidence suggests that cues A and R promoted more of a stop response 
compared to cue G, with cue A having marginally significantly slower reaction 














Type of cues Reaction Time p(respond) p(miss) 
Filler cues Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
B+ 401.03 45.47 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
I- 380.95 51.34 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 
IP+ 396.19 45.58 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 
J± 392.51 59.52 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 
P-/+ 402.58 61.21 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 
YZ-/+ 381.36 46.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 





      
A 374.70 43.75 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.00 
G 382.65 63.78 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.05 
R 401.18 55.08 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.05 
RA 371.73 54.55 0.07 0.11 0.01 0.03 





      
A 369.72 60.23 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 
G 359.58 42.79 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 
R 365.06 45.10 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 
RA 359.48 48.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 
Table 3.12. Test descriptive statistics for Experiment 5. Reaction time means 




I conducted the expectancy analysis for Experiment 5 in the same manner as 
described in Experiment 4 (see Table 3.13 for descriptive statistics). The alpha 
level was corrected to .008. The best model fitted the main effects of cue with 
random intercept (R2 = 0.25). One participant did not provide any ratings and as 
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such the degrees of freedom are smaller for this analysis than for its companion 
in Experiment 4. The G vs. B contrast was significant, t(594) = 4.16, p = < .001, 
95% CI [1.39, 3.88], d = 0.34, with participants more likely to rate G as a go cue 
than B. The A vs. B contrast was not significant at the reduced alpha, t(594) = 
2.24, p = .026, 95% CI [0.18, 2.66], d = 0.18, though there was a trend for 
participants to rate A as more go than B. The A vs. G contrast was marginally 
significant at a standard alpha, t(594) = -1.92, p = .055, 95% CI [-2.46, 0.02,], d 
= -0.16 hinting at a trend for cue G to be rated as go over cue A. The A vs. R 
contrast was not significant, t(594) = 0.26, p = .796, 95% CI [-1.08, 1.41], d = 
0.02. Focusing on cue R, R vs. G was not significant at the reduced alpha, 
t(594) = -2.18, p = .030, 95% CI [-2.62, -0.14], d = -0.18, though there was a 
tendency for participants to rate cue G as more go than cue R. The R vs. B 
contrast was also not significant at the reduced alpha, t(594) = 1.98, p = .048, 
95% CI [0.01, 2.50], d = 0.16, though numerically participants did rate R as 
more go than B. Unlike in Experiment 4 the awareness ratings are less clear. 
Overall, it seems that awareness is centred on G vs. B, with perhaps the 
participant’s awareness of this contrast driving the rest of the pattern of results. 
There was some evidence that participants were aware that stopping was more 
likely in response to A and R than to G, and some awareness that stopping was 
even more likely to B. 
As in Experiment 4, comparing J and YZ against B and G allowed me to see if B 
was experienced as a relatively neutral cue or not. This analysis was separate 
from that conducted above and so an alpha level of .013 was applied. The 
contrast J vs. G was significant, t(594) = -2.90, p = .004, 95% CI [-3.08, -0.59], d 
= -0.24, with participants more likely to rate G as go over J. The contrast J vs. B 
was not significant, t(594) = 1.26, p = .207, 95% CI [-0.44, 2.04], d = 0.10. The 
contrast YZ vs G was significant, t(594) = -2.81, p = .005, 95% CI [-3.02, -0.54], 
b = -0.23 with cue G being rated as more go then cue YZ. The contrast for YZ 
vs. B was not significant, t(594) = 1.35, p = .179, 95% CI [-0.39, 2.10], b = 0.11. 
These results suggest that participants expected to make very similar 
responses to cue B (a stop cue) and cues J and YZ (neutral cues). Overall, the 
analysis for B vs. J and YZ suggests that the ratings are very close, and that B 
seems to be somewhat neutral in terms of awareness. This neutrality is 
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dissociated from the response time results which indicate that B is certainly not 
a neutral cue, but is in fact a stop cue in comparison to the go cue, cue G. 
 
 Correlational analysis 
As in Experiment 4 it is possible to undertake a correlational analysis to explore 
if awareness is driving performance. For this experiment I will only report the 
correlation for G vs. B, as this is the contrast that expectancies significantly 
differed on. Thus, the analyses performed were for reaction times and 
commission errors at training and for the first sequence trial data. As seen in 
Figure 3.3 correlations were close to zero, indicating that awareness did not 
drive performance. This suggests that the behaviour was caused by 
associatively-mediated learning, rather than propositional processes, though 





Cue Expectancy Rating 
 Mean SD 
A-/+ 0.84 3.54 
B- -0.58 4.04 
G+ 2.05 3.71 
I+ 0.87 3.52 
IP- -0.09 3.54 
J± 0.22 3.99 
P-/+ 0.02 3.88 
R- 0.67 3.15 
RA+ 0.84 3.48 
Y-/+ -1.25 4.01 
YZ-/+ 0.27 3.62 
Z-/+ -1.31 4.19 
















































































































































































































































































































Experiment 5 explored how the sequences added in Experiment 4 would affect 
learning in a design that has go as the effective outcome. During training on 
both measures the data showed that cue G primed more of a go response than 
cue B – thus learning was occurring as expected. Additionally, there was 
evidence of behaviour occurring through learning, as well as through repetition 
priming effects.  
For cue A the reaction time data at training suggests it primed a weak go 
response. The cue was significantly faster than cue B yet, while not significant 
at the corrected alpha, there was a strong trend for faster reaction times to cue 
G than A. The results for commission errors indicate that cue A was again a 
weak go cue. Errors were greater than cue B, but errors were also significantly 
less than cue G at a standard alpha level. Overall, it seems that cue A was 
experienced as something of a weak go cue at training. Focusing on cue R, the 
fact that at training it was significantly slower and had significantly less 
commission errors compared to cue G indicates that R was not a go cue. For 
reaction times it does not seem to be that strong a stop cue either having 
significantly faster reaction times than cue B. However, R had similar levels of 
errors compared to B. Overall, it would be fair to describe cue R as a weak stop 
cue.  
For the first sequence test trials, as expected the contrast G vs. B was 
significant for both performance measures suggesting that learning had 
occurred. The results indicate that cue A primed a fairly neutral response. It was 
significantly different for cue B at reaction times but not different for commission 
errors. This pattern was reversed when compared to cue G; the two cues were 
similar in reaction time speeds, but for p(respond) cue A had significantly fewer 
errors. For cue R, the data indicates it was somewhat of a stop cue. It had 
significantly slower response times than cue G, and the difference at p(respond) 
was marginally significant at a standard alpha level (with more errors for G). 
Compared to cue B, response times were similar, but cue R did have marginally 
significantly more errors than cue B at a standard alpha level. In summary, 
when in a task set that has going as the effective outcome and sequences are 
in play cue A seemed to prime a weak go response, with cue R seeming to 
promote a weak stop response. At test, in an analysis where repetition priming 
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effects were controlled for, cue A seemed to be linked with a neutral response 
and cue R a stop response. 
The pattern of results is similar to the companion study Experiment 3. In 
Experiment 3 cue R primed a stop response and cue A a neutral to weak stop 
response. While comparatively cue R is perhaps less of a stop cue, and A more 
of a go cue the rough pattern for the placement of the cues along a go/stop 
continuum in a go task set holds. It should be noted that the pattern of results is 
easier to interpret in Experiment 4 (especially for commission errors), with this 
likely being a product of the enhanced learning generated by sequential 
learning. 
Finally, the results again support the proposition that sequence learning can 
occur through associatively-mediated processes. 
 JOINT ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENT 4 AND EXPERIMENT 5 
As Experiments 4 and 5 are mirror opposites in much the way that Experiments 
2 and 3 were, it is possible to combine the two and undertake a between-
participants analysis to investigate changes across the studies. While in 
Chapter 2 I presented a joint analysis of the traffic light cues, to begin to capture 
a more complete understanding of task set, given the similarity of the 
experiments presented here to their comparison experiments in Chapter 2 such 
an analysis will not be undertaken. However, I do report an analysis of the 
feature-positive effect between Experiments 4 and 5. As these analyses are 
manipulation checks a standard alpha level was applied. 
 Joint feature-positive analysis 
In Chapter 2 I conducted a t-test looking at R vs. RA against IP vs. I, i.e. of the 
feature-positive vs feature-negative across Experiments 2 and 3. However, an 
equivalent analysis is not possible here. This is because IP vs. I is a non-
sequence contrast, while R vs. RA is. Instead, the approach used here is to 
compare the difference in R vs. RA across the two experiments. This approach 
also controls for repetition priming effects, as both experiments were exposed to 
the same sequence runs but with opposite task sets. In Experiment 5, R vs. RA 
is the feature-positive contrast (R- RA+), while in Experiment 4 it is the feature-
negative pair (R+, RA-). Based on my past findings, I would expect learning of 
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these discriminations to be better in Experiment 5 than 4. As I was not able to 
perform such an analysis within experiments, and the evidence from 
Experiments 2 and 3 was that the effect was fairly difficult to detect, the contrast 
was undertaken for both dependent measures at training and test. 
The result from response times at training were significant, t(110) = -2.32, p = 
.022, 95% CI [-17.25, -1.35], d = -0.44, with enhanced learning to RA compared 
to R in Experiment 5 (mean difference of 7.01, SD = 22.43) compared to 
Experiment 4 (M = -2.29, SD = 19.93). This demonstrates that the changes 
made between the two experiments successfully altered the nature of the 
discriminations experienced by participants in that the effective outcome 
changed from stopping to going. However, the results from test were not 
significant, t(110) = -1.12, p = .266, 95% CI [-36.67, 10.22], d = -0.21. It was not 
possible to conduct this analysis on p(respond) in training since there were no 
errors of commission for RA in either experiment because RA was 100% go. 
However, at test this contrast was significant, t(110) = 2.32, p = .023, 95% CI 
[0.007, 0.08], d = 0.44, with once again better learning of the R vs. RA contrast 
in Experiment 5 (M = -0.04, SD = 0.12) compared to Experiment 4 (0.00, SD = 
0.07). 
Therefore, these analyses provide good evidence that the contrast R-RA was 
significantly different between Experiment 4 (outcome is stop) and Experiment 5 
(outcome is go) at both training for the response time data and in commission 
errors at test. These findings support my results from Chapter 2 and those of 
Bowditch (2016), and provide further evidence that the manipulations employed 
in the paradigm are effective in changing task set.   
 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Fundamentally, the results presented here support those of Chapter 2 and a 
wider body of literature (Best et al., 2016; Bowditch et al., 2016) which 
demonstrate that a cue that is paired consistently with a particular outcome 
promotes that outcome, even when the primed action is no longer required. 
Such support was found in reaction time performance for the first sequential 
trials analysis for both experiments, and for commission errors in Experiment 5. 
The key aspect of this chapter was the addition of sequences and the 
subsequent discussion will explore the effects of sequences.  
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 Sequence learning  
At the introduction to this chapter I discussed how sequences can enhance the 
learning of cues. Given this, it might be assumed that the inclusion of 
sequences would lead to quantitatively different results from those reported in 
Chapter 2 (bigger effect sizes for example), but that qualitatively the actual 
pattern of the results would resemble the companion experiments in Chapter 2. 
There is work consistent with this notion. For example, Gotler, Meiran, and 
Tzelgov (2003) used a task-switching paradigm with two task sets; task 1 
required participants to respond if the target was up or down, while task 2 
required participants to respond if the target was right or left. These tasks were 
presented in sequence blocks and random blocks. Of note for the current 
discussion, the results demonstrated that the type of block (sequence or 
random) did not interact with switching costs (the loss in performance caused 
by the switch from one task to another; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). That is, 
though sequences did enhance learning overall, with faster reaction times in 
sequence blocks compared to random blocks, this effect was separate from 
task-switching costs, with the enhanced learning granted by sequences being 
equal for switch and non-switch trials. Broadly, the results here support this 
position, with the two experiments in this chapter having similar findings to their 
companion experiments in Chapter 2. This of course raises the question as to 
the need for Experiments 4 and 5. However, as highlighted in the introduction 
sequences are a key part of human and learning, and as discussed in Chapter 
1 the traffic light sequence is a ubiquitous feature of life. Therefore, to design a 
paradigm with the express aim of capturing the contingencies experienced at 
UK traffic lights without including the sequences involved would be to ignore a 
key feature of what makes traffic lights, traffic lights. 
 Feature-positive effect 
To my knowledge the work presented here is the first to explore learning of the 
feature-positive effect in the context of sequence learning. A priori, one would 
expect that sequences would enhance rather than diminish the feature-positive 
effect. However, the contrasts undertaken in Chapter 2 and 3 are not identical 
and do not allow for direct testing of this assumption. Yet it is possible to 
undertake the feature-positive analysis performed in this Chapter using the data 
in Chapter 2. This analysis (presented in Appendix C) supports the argument 
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that sequences enhance learning of the feature-positive effect, with bigger 
effect sizes for the sequence versions of the contrasts. 
 Learning and awareness  
Both the experiments conducted in this chapter indicated that awareness of the 
contingencies was not significantly correlated with task performance. However, 
some of the correlations were non-zero. This could be taken to indicate the 
presence of some conscious content (Seth, Dienes, Cleeremans, Overgaard, & 
Pessoa, 2008), but these correlations were never significant. It seems that cues 
within sequences can be learnt about associatively, as well as via conscious 
processes. The lack of correlation seen between performance and awareness 
would be difficult to explain through a single learning system and so supports 
the notion of dual-route models (McLaren et al., 2014). However, it must be 
noted that there are caveats to this claim. The first is that the awareness test 
was given at the end of the experiment and so falls prey to the ‘immediacy’ 
criterion for assessing awareness by Newell and Shanks (2014). The authors 
argue that assessments should be made online (as in the Perruchet 
experiments) to prevent forgetting or interference from subsequent trials. 
Indeed, as the 50/50 test phase is, in effect, an extinction phase, it is likely that 
it would have degraded the contingencies with participants perhaps forgetting 
the contingencies from training. As it stands it is not possible to say that those 
who made more accurate ratings (i.e. rated cue G as a go cue) were simply 
better at remembering cues, compared to those who were less accurate, or if 
the ratings measure true awareness. In defence of the awareness measure 
used it does meet the sensitivity criterion, as the same cues were used to 
assess awareness as seen in the task.  
Another issue with the awareness test used is that there are other forms of 
meta-knowledge it does not measure. For example it does not measure what 
Dienes and Perner (1996, 1999) refer to as ‘content explicitness’, defined as 
knowing that one is in possession of knowledge. This is distinct from the meta-
knowledge assessed in the expectancy rating task which requires participants 
to represent content towards a cue as knowledge about that cue rather than 
confabulation (Dienes & Altmann, 1997), so called ‘attitude explicitness’ (Dienes 
& Perner, 1996). As Reber (as cited in Dienes & Altmann, 1997) posited, 
participants “may know that they know something, even though they may not 
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know what it was that they know” (p.136). Therefore, to provide a more 
definitive case for associative learning it would be necessary to design an 
awareness test that addresses both these forms of metacognition. 
 Conclusion 
To conclude, the experiments presented here continue the development of a 
paradigm exploring contingency learning at UK traffic lights. The addition of the 
sequences seems to be a key enhancer of task performance, and results in 
larger learning effects. Crucially, the pattern of results in both stopping and 
going task sets matches that already established in Chapter 2. With cue A being 
a weak go cue in a stop task set, and a neutral/weak stop cue in a go task set. 
This suggest that, depending on the task set in play, associative learning at 
traffic lights could be such as to encourage dangerous driving. This supports the 
idea raised in Chapter 1 of the need to develop interventions to target these 
maladaptive consequences of associative processes. Having seen how 
sequences can enhance the learning experienced at traffic lights, the next 
question is whether the between-experiment manipulation of task set used so 
far captures the fullest experience of traffic lights. In real-world driving, task set 
will change depending on the light shown. To reflect this, the next experiment 
aims to incorporate both task sets into one experimental design to complete my 
investigation of the associative consequences of experiencing the contingencies 




































4 CHAPTER 4 
ASSOCIATIVE PROCESSES III: THE ROLE OF TASK SET IN 
CONTINGENCY LEARNING  
hroughout this thesis I have highlighted the importance of ‘task set’. This 
chapter defines exactly what I mean by this and summarises the relevant 
research, before discussing how the existing literature could inform the design 
of a within-participants experiment manipulating task set based on the traffic 
light paradigm developed thus far. 
 TASK SET 
A ‘task set’ is a configuration of cognitive resources that are required and 
maintained to complete a task (Monsell, 1996, 2003). In many experiments, 
including the ones presented in this thesis, task set is established through 
instructions. As Sakai (2008) p. 219, notes “participants heed the instructions 
and prepare for the experiment. The participants may remember the instructions 
by verbally rehearsing them, but after practice for several trials, the task 
information is maintained as a configuration of perceptual, attentional, 
mnemonic, and motor processes necessary to perform the task”. In 
understanding how task sets come to affect behaviour, Meiran (2000) argues 
this happens through four steps. Firstly, the task set must be configured (e.g., 
through instructions). Secondly, the information is applied as a mental 
representation. Next, a process the author refers to as ‘similarity matching’ 
occurs, whereby the target stimuli facing a participant are compared with the 
representation of the responses. Through this process each response (e.g., two 
different button presses in a 2-choice reaction time task) acquires ‘potency’, 
which is determined by the degree of similarity between the task set response 
and the stimulus. The final stage is called ‘response decision’. Here the 
potencies between each response are compared and the response with the 
highest potency is selected. More generally, the formation of a task set can be 
seen as two distinct processes. Firstly, there is a preparation stage where the 
rules of a task set need to be activated, and secondly interference from 
competing task sets needs to be inhibited (Mayr, Diedrichsen, Ivry, & Keele, 




 THE TASK-CUEING PARADIGM  
A full review of the many paradigms used in the task set literature is outside the 
scope of this thesis. Rather, the discussion focuses on the task-cueing 
paradigm (Sudevan & Taylor, 1987; Meiran, 1996; Monsell & Mizon, 2006) 
given the parallels with the issues this chapter wishes to address. In 
experiments based on this paradigm, participants are informed at the start 
about the rules of the task and the cues that signal the need to implement these 
rules. Then each trial is preceded by a cue which indicates the type of response 
required by participants to the subsequent stimulus. Participants must respond 
quickly and accurately, as in a typical reaction time task. The task continues in 
this manner with cues preceding stimuli. Typically, there are two tasks to 
perform with a different cue indicating a different task set, with participants 
having to switch task sets throughout the experiment. Performance is 
dependent on participants applying the correct task set based on the cue to the 
stimuli presented on that trial (Li, Li, Liu, Lages, & Stoet, 2019; McLaren et al., 
2019). The exact nature of the task set can vary amongst experiments, from 
requiring participants to classify rectangles by height or width depending on 
whether the preceding cue was h or w respectively (Altmann, 2004), or to 
classify a single digit as either odd or even depending on the colour of a 
preceding disk (Monsell, Sumner, & Waters, 2003). 
One design of a task-cueing experiment that provides a starting point for the 
discussion of Experiment 6 can be found in the work by Meier, Lea, Forrest, 
Angerer, and McLaren (2013). Because the authors wanted to compare the 
behaviour of human participants against that of pigeons, they used different 
colours to indicate task set rather than language-based cues. Thus, in the 
experiment a blue or yellow circle in the centre of the display required 
participants to respond with task A, while red or green circles required 
participants to respond with task B. In this way, the colour of the circle informed 
participants of the correct response towards the subsequent stimuli. The results 
and exact purpose of the work by Meier et al. (2013) are not relevant to this 
discussion. It is sufficient to say that the human participants were able to 




 PRESENT EXPERIMENTS 
Throughout this thesis task set has been an important factor in the design of the 
experiments. Indeed, given that different traffic lights are likely to be 
experienced within different task sets, this factor is fundamental to the 
experience of traffic lights. Yet, the designs employed thus far have only 
enabled comparisons of task set at between participants’ levels. Experiment 6 
explores task set using a within-participants design. As seen in the introduction, 
the task-cueing paradigm can allow the changing of task set within an 
experiment using only simple shapes. To my knowledge, these experiments will 
be the first to apply such a paradigm to the learning environment experienced at 
UK traffic lights. Note that the experiments reported so far in this thesis did 
prepare the ground for the development of the paradigm to capture more real-
world learning; in Experiments 4 and 5, there were two sequences per traffic 
light. For example, in Green 1, G was + mimicking the situation when the lights 
have recently changed to green, and thus it is likely a driver would have time to 
cross the junction. Whereas in Green 2, G was -, modelling the situation when 
the lights have been green for some time and so a driver could be expecting 
them to change to amber and so might be more cautious around them.  
 EXPERIMENT 6 
Capturing the task set used for each individual traffic light is an important step in 
obtaining a fuller picture of contingency learning at UK traffic lights. If a driver is 
approaching traffic lights which are currently on green, they will know they have 
some (unpredictable) time to cross the junction, thus their default will be go and 
their task set (that is, the signalled response they are looking for) will be stop. 
However, if the driver is waiting at a red light then they will expect the light to 
change to red and amber soon, and so their default will be stop (with a task set 
of go). The challenge for Experiment 6 was to capture this combination of traffic 
light changes and the appropriate task set in the laboratory. My previous 
experiments have demonstrated how switching the required response to the 
coloured circles can lead to a change in task set, so this manipulation was 
indicated. Informed by the design of Meier et al. (2013), a cued conditional 
feature was added to indicate the appropriate response to coloured circles. 
While using the approach taken by Meier et al. (2013) and having coloured 
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circles appear in the middle of the screen would build upon this past work, it 
would not be consistent with the design of the paradigm developed thus far, as 
it would disrupt presentation of the fixation bar and the shapes. Therefore, the 
approach taken here was to add another signal on the screen to let participants 
know the correct response whilst not interfering with the existing display. A 
square outline around the centre display was used to cue the task. A dark grey 
square (RGB code 64, 64, 64) surrounding the cue and circle indicated a go 
task (respond to coloured circles) whereas a light grey square (RBG code 191, 
191, 191) designated a stop task (do not respond to coloured circles). 
Therefore, in Figure 4.1 participants were required to respond to the right-hand 






As well as task set, Chapter 3 showed that the sequence of stimuli experienced 
at traffic lights was itself an important source of learning, and therefore 
Experiment 6 used the same sequences, but with the addition of the 
aforementioned conditional cue. Therefore, the response to each trial depended 
on the colour of the enclosing square, which correlated with the sequence. 
Table 4.1 represents the same sequences as Table 3.1 in Chapter 3, except 
that the cues are now colour coded to reflect the colour of the square that will 
appear with them. In addition, now that task set is decoupled from response, + 
equals go and - stop. In Table 4.1, bold dark grey means that participants will 
see a dark grey square (and thus will respond to coloured circles, which means 
the default will be stop and task set is go) while bold light grey means that 
participants will see a light grey square (and thus will be in a stop task set as 
participants will have to not respond to coloured circles and respond to white 
circles). 
Figure 4.1. Conditional cues used in Experiment 6. 
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Table 4.1. Sequence runs for Experiment 6 ‘-’ is 100% stop, ‘+’ is 100% go. 
 
As can be seen in Table 4.1, green traffic lights are always accompanied by a 
light grey square (default go, task set stop). This is because it is assumed that 
initially green traffic lights will always induce a default go response, and thus 
drivers will be looking for stop signs. This helps to correct an issue with the 
design of the experiments in Chapter 3, whereby the sequence Green 2 did not 
have a preceding green cue before the green stop cue to mimic the shift in 
driver’s perception of G being a go cue to a stop cue. However, the interaction 
between task set and go/no-go response sets up a situation where participants 
see a green cue with the default to respond but in fact are required to withhold 
their response. The opposite holds true for R+ in the Red 2 sequence. In this 
sequence R+ is designed to mimic the situation where a driver has come 
around a corner, seen the lights are on red and approached while the lights are 
still red. The driver knows the lights must change to red and amber shortly and 
might be assumed not to brake in the approach towards the light. In this 
instance R acts a go cue. However, red is likely to still engage a default stop 
response and so is accompanied by a dark grey square. 
As before the filler cues need to balance out the above design. The addition of 
the conditional cueing means that this also needs to be controlled. This raises 
another issue for the experimental design: is it more important that the 
experiment mimics real-life or that it is a balanced design? If the former is key, 
the filler cues would need to have the opposite conditional cueing to cues in the 











G+ -> G+  
G- -> A- -> R- -> R- -> RA+ -> G+ 
A+ -> A+  
A- -> R- -> R- -> RA+ ->G+ 
R- -> R- -> RA+ ->G+ 
R+ -> RA+ -> G+ 
RA+ -> G+ 
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sequence, e.g., cue B would have a dark grey square cue. This would mean 
that the conditional cue (grey outline square) would also signal what type of trial 
(+ or -) was likely to happen, with the light grey square (that cue linked to G) 
indicating that a trial is very likely to be a go trial. This design would create a 
situation where one is being cued for situations where one is mostly likely to go, 
or to stop – which is what traffic lights in some way do. If on the other hand a 
balanced design is most important, then cue B would need to be accompanied 
by a light grey square. In other words, each filler cue has the same conditional 
cue as its main counterpart. The conditionality then cannot indicate the 
response that is likely to be needed. To ensure that Experiment 6 was 
consistent with my previous experiments, it was decided to use a design that 
was balanced (see Table 4.2). It will be noted that cues J and YZ appear 
equally in a stop and go task set. This was to prevent a cue becoming linked to 
a specific colour circle. For example, if cue J was not split by the conditionality 
feature and response as shown, then a feasible design would be J- 
accompanied by a dark grey conditional cue, and J+ accompanied by a light 
grey conditional cue. In this case, while the overall response would be balanced 
(4 go and 4 stop), participants would only see white circles when this cue 
appeared. This would be because with J- (stop trials) white circles would be the 
stop cue, while for J+ (change in task set) white circles would require a go 
















The inclusion criteria and outlier removal process were the same as Experiment 
2 (see Results section for details of those removed). A power analysis using the 
R package SIMR (Green & MacLeod, 2016) and the data from Experiments 4 
and 5 suggested that 50 participants would give a 84.30% chance of detecting a 
20.37ms difference between a go vs. stop cue (G vs. B, see section 4.4.1.2 for 
details) for the first sequence trial analysis for response times (the average 
difference from G vs B for those two experiments). This sample size is also in 
line with other recent similar experiments, such as Forrest et al. (2014). Of the 
final sample, 44 were female with an overall mean age of 20.00 (SD = 3.09). 
Participants received payment of £5 or one course credit. 
 Design  
The design (see Table 4.3) was similar to that of Experiment 4 and 5 except for 
conditionality, as discussed above, and the calibration block. In past 
Cue type Cue Occurrences per block 
Cue G filler 
 
Cue R filler 
 








































experiments the calibration block comprised 24 trials. However, in order to allow 
participants practice at the conditional nature of the current task the calibration 
block was extended to include 36 trials, split into three runs of six trials for each 
task set with these runs ordered randomly. To reflect the new nature of the first 
block in Table 4.3 it is renamed as a Learning Phase. The decision to split J by 
conditionality and response for training and test blocks also meshes with the 
change to the calibration block. If the cue had not been modulated by these 
factors, then participants would have experienced a split design in the learning 
phase but not for the training or test phases. This could have led to participants 
changing their performance to cue J in the subsequent blocks, which in turn 
could have disrupted the tracking procedure. Another feature of the design 
worth highlighting is that in more traditional cued task-switching designs, trials 
(and therefore responses) are randomly ordered. However, in the design 
employed for Experiment 6 the order in each sequence is fixed, but the order of 
the sequences was random.  
 
Table 4.3. Summary of Experiment 6 design. Letters represent a sequence. The 
numbers in parentheses indicate how often the sequence will occur per block. At 
test the contingencies were ±. 







1 36  J 
Training 6 232 G1(4), G2(4), A1(4), A2(4), R1(4), 




Test 1 232 G1(4), G2(4), A1(4), A2(4), R1(4), 





 Procedure  
The procedure was identical to that of Experiments 4 and 5 apart from changes 
to the instructions and the addition of the cueing square. The task was designed 
so that a cueing square was always on screen, appearing with the fixation bar 
for that trial and then changing (or not) with presentation of the next fixation bar 




The instructions were amended to reflect the addition of the conditional feature. 
Instructions for responses to a dark grey square (respond to coloured circles, 
withhold to white circles) were presented first, followed by the instructions for 
the light grey square (withhold to coloured circles, respond to white). This was 
then reinforced with the final instructions screen telling participants “if you see a 
dark grey rectangle then respond to coloured circles. If you see a light grey 
rectangle do not respond to coloured circles.” The instructions were written with 
a focus on a response to the coloured circles in order to reinforce the change in 
task requirements and to ensure that participants were in the correct task set. 
Figure 4.2. Schematic of a trial for Experiment 6. As the cueing square is dark 
grey this would indicate to participants that they need to respond to coloured 




By starting with responses to white circles (as in past experiments) it might have 
led to participants not fully appreciating the change in the task (as the response 
to colour is the more salient of responses). One potential issue with this is that 
the second line is an example of a reversed instruction, telling participants what 
not to do, which can be harder to interpret. Additionally, the fact that the go task 
set instructions were presented first might lead participants to assume this is the 
default task and so shift performance to trials with the stop task set. One 
approach could have been to counterbalance the order of the instructions 
across participants. However, this would have meant that instructions would 
have focused on not responding to coloured circles first. It was felt this might 
have been difficult for participants to understand, given that instructions in most 
psychological experiments prime what to do first. 
4.4.1.3.1 Awareness measures 
As with Experiments 4 and 5 an awareness measure was included. 
 Analysis and results 
The analysis for Experiment 6 was conducted in a similar manner to that for 
Experiments 4 and 5 and so the particulars will not be repeated here. In terms 
of outliers, two participants were removed and replaced for having high 
omission errors, while one participant was removed and replaced for having 
high commission errors. Two participants failed to complete the experiment. 
There were no outliers for reaction times. One change is that due to the 
variation of task set there is no longer a basis for undertaking the feature-
positive effect analysis. Additionally, although this chapter has discussed the 
task switching literature, the analysis still focuses on the learning that takes 
place to the cues, and so analyses that one would normally see with some task 
set paradigms (e.g., switch costs) were not investigated here. 
 Training phase  
As with the analyses reported in Chapter 3, performance is likely to be affected 
by repetition priming effects and so contrasts were undertaken to demonstrate 
learning in situations where such effects were not in play. I then present the 
traffic light analysis to explore performance to the cues of interest (Table 4.4 




Cue Reaction Time p(respond) p(miss) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
A-/+ 504.08 76.55 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02 
B- 537.24 84.81 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04 
G+ 477.56 87.32 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 
I+ 540.07 75.61 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 
IP- NA NA 0.04 0.02 NA NA 
J± 546.52 76.05 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.03 
P-/+ 530.46 84.73 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 
R- 564.59 87.22 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 
RA+ 542.7 82.35 NA NA 0.02 0.02 
YZ-/+ 558.39 71.68 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Table 4.4. Training descriptive statistics for Experiment 6. Reaction times 
means are calculated using are raw data, but mean p(respond) and p(miss) use 
transformed data. 
4.4.2.1.1 Reaction times  
For the training data, the best fitting model had a conditional R2 of 0.86 (see 
Table 4.5 for AICs).  
4.4.2.1.1.1 Evidence of associative learning 
As with Chapter 3, the contrasts that provide evidence of associative learning in 
isolation are R vs. I and R vs. B. Importantly, the contrast R vs. I also controls 
for the effect of task set (as they both have the same conditional response). The 
alpha level was corrected to .025. The contrast R vs. I was significant, t(392) = -
3.86, p = < .001, 95% CI [-36.97, -12.07], d = -0.39, with slower responses to R 
than I indicating that cue R was not a go cue. The comparison R vs. B was also 
significant, t(392) = -4.31, p = < .001, 95% CI [-39.80, -14.90], d = -0.43, with 
faster reaction times to cue B than R suggesting that participants learnt that cue 
R was a stop cue. Of course, it must be noted that B and R have different 
conditional cues. This, then, may in part be why R is coming out as a stronger 
stop cue than B. But that is not to in any way minimise the result. Under these 
conditions, and the assumed conditions experienced at UK traffic lights, R is a 
strong stop cue. 
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4.4.2.1.1.2 Traffic light contrasts 
Noting the above results, I can be confident that the following results arise 
because of associative learning as well as repetition priming. As G vs. B is no 
longer a pure manipulation check, the alpha level was corrected to .008. The G 
vs. B contrast was highly significant, t(392) = 9.40, p = < .001, 95% CI [47.24, 
72.14], d = 0.95, with G having faster response times than B indicating that 
learning was occurring. The A vs. B contrast was also highly significant, t(392) = 
5.22, p = < .001, 95% CI [20.71, 45.61], d = 0.53, with cue A being faster than 
B, indicating that A was not experienced as a stop cue. The A vs. G contrast 
was significant, t(392) = -4.18, p = < .001, 95% CI [-38.97, -14.07], d = -0.42, 
with faster response for G than A, indicating that while A primed responding 
more than B it was not as much a go cue as G. Cue R was significantly slower 
than B, t(392) = -4.31, p = < .001, 95% CI [-39.80, -14.90], d = -0.43 suggesting 
that it was more of a stop cue than B. Cue R was also highly significantly slower 
than cue G, t(392) = -13.70, p = < .001, 95% CI [-99.49, -74.59], d = -1.38, 
suggesting that R was not a go cue. The A vs. R contrast was highly significant, 
t(392) = 9.73, p = < .001, 95% CI [48.06, 72.96], d = 0.96, suggesting that A 
was more of a go cue than R. 
4.4.2.1.2 p(respond)  
For this measure, the best model was a model that included the main effects of 
cue with a Gamma family and inverse link and random intercept (see Table 
4.5).  
4.4.2.1.2.1 Evidence of associative learning 
For this measure the contrasts G vs. B and G vs. I provide the conditions to 
assess for the occurrence of associative learning, with the contrast G vs. B 
controlling for the effect of task set. The G vs. B contrast was not significant, z = 
-0.28, p = .781, nor was the G vs. I contrast, z = -072, p = .473. Overall, these 
two contrasts demonstrate that associative learning was weak for this measure 
and leads to the conclusion that this measure is less sensitive than reaction 
times, probably because of the low error rate. It is worth noting that cue B has 
the same conditional cue as G, and so that is the most important comparison.  
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4.4.2.1.2.2 Traffic light contrasts 
Given the above results it is likely that performance for commission errors is 
driven more by repetition priming effects than associative learning. For this 
analysis, the alpha level was corrected to .008. The G vs. B contrast was not 
significant, z = -0.28, p = .781. The A vs. B contrast was not significant at the 
corrected alpha, z = 2.44, p = .015, although this does suggest a trend for more 
errors to A than B which would be consistent with A priming go responses. 
Looking at Table 4.1 it could be that cue A is not overly affected by repetition 
priming. This is because when the cue does appear in a sequence trial position 
greater than 1 it is equally balanced to appear after a go or a stop cue (in Green 
2 it occurs after a stop cue and itself is stop, while in Amber 1 the second cue is 
a go cue A and is proceeded by another go cue A). The nearly significant result 
for A vs. B could be indicative of some associative learning. The A vs. G 
contrast was highly significant, z = 6.24, p = .007, with surprisingly more errors 
for A than G, indicating that cue A was also more likely to prime errors of 
commission than cue G. Given that cue G is more often than not proceeded by 
another go cue (see Red 1 for example), one would expect repetition priming 
effects to push cue G to become a go cue on this measure. The fact it does not 
suggests that cue A is a strong go cue. The contrast R vs. B was significant, z = 
-3.08, p = .002, with unexpectedly more errors for cue B than R, which supports 
the contrasts for reaction times that suggested cue R was a stronger stop cue 
than B. However, noting the results in section 4.4.2.1.2.1 the role of repetition 
priming cannot be ignored. This is especially the case for this contrast where 
cue R is often embedded in a run of stop trials which is likely to enhance the 
stopping behaviour exhibited to this cue. The subsequent analysis on test data 
will help determine if this is the case. The R vs. G contrast was significant, z = -
2.83, p = .005, with more errors for G than R, again suggesting that R was not a 
go cue, yet for the reasons discussed above this difference is not unexpected. 
The A vs. R contrast was highly significant, z = 5.10, p = < .001, demonstrating 
that cue A was more of a go cue than cue R, and matching the results for 
reaction times. Nevertheless, these results could also be a consequence of 
repetition priming.  
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4.4.2.1.3 Training phase summary 
Overall, the reaction time data provides evidence that associative learning was 
occurring. However, given the lack of such evidence for commission errors it 
seems prudent to assume that performance on p(respond) could be, in a large 
part, driven by repetition priming effects. In summary it seems that, in an 
experiment that combines go and stop task sets and some of the sequences 
experienced at traffic lights, cue G is a go cue, cue A is slower than G (and 
faster than B) but leads to more errors so is perhaps similar to G, and cue R a 
strong stop cue.  
Table 4.5. AICc scores for models for Experiment 6 run on reaction time and 
p(respond) data at training and test. Bold are the models chosen.  
 Test analysis  
The same issues within the test phase highlighted in Chapter 3 are also 
relevant for Experiment 6. Thus, the same two separate analyses will be 
undertaken as in Chapter 3. The first analysis focuses on filler trials and first 
trial in a sequence, while the second explores performance on trials embedded 
within sequences. See Table 4.6 for descriptive statistics.   
Model Training 1st Sequence Other sequence 
Reaction time models    
Main effects of cue 5242.19 6045.60 6024.71 
Main effects of cue with 
random intercept 
 
4551.45 5624.26 5529.98 
p(respond) 
 
   
Main effects of cue with 
Gamma family and inverse 
link 
 
-1856.54 -2165.71 -2297.90 
Main effects of cue with 
Gamma family and inverse 
link and random intercept 
-1871.31 -2181.90 -2322.91 
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4.4.2.2.1 First trial analyses 
The analyses conducted on the first trial of each sequence were a G vs. B 
contrast (which is now once again a manipulation check) and A vs. B, A vs. G, 
A vs. R, R vs. B and R vs. G. The alpha level for these analyses was corrected 
to .010 (see Table 4.5 for AICc’s).  
4.4.2.2.1.1 Reaction times 
The model chosen had a conditional R2 of 0.66. The G vs. B contrast was 
significant, t(441) = 4.95, p = < .001, 95% CI [36.48, 84.23], d = 0.47 indicating 
that learning had taken place by the test phase. The A vs. B contrast 
approached significance at a standard alpha level, t(441) = 1.88, p = .061, 95% 
CI [-1.02, 46.72], d = 0.18, suggesting a weak trend for participants to make 
faster responses to cue A than B. The A vs. G contrast was significant, t(441) = 
-3.08, p = .002, 95% CI [-61.38, -13.64], d = -0.29, suggesting that cue G 
primed more of a go response than cue A. The R vs. B contrast was not 
significant, t(441) = -1.18, p = .241, 95% CI [-38.19, 9.56], d = 0.11, and cue R 
had significantly slower reaction times than cue G, t(441) = -6.13, p = < .001, 
95% CI [-98.54, -50.79], d = -0.58 suggesting that cue R was not a go cue. The 
contrast A vs. R was also significant, t(441) = 3.05, p = .002, 95% CI [13.28, 
61.03], d = 0.29 suggesting that cue A primed more of a go response than cue 
R. These results clearly indicate that G is a go cue, R a stop cue, and A 
somewhere in between. 
4.4.2.2.1.2 p(respond) 
For commission errors there was a non-significant difference for G vs. B, z = -
0.19, p = .848, suggesting that performance was not strong for this contrast. 
The contrast A vs. B was significant at a standard alpha level, z = 2.13, p = 
.033, and hints at a trend for more errors to A than B. The difference between A 
vs. G was significant at a standard alpha level, z = 2.29, p = .022, suggesting an 
unexpected trend for more errors to cue A than G. For cue R, the contrast 
against cue B was not significant, z = -0.82, p = .410 (this suggest that the 
significant difference in training was largely due to repetition priming), nor was 
the contrast against G, z = -0.64, p = .525. The contrast for A vs. R was 
significant, z = 2.77, p = .006, with more errors to cue A than R. These results 
suggest that A is as much of a go cue (perhaps more so) than G and confirm 
that R is a stop cue. 
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4.4.2.2.2 Other sequence trial analyses 
This analysis focused on comparing the traffic light cues within the sequences. 
Therefore, contrasts undertaken were A vs. G, A vs. R, and R vs. G. The alpha 
level was corrected to .017.  
4.4.2.2.2.1 Reaction times 
The model chosen had a conditional R2 of 0.73. The A vs. G contrast was 
significant, t(441) = -3.93, p = < .001, 95% CI [-64.39, -21.56], d = -0.37, with 
faster responses to cue G than A suggesting G primed a greater go response. 
The A vs. R contrast was significant, t(441) = 3.85, p = < .001, 95% CI [20.61, 
63.43], d = 0.37, with faster responses to cue A than R. Lastly, the R vs. G 
contrast was highly significant, t(441) = -7.78, p = < .001, 95% CI [-106.40, -
63.58], d = -0.74, with faster reaction times to cue G than R indicating that R 
was not a go cue. Once again, the reaction time data suggest that G is a strong 
go cue, R a strong stop cue and A is in between. 
4.4.2.2.2.2 p(respond) 
The A vs. G contrast was not significant, z = 1.24, p = .215. The A vs. R 
contrast was significant at a standard alpha level, z = 2.34, p = .019, suggesting 
a weak trend for cue A to promote more of a go response than cue R. The R vs. 
G contrast was not significant, z = -1.23, p = .219. I note that the analysis of the 
sequence trials is now producing useful results. Yet this is qualified by the 
change in task set that will occur during sequences. 
4.4.2.2.3 Test phase summary 
The first sequence trial analyses indicates that at a purely associative learning 
level participants had learnt that G was a go cue, with this having significantly 
faster reaction times than cue B. Cue A seems to be a fairly weak go cue, with 
hints at being more going than cue B for both reaction times and commission 
errors, and having significantly more errors than G but slower reaction times. 
The cue was also significantly more go on both measures when compared to 
cue R. For cue R learning suggests it primed a stop response, having 
significantly slower reaction times than cue G but similar performance on both 
measures to B (and similar levels of error rates to G).  
This general pattern is supported by the other sequence trial analyses. Once 
again cue A seemed to be a fairly weak go cue. The cue had significantly 
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slower reaction times than cue G but similar commission errors, and it primed 
significantly more going behaviour than cue R for both measures. For reaction 
times cue R promoted significantly more stopping behaviour than cue G, 
suggesting it was a stop cue.  
Type of cues Reaction Time p(respond) p(miss) 
Filler cues Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
B+ 539.21 84.33 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 
I- 537.72 96.37 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 
IP+ 571.41 109.1 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.04 
J± 556.54 108.24 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.07 
P-/+ 527.29 88.52 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.07 
YZ-/+ 562.16 104.44 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.06 





      
A 516.37 91.62 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.03 
G 478.86 109.77 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.00 
R 553.53 117.28 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.11 
RA 531.39 94.17 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.05 





      
A 488.02 107.21 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.03 
G 445.05 92.87 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.02 
R 530.04 97.54 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.02 
RA 498.02 96.26 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 
Table 4.6. Test descriptive statistics for Experiment 6. Reaction time means are 





As in Chapter 3 it was possible to contrast expectancy scores between cues to 
assess the evidence of awareness. This analysis was undertaken in the same 
manner as the reaction time data (see Table 4.7 for descriptive statistics). An 
alpha level of .008 was applied to this analysis. The best model fitted the main 
effects of cue with random intercept (R2 = 0.74). The G vs. B contrast was 
highly significant, t(539) = 6.34, p = < .001, 95% CI [3.03, 5.73], b = 0.55, with 
participants more likely to classify G as a go cue than B. The A vs. B contrast 
was not significant at the reduced alpha, t(539) = 2.00, p = .046, 95% CI [0.03, 
2.73], d = 0.17, although there was a trend for participants to rate cue A as 
more go than cue B. The A vs. G contrast was significant, t(539) = -4.34, p = < 
.001, 95% CI [-4.35, -1.65], d = -0.37, with participants more likely to rate G as a 
go cue than cue A. The A vs. R contrast was marginally significant at a standard 
alpha, t(539) = 1.68, p = .094, 95% CI [-0.19, 2.51], d = 0.14, with a slight trend 
for higher go ratings for A than R. Focusing on cue R, R vs. G was highly 
significant, t(539) = -6.03, p = < .001, 95% CI [-5.51, -2.81], d = -0.52, with 
participants more likely to rate cue G as go than cue R. The R vs. B contrast 
was not significant, t(539) = 0.32, p = .750, 95% CI [-1.13, 1.57], d = 0.03.  
As in Chapter 3 it was possible to use J and YZ as baseline cues to see if 
awareness for B was neutral or biased in some way. This analysis was separate 
from that reported above and so an alpha level of .013 was applied. The J vs. G 
contrast was significant, t(539) = -4.95, p = < .001, 95% CI [-4.77, -2.07], d = -
0.43, with participants more likely to classify G as a go cue than J. The YZ vs. G 
contrast was highly significant, t(539) = -6.08, p = < .001, 95% CI [-5.55, -2.85], 
d = -0.52, again with participants more likely to see G as a go cue than YZ. 
Thus, participants seem to have been aware that cue G was a go cue 
compared to neutral cues. Against B, the contrast for J was not significant, 
t(539) = 1.39, p = .164, 95% CI [-0.39, 2.31], d = 0.12, nor was the contrast for 
YZ vs. B, t(539) = 0.26, p = .794, 95% CI [-1.17, 1.53], d = 0.02. This indicates 
that participants expected to make very similar responses to cue B (a stop cue) 
and cues J and YZ (neutral 50:50 cues). Of course, contrasts against cue R 
might support the argument regarding participant’s lack of awareness best 
given that R is now a strong stop cue. Indeed, neither the J vs. R contrast, 
t(539) = 1.07, p = .284, 95% CI [-0.61, 2.09], d = 0.09, nor the YZ vs. R 
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contrast, t(539) = -0.06, p = .954, 95% CI [-1.39, 1.31], d = -0.00 was significant. 
Thus, though cue R seems to be a strong stop cue behaviourally, it is 
numerically similar to J and YZ in terms of expectancy. 
Overall, the analysis shows that for some cue’s participants were aware of the 
required response. This awareness seems to focus on cue G, with participants 
showing consistent awareness of this cue relative to others.  
Cue Expectancy Rating 
 Mean SD 
A-/+ 1.98 3.35 
B- 0.60 4.69 
G+ 4.98 3.40 
I+ 2.66 3.49 
IP- -0.92 3.92 
J± 1.56 4.26 
P-/+ 1.86 3.73 
R- 0.82 4.09 
RA+ -0.52 3.60 
Y-/+ -0.28 4.11 
YZ-/+ 0.78 3.65 
Z-/+ -0.28 4.53 
Table 4.7. Descriptive statistics for expectancy ratings for Experiment 6. 
 Correlational analysis  
As in Chapter 3 it is possible to compare performance scores and expectancy 
ratings to see if there is a correlation between them. Therefore, correlations 
comparing the significant contrasts from the expectancy ratings are presented, 
that is, G vs. B, G vs. A, and G vs. R. For training the whole dataset was used, 
whilst for test only data from first sequence trials was included. Looking at 
Figure 4.3, once the alpha level correction is applied (to p = .017), it seems that 
awareness did not affect performance at training – though the result for G vs. B 
for response times might be taken to indicate that awareness did have some 
influence upon performance. Regarding the test data (Figure 4.4) it seems 
performance and awareness were not correlated. Thus, although participants 
appear to notice cue G, and to be able to articulate this knowledge in their 
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ratings at training, the correlation between the advantage of G over B and the 
difference in awareness ratings never becomes significant after correction. Of 
course, one caveat is that perhaps there is a small causal influence that this 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Experiment 6 was an attempt to combine two factors highlighted in preceding 
chapters that seem to influence learning of the contingencies experienced at UK 
traffic lights, or more accurately, within the paradigm developed here to capture 
learning at UK traffic lights. Using a within-participants design, Experiment 6 
exposed participants to both the task sets and sequences likely to be 
experienced at traffic lights.  
Firstly, it is worth noting that participants were able to cope with this paradigm. 
The (by now) typical finding of G being significantly different from B was 
obtained, with significantly faster response times to G than to B in both the 
training phase and in the first sequence trials analysis, though cue G did not 
produce significantly more errors for p(respond) in either phase. This illustrates 
that at a fundamental level learning to Experiment 6 was still occurring as 
expected despite the substantial changes that had been made.  
Turning to the two key traffic light cues of A and R, at training there is evidence 
that cue A was not a stop cue, having significantly faster response times than B 
and a strong trend (though not significant at the corrected alpha level) for more 
commission errors than B. Of course, caveats apply for the A vs. B contrast for 
commission error as there was little evidence that associative learning was 
driving performance for this measure. Compared to G, cue A was significantly 
slower at training but had significantly more commission errors. The 
commission contrast is intriguing, being contrary to expected performance 
based on repetition priming effects and indicating a role for associative learning. 
Overall, focusing on the reaction times (where I can be confident performance 
is, in part, an outcome of associative learning) it seems that cue A is a neutral 
cue. However, the results for p(respond) do hint that cue A may be more of a 
weak go cue than a neutral cue. In the case of R, it was significantly slower in 
terms of reaction times for both cue G and cue B, indicating that cue R is a 
strong stop cue. For p(respond), cue R also had significantly less errors than B 
or G, supporting the argument that cue R was a stop cue. However, it must be 
highlighted that for both contrasts for errors there is a clear logic supporting the 
effects of repetition priming upon performance.  
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For the first sequence test trials the results suggest that cue A primed a quite 
weak go response. Reaction times were faster for A than B, but this difference 
only approached significance at a standard alpha level, and cue A had 
significantly slower response times compared to G. Yet, for error rates cue A 
had significantly more errors at a standard alpha level than both B and G, 
suggesting that for errors there was a trend for cue A to promote a go response. 
For cue R, the data indicates it was a stop cue. The cue had significantly slower 
response times than cue G but was similar in performance for cue B. For 
commission errors learning seemed to be weak, with error rates not being 
significantly difference between B, G or R. Overall, the results suggest that on a 
stop-go continuum, cue G was a go cue, cue A was quite a weak go cue, cue B 
a stop cue, and cue R a stop cue, slightly more so than cue B based on the 
reaction time data.  
In terms of the results for cue A, Experiment 6 is consistent with other results 
presented in this thesis and shows how an amber light could become linked to a 
go response, albeit a weak one. For cue R, this experiment contrasts quite 
sharply with the general conclusion of the previous experiments that suggested 
R to be a weak stop cue. However, R has been consistently found to promote 
stopping (to varying degrees) and so the shift is not quite as marked as might at 
first appear. The difference could well be due to the different task sets in play. 
Looking back to the experiments in Chapters 2 (and ignoring the enhanced 
learning generated by sequences) it would seem that what I have called a stop 
task set (where the default is go) is one that potentiates learning to go to cue A. 
Whereas, in a go task set (where the default is stop) learning potentiates 
stopping to R. In some sense, then, the labelling of these task sets can be seen 
as giving the wrong impression (even though logically they are labelled entirely 
correctly). Of course, the task sets themselves are confounded with particular 
sequences and cues that have different contingent relationships to responding, 
so it is difficult to be unequivocally sure about this conclusion. The take home 
message is that whilst one may now have more confidence that a red traffic 
light will indeed be learnt as a stop cue due to driver's experience at traffic 
lights, it still remains the case that an amber light might promote something of a 




The results for the awareness correlations continue to support the view that 
participants are learning about the task through associatively-mediated 
processes, with correlations not being significant after corrections. However, the 
fact that the G vs. B correlation was significant at a standard alpha level for 
training does suggest that awareness might have some role to play in 
performance, and that these null results could partly be due to a lack of power. 
It might be fairer to acknowledge that participants do seem to pick up on G 
more often than not, realising that a response will be required to this cue, but 
that the other cues all seem to be similar in regard to the expectancy ratings. 
In past chapters the first experiment has been replicated, but with a switch in 
task set. This approach is not appropriate here, but Experiment 7 does replicate 
the training phase of Experiment 6, and begins the process of development of a 
paradigm that will allow us to change the learnt contingencies to cue A.  
 EXPERIMENT 7  
Throughout the experiments presented in this thesis, it has become clear that 
amber traffic lights may not be associated with the weak stop/stop contingency 
that the Highway Code prescribes, but rather seem to be associated with a 
weak go response (at least in the task developed here). This suggests that the 
associative system is cueing people for a go response at amber traffic lights, 
and that either in tandem with more conscious decision making (e.g., If I jump 
the light I could get home early), or, worse, without the input of conscious 
control (McLaren et al., 2019) could lead to people crossing amber lights. Given 
the role associative learning might have in motivating people to jump amber 
traffic lights, the next question becomes: is it possible to address this behaviour 
by retraining learning, so that amber is associated with stop rather than go? 
This brings to mind the work on associatively-mediated inhibition such as that 
by N. S. Lawrence, O'Sullivan, et al. (2015) reviewed in Chapter 1, and I will 
return to this in the discussion. Experiment 7 begins the development of this 
inhibition training, but it is also a direct replication of Experiment 6 (the inhibition 
training aspect will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6).  
The existing paradigm has two parts; in the training phase participants learn the 
contingencies of the task (which reflect some of the contingencies at play in UK 
traffic lights) and then in the test phase I investigate what learning has taken 
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place. By the end of the training phase, but before the test phase, participants 
seem to learn that A is a fairly weak go cue. Therefore, placing an inhibition task 
whereby cue A is linked to stopping before the test phase should retrain 
participants to exhibit a stop response to cue A. In the subsequent test phase 
one would expect those who had this training to have slower responses and 
less commission errors to cue A than those who received a similar task.  
In terms of the participant’s experience of the inhibition phase, it needed to be 
similar to the existing design for learning to transfer, therefore a warning cue 
(the shape) had to appear on the screen followed by another signal denoting 
the response required. The responses used so far have been go or stop and 
these responses were used again. In addition, go signals have previously 
appeared on either side of the shape and so this will be another constraint on 
the inhibition task. As task set was not manipulated during this phase, the 
cueing square was removed. Given the intervention is about learning to stop, 
this phase only had two cues, a prepotent go cue and a less frequently seen 
stop cue. Therefore there was no tracking cue, with the experiment having a set 
response window of 1000ms in line with similar work (Bowditch, 2016). 
Regarding the cues used in this inhibition phase, clearly A has to be the stop 
cue for the experimental group. While it would seem sensible at face value to 
use cue G as the go cue, the extra exposure to cue G might affect learning at 
the test phase. Additionally, the inhibition task will not use sequences, and so 
using a novel go cue was felt best in order to leave comparisons of G vs. B at 
test unaltered. Therefore, a new cue, cue X, was employed as the go cue for 
the inhibition phase. For the control condition, in order to match learning as 
closely as possible, participants were exposed to the go cue X but for the 
stopping response saw another novel cue, cue O, instead of cue A. 
One last change was made: rather than respond (or not) to white or coloured 
circles participants had to respond (or not) to black arrows. This change was 
made to ensure that the phase was not too similar to the past blocks, as if it was 
identical then the phase would not be inhibition per se, but rather additional 
training, with admittedly changed contingencies. However, to ensure that 
learning from the inhibition phase did transfer to test it was important to ensure 
that the phase did not feel too dissimilar either, and so responding to arrows 
rather than circles was felt to strike the optimum balance. Black was chosen as 
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the colour for the arrows to ensure that any learning to colours resulting from 
the training phase did not impact learning for the inhibition phase, with 
participants never responding (or not) to black circles.   
Figure 4.5 shows a go trial for the inhibition phase. What should be obvious is 
how similar it is to the designs already used (especially to the designs used in 
Experiment 1-5). In fact, the only visual change from those experiments is the 
replacement of the signal circle with an arrow pointing to which side key needed 
pressing (these keys remained the same throughout experiments).  
Figure 4.6 shows a no-go trial. Several other adjustments were made for these 
trials, primarily to maintain task engagement. This was a concern as the phase 
was relatively slow in the absence of a tracking cue. Also, the phase was 
relatively straightforward, with only two cues, and came towards the end of the 
overall experiment when enthusiasm might be flagging. To address this, instead 
of having a coloured or white arrow to denote no-go, firstly a black go arrow 
appeared followed at one of three intervals by a black X superimposed on the 
arrow to indicate no-go. In effect this is a stop rather than a no-go trial. Finally, 
to reinforce learning to the stop cue, commission errors led to a two second 
timeout screen displaying the message “Error! Timeout!” 







The inclusion criteria and outlier removal process were the same as Experiment 
2 (see Results section for details of outliers). Experiment 7 had a similar sample 
size as Experiment 6 but was split into two groups (26 in each). In the final 
sample, 8 in the experimental group and 17 in the control group were female, 
with a mean age of 19.81 (SD = 1.60) and 20.69 (SD = 2.07) respectively. 
Participants received payment of £10 or one and a half course credits. 
 Design  
Although Experiment 7 had a between participant’s feature (the type of 
inhibition training), this was only introduced in the inhibition phase, and all 
participants experienced the learning and training phases identically; in fact, 
these phases were a direct replication of Experiment 6. The design of 
Experiment 7 can be seen in Table 4.8. Here, another feature of the design is 
made clear. While the importance of prepotent responses for the inhibition task 
Figure 4.6. Schematic of a stop trial for the inhibition phase of Experiment 7. 
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has been noted, it is still important to have data regarding commission errors, 
and so each cue had eight trials that were the opposite of its majority response 
(this also served to keep participants focused on the task). One issue with this 
approach was that while there were three possible stop delays for the stop cue 
in the inhibition task, there were 22 go trials. To square this mathematical circle, 
each participant received 7 of each of the delays with the extra delay being 
chosen from the three groups at random. While there was a 10 second break 
half-way through each block in the training and test phase, this was not the 
case for the inhibition block and participants only received 10 second breaks at 
the end of each block. No awareness measures were taken. 
 Procedure  
The only change in procedure from that of Experiment 6 were the instructions 
participants received. Participants received the same instructions as in 
Experiment 6 at the start of the experiment and at the start of the test phase. In 
the case of the inhibition task there was only one way of presenting the 
instructions, with participants first being informed how to respond to the arrows 
and then being instructed not to respond if you see a black cross. To some 
extent this can be seen as promoting a stop task set. Additionally, the final set 
of instructions for the inhibition phase instructed participants to “not respond if 











Table 4.8. Summary of Experiment 7 design. Letters represent a sequence. The 
numbers in parentheses indicate how often the sequence will occur per block. At 
test the contingencies were ±. 
 Analysis and results 
The analysis for Experiment 7 is split into three sections. As the training phase 
was experienced in the same manner for all participants, this was analysed in 
the same way as Experiment 6 (to enable assessment of the replication of that 
experiment). The inhibition phase was analysed in a way that would determine 
whether participants were learning about the cues contained therein. The test 
phase was analysed in a similar manner as in Experiment 6, except for the 
addition of a between-participants factor based on the inhibition task that 
participants experienced. Two participants were replaced to due to withdrawing 
from the experiment; two were replaced for being commission outliers, and two 
for being omission outliers. There were no reaction time outliers.  


























G1(4), G2(4), A1(4), A2(4), R1(4), 
R2(4), RA(8), B(36), I(28), IP(24), 
P(16), YZ(16) 
 
Experimental group: X (70, 8 STOP, 
62 GO), A (30 STOP, 8 GO). 
 
Control group:  X (70, 8 STOP, 62 





Test 1 232 G1(4), G2(4), A1(4), A2(4), R1(4), 





 Training phase  
As with the analysis of Chapter 3 performance is likely to be affected by 
repetition priming effects and so contrasts were undertaken to demonstrate 
learning in situations where such effects were not in play. I then present the 
traffic light analysis to explore performance to the cues of interest (Table 4.9 
contains the relevant descriptive statistics). 
4.5.2.1.1 Reaction times  
For the training data, the best fitting model had a conditional R2 of 0.88 (see 
Table 4.10 for AICs).  
4.5.2.1.1.1 Evidence of associative learning 
As with Experiment 6 the contrasts that provide evidence of associative learning 
in isolation are R vs. I and R vs. B. Importantly, the contrast R vs. I also controls 
for the effect of task set (as they both have the same conditional response). The 
alpha level was corrected to .025. The contrast R vs. I was significant, t(408) = -
3.61, p = < .001, 95% CI [-36.92, -10.94], d = -0.36, with slower responses to R 
than I indicating that cue R was not a go cue. The comparison R vs. B was also 
significant, t(408) = -3.27, p = .012, 95% CI [-34.64, -8.66], d = -0.32, with faster 
reaction times to cue B than R suggesting that participants learnt that cue R 
was a stop cue. 
4.5.2.1.1.2 Traffic light contrasts 
Noting the above results, I can be confident that the following results arise as a 
consequence of associative learning as well as repetition priming. As G vs. B is 
no longer a pure manipulation check, the alpha level was corrected to .008. The 
G vs. B contrast was highly significant, t(408) = 11.32, p = < .001, 95% CI 
[62.04, 88.03], d = 1.12, with G having faster response times than B, indicating 
that learning was occurring and replicating the effect seen in Experiment 6. The 
A vs. B contrast was also highly significant, t(408) = 8.06, p = < .001, 95% CI 
[40.43, 66.42], d = 0.80, with A being faster than cue B, indicating that cue A 
was not experienced as a stop cue. The A vs. G contrast was significant, t(408) 
= -3.26, p = .001, 95% CI [-34.60, -8.61], d = -0.32, with faster response for G 
than A, indicating that while A was more go than B it was not as strong at 
priming responding as G. Cue R was significantly slower than cue B, t(408) = -
3.27, p =  .001, 95% CI [-34.64, -8.66], d = -0.32, suggesting that it was more of 
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a stop cue than B. Cue R was highly significantly slower than cue G, t(408) = -
14.58, p = < .001, 95% CI [-109.68, -83.69], d = -1.44, indicating it was not a go 
cue. The A vs. R contrast was highly significant, t(408) = 11.33, p = < .001, 95%  
CI [62.08, 88.07], d = 1.12, suggesting that A was more of a go cue than R. 
Cue Reaction Time p(respond) p(miss) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
A-/+ 483.67 84.14 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.02 
B- 537.09 97.71 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 
G+ 462.06 96.6 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.01 
I+ 534.82 92.9 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.02 
IP- NA NA 0.05 0.03 NA NA 
J± 548.13 93.6 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.04 
P-/+ 527.05 92.83 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.02 
R- 558.75 90.74 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
RA+ 533.35 93.82 NA NA 0.02 0.02 
YZ-/+ 554.23 91.77 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.03 
Table 4.9. Descriptive statistics for the training phase of Experiment 7. Reaction 
times means are calculated using are raw data, but mean p(respond) and 
p(miss) use transformed data. 
4.5.2.1.2 p(respond)  
For this measure, the best model was a model that included the main effects of 
cue with a Gamma family and inverse link and random intercept (see Table 4.10 
for AICs).  
4.5.2.1.2.1 Evidence of associative learning 
For this measure the contrasts G vs. B and G vs. I provide the conditions to 
assess for the occurrence of associative learning, with the contrast G vs. B 
controlling for the effect of task set. The alpha level was corrected to .025. The 
G vs. B contrast was not significant, z = 1.43, p = .154, but, the G vs. I contrast 
was, z = -2.39, p = .017, with more errors to I than G indicating that for this 
measure G did not promote going to the same extent as I. 
4.5.2.1.2.2 Traffic light contrasts 
Given the above results it is likely that performance for commission errors is 
driven more by repetition priming effects than by associative learning. For this 
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analysis, the alpha level was corrected to .008. The G vs. B contrast was not 
significant, z = 1.43, p = .154. The A vs. B contrast was not significant at the 
corrected alpha, z = 2.37, p = .018, although this suggests a trend for more 
errors to A than B. As discussed in Experiment 6 this provides some evidence 
for associative learning impacting performance as repetition priming should act 
to prevent errors to A ‘in sequence’. The A vs. G contrast was not significant, z 
= 0.98, p = .326. The R vs. B contrast was not significant, z = -1.35, p = .176. 
However, the R vs. G contrast was significant, z = -2.72, p = .007, with more 
errors for G than R suggesting that G was a go cue compared to R. This 
contrast can be explained by reference to the repetition priming effects likely to 
be in play within sequences. The A vs. R contrast was significant, z = 3.59, p = 
< .001, demonstrating that cue A was more of a go cue than cue R. 
Nevertheless, these results could also be a consequence of repetition priming. 
4.5.2.1.3 Training phase summary 
Overall, what is striking about these results is how similar they are to those of 
Experiment 6. In fact, the reaction time results are only quantitatively different. 
There is a slight difference for the p(respond) data where A is not significantly 
different from G, whereas in Experiment 6 cue A had significantly more errors. 
The R vs. B contrast is also not significant, where in Experiment 6 it was (with 
more errors for B than R). However, the general picture of results for p(respond) 
do not suggest different conclusions to those drawn for Experiment 6. To sum, 
for Experiment 7 at training it seems that cue G is a go cue, cue A quite a weak 











Table 4.10. AICc scores for training models for Experiment 7 run on reaction 
time and p(respond) data. Bold are the models chosen. 
 Inhibition phase 
In order to explore learning for the inhibition phase within each condition, 
contrasts comparing cue GO (cue X) to cue STOP (cue A or O in the 
experimental and control conditions respectively) were run in order to assay 
evidence for this discrimination. I also ran a between-participants analysis to 
see if the difference between cue GO vs cue STOP was different between 
conditions. Due to the lack of sequences for this phase, repetition priming 
effects will not impact performance, and based on findings in Chapter 2 it is 
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Cue Reaction Time p(respond) p(miss) 
Experimental Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
X 487.46 48.71 0.21 0.16 0.03 0.02 
A 493.60 51.46 0.23 0.14 0.04 0.04 
       
Control        
X 477.43 47.34 0.23 0.14 0.03 0.02 
O 497.59 46.25 0.18 0.09 0.05 0.06 
Table 4.11. Descriptive statistics for the inhibition phase of Experiment 7. 
Reaction times means are calculated using are raw data, but mean p(respond) 
and p(miss) use transformed data. 
 
The reaction time contrasts were run using a mixed effects model with 
participant as a random intercept (see Table 4.12 for AICs). An alpha level of 
.025 was applied to this analysis. The X vs. A contrast (conditional R2 of 0.84) 
was not significant, t(25) = 1.12, p = .274, 95% CI [-4.61, 16.89], d = 0.05, 
indicating that participants in the experimental condition did not learn the 
contingencies. However, the same contrast (X vs. O) for the control condition 
(conditional R2 of 0.80) was significant, t(25) = 3.42, p = .002, 95% CI [8.61, 
31.71], d = 1.37, suggesting that participants in the control inhibition contrast 
had learnt the discrimination with faster response times to the go cue.  
In terms of commission errors, the best fitting model was a model that included 
a gamma link but no random terms (see Table 4.12 for AICs). An alpha level of 
.025 was applied to this analysis. In this model, the contrast X vs. A was not 
significant, z = 0.45, p = .651. The X vs. O contrast was also not significant, z = 
1.60, p = .109. This suggests that for both conditions the discriminations were 







Table 4.12. AICc scores for inhibition models for Experiment 7 run on reaction 
time and p(respond) data. Bold are the models chosen. 
 
Given the null findings for p(respond) I did not run a between-participant’s 
analysis for this measure, but I did for the response times. A t-test found a 
marginally significant difference (at a standard alpha level) between the 
differences for the go cue minus the stop cue between the two conditions for 
response times, t(50) = 1.74, p = .089, 95% CI [-2.15, 30.19], d = 0.48, with a 
greater difference between GO vs. STOP in the control condition (M = -20.15, 
SD = 30.05) compared to the experimental condition (M = -6.14, SD = 27.97). 
This indicates that there was a weak trend for differences between the two 
conditions. It should be noted that the learning experience between the 
conditions was not equal. This was because participants in the control condition 
were exposed to two novel stimuli, while cue A was a familiar cue for the 
experimental condition participants. The marginally significant difference in 
favour of controls could be caused by differences in learning occurring through 
the different designs, e.g., better learning for the control condition due to the 
new, and more salient, cues. Moreover, for the experimental condition cue A 
already seems to be a weak go cue, so that for it to prime stopping it first needs 
to prime not going, whereas for the control condition cue O is a novel cue and 
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was generally poor, though the contrast for reaction times indicates that those in 
the control condition were learning the discrimination between a go and a stop 
cue.  
 Test phase 
The analyses conducted for this test phase differ from those undertaken for 
Experiments 4 – 6. Whereas in these experiments two sets of analyses were 
conducted, in this experiment the focus is subtly different. The focus is now not 
on understanding what learning occurs generally or exploring the effect of 
sequences, but rather seeing if cue A is more go or stop between groups. 
However, given that the test phase for Experiment 7 was identical to 
Experiment 4 – 6 repetition priming effects are still an issue. As such, the 
analysis for Experiment 7 at test used data from cues that were the first trial of a 
sequence to investigate differences in behaviour towards cue A between 
groups.  
It was important to ascertain that learning had occurred in this phase, and so 
the G vs. B contrasts are reported first. Next, contrasts were undertaken to 
explore the effect of the inhibition training upon learning to cue A. These 
compared A against G and against B. If the training was effective, then it would 
be expected that the experimental group would see cue A as more stop than 
those in the control group. As before a standard alpha level was used for the G 
vs. B contrast, but other contrasts used a corrected alpha level of .017 (see 
Table 4.13 for descriptive statistics). Separate models were run for each 
condition for each performance measure (see Table 4.14 for AICs). 
4.5.2.3.1 Contrasts for G vs. B  
4.5.2.3.2 Reaction times  
For the experimental condition the contrast for G vs. B (conditional R2 = 0.72) 
was highly significant, t(225) = 4.80, p = < .001, 95% CI [43.57, 103.64], d = 
0.64, with faster response times to cue G than B. For the control condition 
(conditional R2 = 0.70) the contrast was also significant, t(225) = 2.38, p = .018, 
95% CI [7.17, 74.15], d = 0.32, again with faster responses to G than B. These 
contrasts indicate that for both conditions associative learning had taken place 
by the test phase. An interaction model (conditional R2 = 0.71) including both 
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conditions found a non-significant difference between G vs. B between groups, 
t(450) = -1.44, p = .152, 95% CI [-77.93, 12.04], d = -0.14.  
4.5.2.3.3 p(respond)  
For p(respond), the contrast in the experimental condition was not significant, z 
= -0.14, p = .160. However, the same contrast for the control condition was 
significant, z = 2.45, p = .014, with more errors in the presence of cue G than B. 
The interaction model was significant, z = 2.81, p = .005, indicating better 
learning of the G vs. B contrast in the control condition against that of the 
experimental condition.  
4.5.2.3.4 Contrasts for G vs. A 
4.5.2.3.5 Reaction times  
For the experimental condition the G vs. A contrast was significant, t(225) = 
3.12, p = < .002, 95% CI [17.83, 77.90], d = 0.42, with faster response times to 
cue G than A, suggesting A was not as much a go cue as G. For the control 
condition the contrast was also significant, t(225) = 3.28, p = .001, 95% CI 
[22.56, 89.55], d = 0.44, again with faster response to G than A. If the training 
had been effective, then it would be expected that the difference between G vs. 
A would be greater in the experimental condition than the control condition, yet 
an interaction model found no significant differences between groups, t(450) = 
0.36, p = .721, 95% CI [-36.79, 53.18], d = 0.04.  
4.5.2.3.6 p(respond)  
For the experimental condition the contrast G vs. A was significant, z = -2.53, p 
= .011, with more errors to A than G. However, for the control condition the 
contrast was not significant, z = -1.11, p = .266. The interaction between the two 
conditions was significant, z = 1.49, p = .016, with a greater difference between 
G vs. A in the experimental condition compared to the control condition. 
However, this difference was in the opposite than expected direction (based on 
the assumption that the inhibition training would cause A to become a stop cue 





Condition Reaction Time p(respond) p(miss) 
Training Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
A 492.56 114.49 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.00 
G 444.7 95.03 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.05 
R 520.67 112.59 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.00 
RA 494.62 96.27 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.00 
B 518.3 105.44 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.01 
I 513.35 91.89 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 
IP 532.86 114.11 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 
J 538.97 107.56 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.05 
P 483.54 83.89 0.05 0.09 0.02 0.02 
YZ 540.94 87.66 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 
       
Control       
A 517.31 116.78 0.09 0.13 0.02 0.00 
G 461.25 121.28 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.05 
R 527.08 102.97 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.00 
RA 512.38 124.44 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.05 
B 501.92 109.53 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 
I 511.54 106.79 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.04 
IP 541.3 93.13 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
J 511.66 122.86 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.05 
P 506.6 94.13 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 
YZ 531.79 102.94 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03 
Table 4.13. Descriptive statistics for test by condition for Experiment 7. Reaction 
times means are calculated using are raw data, but mean p(respond) and p(miss) 
use transformed data. All data is from first sequence trials. 
4.5.2.3.7 Contrasts for A vs. B  
4.5.2.3.8 Reaction times  
The difference between A and B for the experimental group was marginally 
significant at a standard alpha level, t(225) = 1.68, p = .094, 95% CI [-4.29, 
55.78], d = 0.22, with faster response times to A hinting at a trend for cue A not 
to promote a stopping response. For the control condition the difference was not 
significant, t(225) = -0.90, p = .369, 95% CI [-48.88, 18.10], d = -0.12. If the 
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training was effective the difference between A vs. B would be expected to be 
significantly smaller in the experimental condition compared to the control 
condition. The difference was only marginally significant at a standard alpha 
level, t(450) = -1.79, p = .074, 95% CI [-86.12, 3.85], d = -0.17, with the 
difference between A and B being greater in the experimental condition then the 
control condition - with faster responses to cue A than cue B.  
4.5.2.3.9 p(respond)  
For commission errors, in the experimental condition the contrast was not 
significant, z = 1.43, p = .153, with little difference in error rates between the two 
cues. However, the control condition had a significant difference between A and 
B, z = 3.10, p = .002, with more errors for cue A than B suggesting that in the 
control condition A was a go cue. The interaction was significant (but only at the 
standard alpha), z = 2.16, p = .031, with a greater difference between A vs. B in 
the control condition compared to the experimental condition. This could be 
taken as evidence of those in the control condition having less inhibition to cue 
A. However, the means show that cue A was experienced in a similar fashion 
for both groups, and rather, the difference lies in cue B. Those in the control 
condition have lower errors than those in the experimental condition. Thus, the 
interaction effect is seemingly caused by cue B prompting more stopping in the 
control condition, rather than less stopping to cue A.  
 Test phase summary 
In conclusion, with regards to the test phase there is clear evidence (in the 
response times) that both conditions were learning the discrimination G vs. B 
and that this was in the expected direction. However, the commission error data 
indicates that those in the control condition learnt the discrimination better than 
the experimental group. The data suggests that inhibition training did not affect 
learning to cue A. For the G vs. A contrast both conditions had significantly 
slower responses to A than G, suggesting that A was not a strong go cue. For 
commission errors, the results suggest that those in the experimental condition 
had learnt more about the difference between G vs. A than the control condition 
(perhaps expected due to the increased exposure to cue A from the inhibition 
training). However, the direction of the effect indicated that cue A promoted 
more going than cue G. For the A vs. B contrast, the experimental condition had 
marginally faster responses to A than B, giving a hint of a trend for cue A to 
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promote going over B for this group. The difference for the control condition was 
not significant, with the interaction model supporting the view that those in the 
experimental condition had learnt more about A vs. B than the control condition, 
with this learning, albeit only marginally significant at a standard alpha level, 
priming going to A rather than B. Interestingly the pattern was reversed for 
commission errors, with the control condition showing significantly greater 
errors to A than B (suggesting A was more of a go cue), with the experimental 
contrast being non-significant. However, while the interaction was significant, 
the means indicated that the difference could be accounted for by the greater 
stopping witnessed to cue B in the control condition compared to the 
experimental condition. Overall, there is no evidence to support the conclusion 
that inhibition training was effective. 
Table 4.14. AICc scores for test models for Experiment 7 run on reaction time 
and p(respond) data. Bold are the models chosen. 
 Summary 
Experiment 7 served to replicate the findings of Experiment 6 in the training 
phase and began to investigate the merits of using inhibition training to change 
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first objective Experiment 7 was successful, but it was unsuccessful for the 
second.  
In terms of replicating Experiment 6, the experiment found broadly similar 
findings for the training phase. This gives confidence that the findings of 
Experiment 6 (notably the strong stop response to cue R) are in fact due to the 
experimental manipulation rather than error variance. It is clear that the most 
complete design of the paradigm presented in this thesis, in terms of capturing 
several aspects of the contingencies experienced at UK traffic lights, suggests 
that cue A is a weak go cue and R a strong stop cue.  
Regarding the inhibition training the picture is less positive. The results from the 
inhibition phase itself suggest that participants did not learn much during this 
task, with only the control condition for the GO vs. STOP contrast for response 
times suggesting any learning had taken place. This could be due to the phase 
only having two blocks. While increasing the number of blocks is an obvious 
suggestion to increase the chance of learning occurring, it must be balanced 
against the overall length of the experiment - it would be undesirable for it to 
become too long. Given these results, the outcome of the test phase was 
perhaps a foregone conclusion. Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that 
those in the experimental group had shifted their response to cue A towards 
stopping. Indeed, the evidence seems to suggest that, compared to the control 
group, the experimental group was more inclined to treat cue A as a go cue. 
Following the trend in the inhibition phase, the control condition seems to be 
better learners of a basic Go vs Stop contrast, seemingly learning the G vs. B 
contrast better than the experimental group.  
At test, there is evidence of the expected significant G vs. B contrast - with both 
conditions having faster responses to cue G than B. It is worth reflecting on this. 
The results show that despite completing a five-minute filler task (the inhibition 
phase), where participants did not see cue G or B, participants were still 
retaining the earlier learning about G and B. These results show the strength of 
learning to the cues resulting from training. They also speak to the null findings 
resulting from the inhibition phase and indicate that more, or a different version 
of, inhibition training would be needed to overcome learnt responding arising 
from the training phase.  
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 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This chapter has presented research where the ideas from Chapters 2 and 3 
were combined in an experimental design that captured both some of the 
sequence information and (assumed) task sets in operation at UK traffic lights. 
The results from the two experiments presented here support my past work and 
those of others (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b) in showing how pairing a certain 
response with a cue can lead to that cue priming the response even when the 
contingencies no longer support this learning. These results should not be 
dismissed as a foregone conclusion. The designs were complex, with task set 
(and thus responses) changing frequently. Additionally, the fact that the G vs. B 
contrasts at test for reaction times were significant in both experiments clearly 
demonstrates that participants were learning about the cues within the task. 
This strengthens the validity of the experiment. It also gives confidence in the 
conclusion that participants are truly learning about the contingencies in play, 
and that the results are not a product of participants guessing the responses, or 
applying some arbitrary rule, such as “I’ll respond to every fourth trial” in order 
to complete the task. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that another 
consistent finding is weaker (though still reliable) learning overall at test. This 
may well be due to the fact that it is, in essence, an extinction phase. 
 Learning of traffic light cues 
While the work discussed prior to this chapter can be generally summarised as 
indicating that cue R is a neutral/weak stop cue, in the work presented here cue 
R seems to have become a strong stop cue. This is a notable shift from the past 
work and has at least two possible explanations. The first is that the 
combination of task set and the embedding of cues in a sequence enabled 
more effective learning, resulting in cue R coming to effectively prime stopping. 
The second is that the finding is a result of some unknown issue with the 
internal validity of both Experiments 6 and 7. Given the results found so far in 
the thesis it might be tempting to dismiss the findings presented in this chapter 
as perhaps arising due to participants not understanding the task, or just 
chance variation in responding. However, they do fit into the research narrative. 
In Chapter 2, R was a weak stop cue when the task set was stop but was a 
stronger stop cue when in a go task set. In Experiment 6 and the training phase 
of Experiment 7, R was also presented in a go task set and seems to be a very 
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strong stop cue. This line of argument does ignore the results of Experiment 5, 
where R was fairly weak stop cue, but this could be a consequence of chance 
fluctuations rather than anything systematic. Overall, if one holds the 
assumption that Experiment 6 represents a design that is most true to the 
contingencies experienced at UK traffic lights, then it seems clear that a red 
traffic light will prime a stopping response, and an amber traffic light a weak go 
response. In other words, the associative learning for red traffic lights in the 
designed paradigm conforms to the rules of the Highway Code but that for 
amber lights does not. This suggests that in addition to training focusing on 
conscious control, training that targets the associatively-mediated ‘amber – 
weak go’ link needs to be developed. This was the motivation for the 
intervention used in Experiment 7.  
 Inhibition training  
The inhibition training was not successful, and as discussed earlier, this is likely 
to be partly due to not enough training to retrain amber as stop. What does this 
initial foray into inhibition training tell us? Firstly, training needs to be longer to 
encourage more learning. Secondly, transfer effects might be an issue. This is 
whether training on one task will generalise to performance on other tasks. In 
the inhibition task participants responded, or not, to black arrows, while in the 
test phase they responded to white or coloured circles. Therefore, the tasks are 
not quite the same, particularly in terms of their surface features, and it may be 
the case that, even if learning did occur in the inhibition phase, it would not 
transfer to performance on the test phase. This argument is more formally 
explored by Simons et al. (2016) who summarises research into inhibition and 
transfer effects by concluding that inhibition training can improve performance 
for a practiced task or near identical one, but that the range of transfer is limited, 
even for related tasks (see also Noack, Lövdén, Schmiedek, & Lindenberger, 
2009). These issues will be key considerations for my design of an inhibition 
intervention aimed at increasing stopping to amber in the next chapter.  
 Conclusion 
To conclude, the experiments presented in this chapter mark the final 
development of the laboratory-based paradigm designed to capture contingency 
learning at UK traffic lights. Overall, this final iteration, one assumed to be the 
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truest to life, suggests that a red traffic light (or at least the cue that has the 
same contingencies) develops an associatively based stop response, while an 
amber traffic light becomes linked to a weak go response. So far, the thesis has 
focused on exploring what is learnt at an associative level. However, 
Experiment 7 also marked a shift from exploring learning of the contingencies 
experienced at UK traffic lights to investigating if these learnt, associatively-
mediated, contingencies can be changed. Although this attempt at intervention 
was ultimately unsuccessful, it provides a starting point for ideas further 
explored in the next chapter, where I present three experiments that used the 
concept of response inhibition training in a bid to bring about behaviour change 





































5 CHAPTER 5 
Inhibition Training I: The STOP-CHANGE Paradigm 
hapter 4 introduced the initial testbed for using inhibition training to shift 
learning of the cue representing amber from go to stop. It was clear that 
the training needed improving. In this chapter I work towards a design of an 
inhibition task that shows some promise in changing people’s driving behaviour.  
 COGNITIVE CONTROL IN DRIVING  
As discussed in Chapter 1, there have been calls for interventions aimed at 
improving driving behaviour to consider associatively-mediated, as well as 
conscious processes. Decision making is often conceptualised as an interaction 
between goal-directed deliberate processing and more automatic processes 
(see the concepts of cold and hot cognition by Kahneman, 2011), and 
departures from rational decision making have been attributed to cognitive 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), affective (De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & 
Dolan, 2006) and learnt associatively-mediated processes shared between 
humans and monkeys (M. K. Chen, Lakshminarayanan, & Santos, 2006; 
Lakshminaryanan, Keith Chen, & Santos, 2008).  
Driving is a complex activity that requires the intermixing and appropriate 
deployment of sensory, motor, and cognitive abilities (Anstey, Wood, Lord, & 
Walker, 2005). It is of no surprise that there is considerable evidence to suggest 
that cognitive control is needed to maintain safe driving, with poorer cognitive 
abilities being associated with riskier driving (Walshe, Ward McIntosh, Romer, & 
Winston, 2017). Of relevance to this thesis is the link between poor response 
inhibition and risky driving. For example, low levels of inhibition have been 
shown to be strongly correlated with self-reported driving violations (Tabibi, 
Borzabadi, Stavrinos, & Mashhadi, 2015). Fischer, Barkley, Smallish, and 
Fletcher (2007) found that those with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder 
have significantly more real-world traffic violations compared to matched normal 
controls, while O’Brien and Gormley (2013) showed that traffic offenders had 
worse response inhibition compared to non-offenders, though the results in this 
study were not completely conclusive. Additionally, Brown et al. (2016) found 




speeding had significantly impaired performance on a task measuring inhibitory 
control (and see Hatfield, Williamson, Kehoe, & Prabhakharan, 2017). To 
summarise, the research indicates that poor response inhibition can contribute 
to dangerous driving, suggesting that targeting inhibition could lead to safer 
driving. 
 TRAINING CONTROL  
Given that executive control seems to be important to safe driving it is logical to 
ask whether improving control, namely inhibition, can bring about safer driving. 
Such training involves pairing arbitrary cues with stop responses to increase 
overall inhibition, and thus can be characterised as strengthening the inhibition 
‘muscle’ to bring about global improvements. As noted in Chapter 1 such 
training has generally been ineffective. For example, N. S. Lawrence, 
Verbruggen, et al. (2015) found no effects of such training upon food 
consumption after training in a student population. The study consisted of three 
groups. Two groups received non-cue specific training whereby participants 
inhibited responses to random images, or to specific categories of non-food 
images. In the third condition participants had to make double responses to 
specific categories of non-food images. This training was designed to increase 
impulsivity, and thus result in increased consumption, see Guerrieri et al. 
(2012). Food intake was strikingly similar across all conditions, suggesting that 
non-cue specific training did not decrease food consumption compared to a 
group primed for general disinhibition. Yet, work by Berkman, Graham, and 
Fisher (2012) suggests that such general inhibitory training might work better in 
children than adults by supporting the development of abstract rule use 
(Munakata, Snyder, & Chatham, 2012). Overall, it seems that training non-cue 
specific inhibition would be an unsuccessful route to improving driving 
behaviour. However, behaviour change has been more successful in an 
associative context.  
 LEARNT CONTROL 
As discussed throughout this thesis there is strong evidence that pairing a cue 
with a certain response leads this cue to become able to prime that response. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that associative learning within the task 
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designed in this thesis to mirror the contingencies at UK traffic lights promotes a 
go response to amber lights, whereas the Highway Code dictates a stop 
response. Combining these two ideas, Experiment 7 explored whether it would 
be possible to train an associatively-mediated stop response to amber lights. 
The evidence supporting this idea has already been covered in Chapters 1 and 
Chapter 4 and so will not be repeated here. Generally, the research has shown 
limited promise in training learnt responses to specific cues – though the work in 
reducing food consumption has shown more success (N. S. Lawrence, 
O'Sullivan, et al., 2015). Yet, there is good reason to support the application of 
specific inhibition training to driving. The work by Briggs et al. (2017) mentioned 
in Chapter 1 showed that whilst under a cognitive load drivers' behaviour was 
impaired (and see House of Commons Transport Committee, 2019), with 
drivers seemingly relying on past experiences and schemas. The notion here is 
that control processes are disrupted by heavy demands, while associatively-
mediated processes are relatively unaffected, and that for most people driving is 
relatively automated (Shinar, Meir, & Ben-Shoham, 1998). Therefore, 
addressing these processes could result in desirable behaviour change.  
 PRESENT EXPERIMENTS 
The work presented in this chapter aims to go beyond the traffic light paradigm 
designed thus far, and rather than investigate what participants learnt at UK 
traffic lights at an associative level, start to change this learning. Due to this shift 
in motivation the designs are substantially different from preceding experiments 
in this thesis. However, the fundamental task of training a cue to become linked 
to a certain response, and then exploring learning in a test phase, remains the 
same. 
One change from past experiments is that those reported in this chapter will not 
use go/no-go training to train responses, but rather make use of another 
paradigm, the STOP-CHANGE task. As outlined in Chapter 1 this is where the 
required response changes mid-trial, rather than being set at the start as in 
go/no-training. The paradigm requires participants to inhibit an ongoing go 
response and replace it with an alternative response. This paradigm was 
chosen for the important reason that it is more realistic in the context of driving. 
The work here aims to develop a training task that could be used in the real-
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world and therefore to increase the likelihood of the training transferring to real-
world driving it needs to match as best as possible to motor responses used in 
driving. So far, I have written about participants stopping or going at traffic 
lights, yet this does not capture the full range of motor responses required to 
stop. To actually stop a car, one needs to stop accelerating (one response) and 
move the foot to depress the brake pedal (another response). Therefore, while 
going and stopping are perfectly adequate ways to describe the macro actions 
at traffic lights, the STOP-CHANGE paradigm is more analogous to the micro 
actions involved in stopping at traffic lights. Regarding the specific mechanisms 
tapped by the paradigm, as noted in Chapter 1, there is evidence that inhibition 
does occur in these types of task (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). Indeed, 
pigeons are capable of performing the task with similar performance to a stop-
signal task (Meier, Lea, & McLaren, 2018) I am therefore confident that the 
switch in task will not, by itself, impact learning about the contingencies in the 
experiment (though note inhibition training has been found to be less effective 
when using stop signal, from which the STOP-CHANGE task is adapted from, 
rather than go/no-go tasks, Veling et al., 2017). 
 EXPERIMENT 8 
This experiment aimed to provide initial evidence of the benefits of inhibition 
training to promote stopping at amber traffic lights. The work built upon that of 
Experiment 7 by specifically addressing the transfer issues discussed in relation 
to that experiment.  
One important change is that while the experiments presented in this thesis so 
far have focused on behaviour in a simple laboratory task, to assay evidence of 
behaviour change (and in line with other inhibition work, e.g., N. S. Lawrence, 
O'Sullivan, et al., 2015), a more real-world measure was used. Therefore, 
behaviour change was measured using performance on a driving computer 
game where participants ‘drive’ through a series of junctions and must decide 





A mixed-measures 4 x 2 design was used with two independent variables: 
condition (experimental vs. control 1 vs. control 2 vs. control 3) and time (pre- 
and post-training performance).  
In terms of the groups for the experiment, the desired outcome is that the group 
that receives inhibition training should develop an amber-stop associative link, 
and, following the analysis just given, this group will receive cue specific 
inhibition training. That is, participants will see amber circles in the change trials 
(requiring participants to change motor response mid-trial, see section 5.5.1.3.1 
for details). However, the control conditions are more complicated. Simons et al. 
(2016) argues that one issue in the inhibition field is the use of passive control 
groups, with any differences between this control and the experimental group 
not necessarily being due to the training but rather other factors, such as 
motivation. To avoid this issue, the first control group will be an active control 
group, with the task closely matched to that of the experimental group. 
Therefore, control 1 will receive STOP-CHANGE training to purple circles, with 
the cue still being specific but irrelevant (as purple circles are not linked to any 
rules regarding UK traffic lights). This design opens up the issue that rather than 
the training per se, it is exposure to amber circles, through a process of 
directing attention towards these cues, which could account for any behaviour 
change. To counter this, control 2 will not receive inhibition training and instead 
the STOP-CHANGE trials will be replaced by simple presentation of amber 
circles, that is a relevant cue in a driving context. Control 3 will receive purple 
circles instead of the inhibition trials, which can be deemed irrelevant with 
respect to driving. In a sense, control 2 is a control for the experimental group 
and control 3 a control for the control 1 group. If the inhibition training is the key 
determinant of behaviour change then the greatest improvement should be 
seen in the experimental group, followed by control 1 (non-specific inhibition 
training effect), then control 2 and control 3 (which would be expected to be 
roughly equal). However, if exposure to amber lights is also a factor then the 
order could be experimental group (both effects contributing), control 1 and 
control 2, then finally control 3. By improvement I mean the biggest uplift in 
stops to amber traffic lights after training compared to pre-training performance.  
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Thus, the four conditions were: cue-specific inhibition training (experimental 
group), cue irrelevant inhibition training (control 1), relevant single trials (control 
2), and irrelevant single trials (control 3). Condition was manipulated between-
participants and time was manipulated within-participants. Participants were 
randomly allocated to one of the four conditions. Responses were obtained on 
one dependent measure: number of stops at amber traffic lights in the driving 
game. 
 Participants 
At the time of recruitment, this experiment was the first to undertake inhibition 
training to change driving behaviour (now see Hatfield et al., 2018). Due to this I 
felt it would be inappropriate to assume an effect size, therefore I decided to 
test 30 in each group, a total of 120 participants. This sample size is similar to 
other intervention studies (e.g., Porter et al., 2018). One-hundred and thirty-
eight participants participated in exchange for payment of £5 or one course 
credit (see Results section for details on the outlier removal process). The 
inclusion criteria were that participants had to be 18-65 years old, hold a full or 
learners driving licence (of any nationality), have normal or corrected vision, and 
not be colour blind.  
 Materials  
5.5.1.3.1 Inhibition task 
The STOP-CHANGE task was designed to train an associatively-mediated 
stop-and-change response to amber traffic lights. The task involved participants 
having to stop their primary task response and replace it with a secondary task 
response (see Figure 5.1). Throughout the task there were only two responses, 
either a left-hand response (the left-ctrl key) or a right-hand response (the right- 
ctrl key) which participants were instructed to make with their left or right index 
fingers respectively on a standard QWERTY keyboard.  
The primary task was to respond with the right key when a green circle (70% of 
trials) was presented, and with a left key response when a red circle (15% of 
trials) was displayed. The remaining 15% of trials introduced the experimental 
manipulations. For those in the experimental and control 1 conditions these 
trials were STOP-CHANGE trials in which a green circle was displayed but 
changed to amber for the experimental condition or to purple for those in control 
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1, with participants in both conditions being required to supress their initial 
green right hand response and instead execute the appropriate secondary left 
hand response. For the control 2 and 3 these trials were not stop-change but 
either displayed a single amber (control 2) or purple (control 3) circle, requiring 
a left-hand response. Thus, the main difference with the other conditions is that 
the amber/purple appeared immediately, and the task became a simple 3-
choice task because no change in response was required.    
 
The direction of the responses mapped onto the pedals used whilst driving. The 
green circle which required a right-arrow response mapped onto the accelerator 
pedal, while the other colours required a left-key response mapping onto the 
brake pedal. The task was designed so that experimental STOP-CHANGE trials 
simulated UK traffic light signals changing from green to amber, with the 
required response of changing from a right hand to a left hand response 
imitating the motor actions needed to stop at such traffic lights, i.e. lift the right 
foot off the accelerator pedal and depress the left brake pedal. The resulting 
learning should be that participants learn an amber = inhibit right pedal, change 
to left pedal response, which should transfer to the real-world as amber – stop 
acerbating and brake. Thus, the task is training participants to make a certain 
Figure 5.1. Schematic of the inhibition training task for Experiment 8. All groups 
received two blocks of 100 trials. Participants saw 70 green trials and 15 red 
trials per block. The remaining 15 trials depended on the condition (see right-
hand side of the Figure). 
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response to amber cues that is the opposite (in some sense) to that made to 
green cues, and this should result in braking whilst driving.  
The colours of the red, green and amber circles corresponded to the RGB 
codes of UK traffic lights, measured 6.7cm2 and were presented in the centre of 
a 19-inch PC monitor on a white background. The task required participants to 
press and hold their response for 500ms and would only continue when the 
correct response was made. The task consisted of two blocks of 100 trials, with 
a 15 second break between each block. While Experiment 7 did indicate the 
importance of having lengthy training, in order to keep training as short as 
possible, given the desire to implement it in the real-world, it was decided to 
retain the same length of training as in Experiment 7.   
Trial order was randomised within each block and there was a fixed 1500ms 
inter-trial-interval. The change feature of STOP-CHANGE trials happened after 
a random delay of 100ms, 150ms or 200ms following the presentation of the 
green circle, with these timings being randomised across the trials but occurring 
equally within blocks. Participants received no feedback during the task.  
In one sense the inhibition task for this experiment is similar to that of 
Experiment 7, in that participants respond (or not) to shapes. However, one 
change is that now the task has cue and signal combined, unlike Experiment 7 
where participants saw a cue and then responded to the signal. This change 
was made to better reflect traffic lights, where a driver only sees one stimulus 
(the light) which acts as both cue and signal.  
5.5.1.3.2 Driving task 
Participants completed a driving computer game before and after the training. 
The Stop Light Task (adapted from Chein, Albert, O’Brien, Uckert, & Steinberg, 
2011) involved participants ‘driving’ a car from the first person point of view 
along a straight road at a set speed with the goal of reaching the destination 
within the time limit (8 minutes). Participants were instructed to press and hold 
the right-ctrl key when they wanted to accelerate the car and to release that key 
and press the space bar when they wished to brake. The right-ctrl key had no 
impact upon the game but was used to create the same motor responses 
required when driving and braking that is of stopping one response and 
changing to another (and to match motor responses in the inhibition task). In the 
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game participants crossed 30 traffic light-controlled junctions. For nineteen of 
the junctions the lights turned from green to amber as the car approached. 
Participants then had to decide whether to brake the car (by pressing the space 
bar) and wait three seconds for the traffic light to turn green, or to cross on the 
amber light (make no response) and risk a crash, which incurred a six second 
penalty. However, unbeknown to participants, the game was programmed so 
that it was impossible to crash (this was to avoid any emotive reactions 
influencing task performance). The remaining ten junctions displayed an equal 
mix of red and green traffic lights.  
The distance between junctions varied from between 10 and 16 seconds. For 
amber light trials, the light turned amber between 2 and 4 seconds before the 
participant reached the junction, and 8 seconds for red trials. The order of traffic 
lights displaying red, green and amber was randomised, and thus were 
unpredictable to participants, replicating a natural driving experience. A vehicle 
sometimes crossed the junction ahead to create the feeling of a busy highway. 
The type of vehicle was randomised to prevent one vehicle type being 
associated with a specific colour traffic light. Performance on this task was 
measured by the number of stops at amber traffic lights. 
 Questionnaires 
To ensure that the four groups were well matched on characteristics that could 
have influenced task performance, participants completed two questionnaires 
following the second driving task (at the end of the experiment).  
5.5.1.4.1 Driving experience 
Participants were asked what type of licence they had and if they had either 
been involved in a road traffic collision either as a passenger or a driver. 
Participants with learner licences were asked if they had any driving experience. 
This questionnaire was of my own design.  
5.5.1.4.2 Impulsivity and sensation-seeking 
High scores on these traits have been linked to an increased propensity to 
engage in red traffic light-jumping (Burgess, 2003) and commit other traffic 
violations (Curran, Fuertes, Alfonso, & Hennessy, 2010). Therefore to account 
for individual differences in this regard, participants completed the Impulsive 
Sensation Seeking Scale from the Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality 
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Questionnaire (Zuckerman, Kuhlman, Joireman, Teta, & Kraft, 1993; 
Questionaire taken from Zuckerman and Aluak, 2014). 
 Procedure  
Participants first performed the driving game which lasted up to eight minutes. 
Participants received instructions telling them to drive normally and to imagine 
that they were driving to a party (to help create a more naturalistic scenario). 
They were told to arrive as quickly as possible, within the eight-minute time 
limit, but also safely. It should be noted that the time was more than adequate to 
complete the task and that all participants did complete it within the timeframe. 
Next, participants were randomly assigned to a training condition and 
completed the inhibition training task (which lasted around 15 minutes). 
Participants then completed another driving game. Following this, participants 
completed the questionnaires. 
 Analysis and results 
Data was processed and analysed using R (R Core Team, 2018). Data was 
analysed using, at least in cognitive psychology, the more traditional 
generalized linear models (computed through the R package Ez; M. A. 
Lawrence, 2016) rather than the mixed effects models used up to now. This 
was to allow for more appropriate, in a statistical sense, comparisons between 
the results reported here and those of past intervention studies. In terms of 
reported effect sizes, Cohen’s D value has been corrected in line with the 
formulas provided in Lakens (2013) and, when reporting ANOVAs, generalised 
eta squared have been provided, rather than partial eta squared, as they 
provide greater comparability between within- and between-participants designs 
(Bakeman, 2005). 
Prior to analysis, the data of the 138 participants from Experiment 8 were 
combined with the 80 participants from my masters’ experiment (which had the 
same design as this experiment, this allowed for increased power) and the 
exclusion criteria applied to this combined dataset. Eighteen participants were 
removed due to experimental issues which meant that they could not complete 
the study. No participants were removed for having less than 60% accuracy for 
green trials. The 60% accuracy threshold is a standard threshold in inhibition 
studies and ensures that participants are responding above chance to the go 
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stimuli. Two participants were removed for having response times to green trials 
of greater than 3 IQRs (i.e. 2*1.5IQR; the same exclusion criteria as applied in 
the other work in this thesis). Eight participants were removed due to having 
greater than 10% of a trial type in the training task with response times under 
150ms (this threshold was chosen as responses faster than 150ms suggest 
participants were responding before the cue appeared on screen). Nine 
participants were removed for having no driving experience and 85 participants 
were removed for not stopping at all red traffic lights in the first driving game. 
There is an argument to be made that removing those who did not stop at all 
red traffic lights is akin to removing those who most need the training, and 
where it might be expected to deliver the largest effects. However, it can be 
assumed that most drivers do stop at red traffic lights in the real-world, and so 
those who did not stop at these lights are likely not to be obeying the task 
instructions in the driving game (this also supports the issue of ecological 
validity raised later in the discussion of this experiment). The final sample was 
96 participants, 38 from my Masters work and 58 from Experiment 8. Conditions 
were similar sizes, with 27, 24, 20, and 25 participants for the experimental 
condition, control 1, control 2, and control 3 respectively. Post-hoc analysis 
using G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) indicated that 
the experiment had a 91% chance of detecting an effect size of f = 0.20 for the 
interaction between time and group at an alpha level of 0.05. The effect size of 
0.20 was chosen as it represents a small to medium effect size, which was 
deemed appropriate for such training to have practically implications for real life.   
 Subject characteristics 
As with many surveys, missing data was an issue. Upon inspection, the missing 
data was confined to a few participants. Given that answers were opt in, the 
non-answering is perhaps more likely to be caused by participants skipping 
questions due to time demands rather than not wishing to give answers due to 
sensitivity reasons. Missing data was replaced where possible through a by-
participant mean replacement strategy. In these cases, the mean for a 
participant on a particular scale without the missing data was calculated and 
this mean was then entered into the empty cell(s). In cases where this was not 
possible, e.g., age, the missing data was removed from analysis as long as the 
total percent of missing data was not more than 20% of the overall sample (See 
202 
 
Appendix D more detail on the particulars for each scale). What is clear is that 
missing data overall was relatively low, and therefore is unlikely to materially 
impact upon conclusions. Randomisation checks revealed that the four 
conditions were well matched (see Appendix E). There was a significant 
difference between the four conditions in crash history, yet given the small 
sample size, especially across the four conditions this is likely to be a result of 
chance variation, and thus can be taken as a spurious finding (Button et al., 
2013). Indeed, applying a Bonferroni correction meant that none of the 
contrasts were significant. One issue to note is that due to a bug in the driving 
game it was possible to crash the car at red traffic lights if a participant pressed 
the spacebar too late resulting in the car stopping across the junction. 
Removing these participants and running the main analysis only produced a 
quantitative difference and so these participants were retained, with only the full 
model being reported.  
The analysis is split into two sections. Firstly, analysis to assess behaviour in 
the training task is presented, followed by the analysis of behaviour change 
between the two driving games.  
 Response inhibition task  
5.5.2.2.1 First reaction times to correct GO trials 
Mean responses to GO trials were calculated by excluding trials where an 
incorrect key was pressed and trials that had response times under 150ms. A 
mixed measures ANOVA with condition as the between participants factor and 
the two blocks as the repeated measure found no significant effect of block, F(1, 
92) = 0.34, p = .561, ηG2 = 0.0003, indicating that response times were similar 
across the two blocks, with block 1 having a mean of 409.91ms (SD = 80.39) 
and block 2 a mean reaction time of 407.42ms (SD = 76.58). The main effect of 
condition was also not significant, F(3, 92) = 0.17, p = .919, ηG2 = 0.005, 
showing that response times were similar across conditions (see Table 5.1 for 
condition by block descriptive statistics). The interaction term in the ANOVA 
was not significant, F(3, 92) = 0.25, p = .862, ηG2 = 0.0006.  
5.5.2.2.2 First response accuracy rates to correct GO trials  
Accuracy rates to GO trials were calculated by excluding trials where an 
incorrect key was pressed and for trials that had response times under 150ms. 
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A mixed measures ANOVA with condition as the between participants factor 
and the two blocks as the repeated measure found no significant effect of block, 
F(1, 92) = 2.68, p = .105, ηG2 = 0.008, indicating that accuracy did not differ 
across blocks. This was possibly due to ceiling effects as accuracy was high 
across both blocks, with block 1 having an accuracy rate of 94.38% (SD = 2.77) 
and block 2 a rate of 94.97% (SD = 2.27). The main effect of condition was also 
not significant, F(3, 92) = 1.37, p = .257, ηG2 = 0.031, showing that accuracy 
was similar across conditions (see Table 5.1 for condition by block descriptive 
statistics). The interaction term in the ANOVA was not significant, F(3, 92) = 
0.545, p = .653, ηG2 = 0.005.  
 GO trials block 1 GO trials block2 

































5.5.2.2.3 First reaction times to correct CHANGE trials 
Response times to CHANGE trials were defined as the difference between the 
time for a response on a trial and the change delay for the change signal 
(including any computer lag time, often around 17ms). Error trials, trials where a 
response was made before the change signal or where an incorrect key was 
pressed in response to the change signal, and trials with response times under 
150ms were removed. Participants with missing values in either blocks were 
Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics for GO trials for Experiment 8. SD given in 
parenthesis. RT = response times. A% = percentage accuracy. 
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removed for the analysis (nine in total). As only the experimental and control 1 
groups experienced CHANGE trials this analysis was limited to these groups. I 
ran a mixed-measures ANOVA on these data with condition as the between 
factor variable and the two blocks as the repeated measure component. The 
main effect of block was not significant F(1, 40) = 2.16, p = 0.150, ηG2 = 0.013 
with similar response times between blocks (M = 530.94, SD = 273.76 for block 
1, and M = 482.14, SD = 140.45 for block 2). The effect of condition was also 
non-significant, F(1, 40) = 1.44, p = .237, ηG2 = 0.03, indicating that response 
times were similar between conditions (see Table 5.2 for condition by block 
descriptive statistics). The interaction term was also not significant, F(1,40) = 
1.164, p = .208, ηG2 = 0.010. 
5.5.2.2.4 First response accuracy rates to correct CHANGE trials  
For this measure accuracy is defined as participants making their first response 
to the change trial. As in the case of the GO cue analysis, incorrect key presses 
and trials with response times under 150ms were removed. Given that 0% (i.e. 
no accurate responses) is a possible outcome, there were no missing values for 
this analysis. I ran a mixed-measures ANOVA on these data with condition as 
the between factor variable and the two blocks as the repeated measure 
component. The main effect of block was not significant F(1, 49) = 0.21, p = 
0.652, ηG2 = 0.0005 with similar accuracy rates between blocks (M = 40.13%, 
SD = 3.89 for block 1, and M = 41.33%, SD = 4.35 for block 2). The effect of 
condition was not significant, F(1, 49) = 0.32, p = .564, ηG2 = 0.006 (see Table 
5.2 for condition by block descriptive statistics). The interaction term was also 
not significant, F(1, 49) = 0.08, p = .781, ηG2 = 0.0002.  
Overall, the results suggest that training was experienced in a similar manner 
for all participants. However, it seems that learning was weak without the 
expected improvement (faster and more accurate responses) over time. The 
fact that there were non-significant differences between both blocks of GO trials 
for response times and accuracy might suggest learning was limited, but 
certainly for accuracy there might be a ceiling effect with accuracy in the first 
block already being high. In terms of the CHANGE trials, both measures 
suggest that both conditions were similar, which is reassuring given I wished to 
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Table 5.2. Descriptive statistics for CHANGE trials for Experiment 8. SD given 
in parenthesis. RT = response times. A% = percentage accuracy. 
 Driving game analysis 
5.5.2.3.1 Effect of training on stopping at amber traffic lights 
The data was analysed with a mixed 4 x 2 (condition x amber stops) ANOVA, 
with condition as the between-participant factor and the number of amber lights 
stopped at in each of the two driving task sessions as the dependent variable. 
The analysis revealed a non-significant main effect of condition on the number 
of stops at amber traffic lights, F(3, 92) = 1.80, p = .152, ηG2 = 0.05. A significant 
effect of time was found, F(1, 92) = 10.67, p = .002, ηG2 = 0.01, with participants 
stopping at more amber traffic lights pre-training (M = 10.22, SD = 5.68) than 
post-training (M = 8.99, SD = 7.22). The interaction between time and condition 
was not significant F(3, 92) = 0.02, p = .964, ηG2 = 0.0003, indicating that the 
training had no effect upon behaviour at amber traffic lights (see Table 5.3 for 
descriptive statistics). Overall, these results suggest that the training did not 
impact upon stopping at amber traffic lights. Further planned analysis revealed 
that pre-training there was a marginally significant difference in the number of 
stops across conditions, F(3, 92) = 2.37, p = .076, ηG2 = 0.072, suggesting that 
before training there were already differences in the groups. It is likely that 
these differences would have weakened any training effect and thus make it 
hard to come to a clear conclusion about the effectiveness of the inhibition task. 
At test there were no significant differences between groups, F(3, 92) = 1.20, p 
= .314, ηG2 = 0.038, and suggesting that the training did not positively impact 
upon task performance.  
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Table 5.3. Descriptive statistics for stops at amber lights for Experiment 8. 
Stops out of 19.  
 Summary 
Experiment 8 investigated whether inhibition training could encourage stopping 
at amber traffic lights within a computerised driving game. However, no 
evidence was found to support the effectiveness of the training. In fact, all 
conditions recorded a decline in stopping at amber traffic lights in the second 
driving game. This might suggest the training was affecting behaviour, but that it 
reduced rather than increased stopping. However, it is more likely that the 
decline in stopping occurs because of experience of the driving game. Over the 
course of the two games, participants are likely to have learnt that it was not 
possible to crash at amber lights. Therefore, the most efficient behaviour, 
especially given the notional time constraints, was to cross all traffic lights. In a 
sense this learning arguably mimics the development of real-world behaviour. If 
a driver crosses an amber light and suffers no costs (i.e. does not crash) then 
they are likely to repeat this behaviour subsequently (as the behaviour is 
positively reinforced by time saved). Through repeated pairing of accelerating or 
taking no action when faced with amber lights, the behaviour becomes 
Game Condition Mean SE 
    
Pre-training 
Game 
Experimental 10.22 1.11 
 
































 Control 3 10.28 1.45 
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associatively-mediated: the prepotent response to amber lights becomes to go, 
rather than stop. Such a decline indicates that in its current form the training 
was unable to counteract the association between amber traffic lights and go 
that may have been learnt in the driving game. The decline could also indicate 
that participants were not engaging fully with the task for the duration of the 
experiment. The fact that so many participants failed to meet the inclusion 
criteria relating to stopping at red traffic lights does suggests task engagement 
was an issue from the first driving game. Additionally, the driving game does not 
realistically portray driving (having no sound, ability to steer, or control of the 
speed of the car beyond braking) and therefore participants’ driving behaviour 
may not be indicative of real-life.  
In terms of the inhibition task the overall non-significant effects for blocks is 
unexpected and goes against the normal improvement in performance (faster 
responses, better accuracy) with practice. Focusing on go trials, it is likely this 
lack of improvement over time is due to ceiling effects. Yet, performance for the 
STOP-CHANGE trials does indicate weak learning (an issue discussed in the 
general discussion) with the low accuracy (less than 50%) indicating that 
inhibition was not often successfully employed. Increasing the length of the 
training, and thus the chance of learning to occur, could lead to more successful 
inhibition; this has been shown to be important for inhibition training tasks to be 
effective (A. Jones et al., 2016). 
Another issue to consider is transfer. For learning in the inhibition task to 
transfer, and thus affect behaviour in the second driving task, the two tasks 
need to be similar. However, this is not obviously the case. For one, the cues 
were completely different. In the driving game participants’ saw traffic light 
shapes while in the inhibition task they responded to simple circles in the middle 
of the screen. Secondly, the response keys did not match up, with participants 
using left- and right-Ctrl keys in the inhibition task and spacebar and right-Ctrl in 
the driving game. In fact, if one assumes that participants learnt that the right-
Ctrl key had no impact upon driving (and stopped using it as instructed), then 
the driving game requires participants to make an active response (press the 
spacebar) to stop the car, rather than stopping and changing a response. 
Therefore, the driving and inhibition tasks are not motorically or cognitively 
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similar. To improve transfer, it will be necessary to reduce the transference gap 
between the two tasks.  
A final issue is the limited sample. Given that the experiment was investigating 
driving behaviour it would be beneficial to have a range of driving experience. 
Indeed, it could be argued that those with a longer driving history would be 
more likely to see amber as a go cue (through years of developing amber – go 
links), therefore the task might be more effective for more experienced drivers.  
In summary, Experiment 8 did not successfully bring about behaviour change. 
However, several improvements are possible, and Experiment 9 was designed 
with these changes in mind.  
 EXPERIMENT 9 
Experiment 9 made several substantial changes to the design above, both in 
terms of the driving game and the inhibition task. In terms of the driving game, 
rather than a simple computer game, the experiment used a more realistic 
simulator. Such simulators have been found to have more validity in 
correspondence to real-world driving (Aksan et al., 2016; Fors, Ahlstrom, & 
Anund, 2018), and can predict behaviour at a five year follow up (Hoffman & 
McDowd, 2010). Regarding the inhibition task, an important change was now 
that cues were traffic light images rather than coloured circles. This was done to 
make the task more ecologically valid and thus reduce the transfer gap between 
the inhibition training and driving games. It should be noted that while the 
experimental condition in Experiment 8 was designated as cue-specific, this is 
rather a misnomer as the cues were substantially different in the two tasks. 
Furthermore, responses were made on a foot pedal response box rather than a 
keyboard to increase the motor response match between the driving game and 
the inhibition task. In addition, an extra block of training was added to the 
inhibition task to improve learning. To speed up recruitment, conditions were 
collapsed to two groups. 
 Method 
 Participants 
Given the null findings for Experiment 8 it was again hard to pick an appropriate 
effect size. An a priori power calculation using G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul et al., 
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2007) indicated that a total sample of 84 participants would have a 95% chance 
of detecting an effect size of f = 0.20 for the interaction between time and group 
at an alpha level of 0.05. Additionally, recruitment was aimed at older students 
and staff members. This was to increase the range of driving experience. The 
recruitment media placed an emphasis on having several years of driving 
history. Furthermore, the decision was made to limit recruitment to UK drivers 
only. This was because not all countries use the same traffic light sequences 
and so it could be the case that non-UK drivers experienced the task in a 
different manner to those UK drivers. 
 Design 
A mixed-measures 2 x 2 design was used with two independent variables: 
condition (experimental vs. control) and time (pre- and post-training 
performance). Condition was manipulated between-participants and time was 
manipulated within-participants. The two conditions were cue-specific inhibition 
training (the experimental group) and cue irrelevant but specific inhibition 
training (the control group). Participants were randomly allocated to one of the 
two conditions. Responses were obtained on one dependent measure: number 
of stops at amber traffic lights in the driving game. 
 Materials  
5.6.1.3.1 Inhibition task 
The same basic paradigm was used from Experiment 8. However, there were 
several changes (see Figure 5.2). Rather than respond to images of coloured 
circles participants responded to images of traffic lights. These images were 
taken from the simulator and so there was a direct match between the inhibition 
task and the driving task. Participants also responded with foot pedals, though 
the direction remained the same, e.g., green still required a right-side response. 
The number of trials per block were the same but with an additional block (total 
of three blocks). Instead of responding to a purple CHANGE cue, participants in 
the control condition responded to a blue traffic light – this change was made as 
it was felt that purple was too near red and blue was a more neutral colour, 
while still being an irrelevant cue in a driving context. In addition, the response 
for the CHANGE cue for controls was modified from a left-hand response to a 
space bar press. This was felt to minimise any rule learning on the part of 
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control participants around changing response when green lights change, as 
this could lead participants to change their response (i.e. brake) in the simulator 
when the traffic lights changed from green to amber. Thus, those in the 
experimental group had to make a left foot pedal response to CHANGE trials, 
whilst those in the control group had to press the spacebar. However, many of 
the features of the training were still controlled for in the control condition. For 
example, control participants still needed to attend to a change in signal and 
alter their response accordingly. Finally, the change delay for CHANGE trials 
was amended to 50ms, 150ms, or 250ms to encourage faster responding to GO 















5.6.1.3.2 Driving task 
The simulator comprised a single PC equipped with three 19-inch LED backlit 
monitors, each with a 1280x1024 screen resolution, a frame rate of 60Hz and 
an aspect ratio of 5:4, two Logitech speakers, a G27 Logitech steering wheel 
with force feedback and pedals, and a standard office chair without wheels. The 
Figure 5.2. Schematic of the inhibition training task for Experiments 9. All 
groups received three blocks of 100 trials. Participants saw 70 green trials and 
15 red trials per block. The remaining 15 trials depended on the condition (see 





system was designed by XPI Simulation and included realistic sounds, including 
braking and accelerating. All participants completed two driving scenarios. The 
first was a practice scenario designed to familiarise participants with the 
simulator controls. The task involved participants driving a car from the first-
person point of view in a city environment. Halfway through the scenario the car 
in front of the participants stopped and turned right. At this point participants 
had to brake and come to a complete halt (if not, then they crashed and the 
scenario ended), moving away once the car ahead had fully turned. In total this 
scenario lasted 1.40 minutes. No data was recorded for this scenario.  
The second scenario was the main driving task and involved participants driving 
a car from the first-person point of view along a straight 5.1km road with 30 
traffic light-controlled junctions. For twenty of the junctions the traffic light turned 
from green to amber as the car approached. Participants then had to decide 
whether to stop the car, by releasing the accelerator pedal and depressing the 
brake pedal, or to cross the junction by keeping the accelerator depressed. As 
in real-life, braking would be the safest option but would also result in a time 
penalty. If a crash did occur the game ended, although the game was designed 
so that it was impossible to crash if a participant crossed an amber light (but it 
was possible to crash if participants crossed at red traffic lights). The remaining 
ten junctions displayed an equal mix of red and green traffic lights. The amber 
traffic lights were set so that they changed from green to amber at different 
distances as the car approached the junction - either 10m away from the 
junction, 20m, 30m, 40m, or 50m, four for each distance. Importantly, as there 
were no vehicles behind the participants’ car (the ‘road’ was clear in the mirrors) 
it would be suitable (and possible) to brake at all amber traffic lights if travelling 
at the speed limit. The game also featured other vehicles, both crossing at 
junctions but also approaching on the other side of the road. Data was collected 
from this scenario. Forward, side and rear views (see Figure 5.3) were 
displayed. Participants were not given any feedback or score for their 
performance in the scenarios. The fact that the game was designed so that it 
was impossible to crash if a participant crossed an amber light may have given 
rise to learning effects, with participants realising there was no penalty for not 
stopping at amber traffic lights and, as a result, stopping less in the post-training 
driving game (as seen in Experiment 8). I would argue that this learning effect 
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reflects the development of similar real-world behaviour and so, if anything, 
increases the ecological validity of the scenario. Participants’ overall average 
speed and lane position were taken as a measure of the realism of the 
simulator, with the expectation that participants would drive within the speed 
limit and maintain a central lane position.  
 Questionnaires 
A wider battery of behavioural characteristics was explored compared to 
Experiment 8, focused on real-world driving and experience of the simulator.  
5.6.1.4.1 Driving experience 
Participants were asked what type of licence they had and if they had been 
involved in a road traffic collision either as a passenger or a driver. Participants 
with learner licences were asked if they had any driving experience. This 
questionnaire was of my own design. 
5.6.1.4.2 Driving behaviour  
To assess if participants differ in their real-world driving styles they were asked 
to complete the extended Manchester Driver Behaviour Questionnaire (Lajunen, 
Parker, & Summala, 2004). This measures four driving behaviours: ordinary 
violations, aggressive driving, lapses, and errors.  
5.6.1.4.3 Impulsivity and sensation-seeking 
These scores were collected in the same manner as Experiment 8. 
Figure 5.3. Photo of the driving simulator used for Experiment 9. Task displayed 




5.6.1.4.4 Motion sickness 
Nausea and motion sickness can occur when using simulators and so it was 
important to ensure that the experience of the simulator was equal for the two 
conditions. Therefore, participants completed the simulator sickness 
questionnaire (Kennedy, Lane, Berbaum, & Lilienthal, 1993; Questionaire taken 
from Stone III, 2017). 
 Procedure  
The procedure was undertaken as described in Experiment 8 with the addition 
of the practice scenario before the main phase of the experiment.  
 Analysis and results  
Data was analysed in the manner described in Experiment 8. For Experiment 9 
a total of 98 participants were tested. Two participants were unable to complete 
the experiment due to technical issues. Three participants withdrew due to 
suffering motion sickness. Finally, one participant met the exclusion criteria of 
not having stopped at all red traffic lights pre-training. This compares to the 85 
participants in Experiment 8 and indicates that the changes to the driving 
simulator had improved task engagement. The final sample size was 46 
participants per condition. Post-hoc analysis using G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul et al., 
2007) indicated that the experiment had a 97% chance of detecting an effect 
size of f = 0.20 for the interaction between time and group at an alpha level of 
0.05.   
Due to the nature of the driving task where participants were always in control 
of stopping and starting, the stop data was noisier than that of Experiment 8 and 
defining a specific event as a stop or go was more complicated. For red traffic 
light junctions, in addition to crossing on red which represents a clear failure to 
stop, there was the potential for participants to cross when the traffic light 
displayed red and amber. In these instances, participants may have come to a 
halt but then have been too quick in accelerating away from the junction. Given 
that participants would have stopped, these instances were coded as a stop 
when calculating frequency of crosses at red traffic lights. Of course, crosses on 
green traffic lights, whereby the participant would had to have waited for the 
entire sequence were counted as stops at red lights. For amber traffic light trials 
the possible events were: a participant crossed while the light was on amber; 
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misjudged the light and by the time the car was crossing the junction the light 
had changed to red; braked and waited for the light to cycle round to green; or 
came to a halt and then crossed before the light displayed green, instead of 
going on a red light or a red and amber light. Crosses on either a green or red 
and amber light indicated that the participant had stopped at the lights and 
waited for the cycle of traffic lights, and as such these two events were coded 
as stop. Crosses on amber were coded as go. Crosses on red could mean that 
the participant tried to cross when the light displayed amber but was not quick 
enough and therefore actually crossed the stop line on a red light, or the 
participant could have crossed on a red light regardless. Due to the nature of 
the game if participants did wait at a red light and then crossed, they would 
have crashed into other cars entering the junction, thus ending the game. Given 
this, crosses on a red light at amber trials indicated that participants did not stop 

















Traffic light Coding Reasoning 
Amber Go As amber will only appear at the start of the 
sequence any recorded amber cross is a failure to 
stop. 
 
Red Go Recording a red cross on an amber trial means 
participants will have to 1) misjudge the light and 
cross the junction on red or 2) brake, wait, but 
cross the junction while the red light is still on. 
However, if participants do this then they would 
crash into the path of oncoming vehicles. In the 
case of 1) even if participants stop, they will have 
crossed the stop line on an amber traffic light and 




Stop To record this event participants must stop at the 
amber traffic light but accelerate too quickly, 
crossing the junction on red and amber rather than 
green. In these cases, while not correct driving, 
participants did stop at the amber traffic light. 
 
Green Stop It is not possible to record a green cross without 
waiting for the full traffic light cycle because on 
amber trials the light will always change to amber 
before participants cross the junction. 
 
Table 5.4. Coding of crosses at traffic lights experienced at amber trials for 
Experiment 9. 
 Participants characteristics 
As with Experiment 8 there was some missing data for the questionnaires in 
Experiment 9. The missing data seemed to be non-systematic and seemingly 
occurred due to participants missing a question by accident rather than 
deliberate non-answer. The specific instances and methods taken to deal with 
the missing data are displayed in Appendix F. For most questionnaires a mean 
replacement strategy was used, but for the Simulator Sickness questionnaire 
missing values were replaced with 0, as advised by the scale author’s (Kennedy 
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et al., 1993). Overall, missing data was low and therefore unlikely to affect the 
conclusions drawn about the sample. Randomisation checks revealed that the 
two conditions were well matched across variables (see Appendix G).   
 Response inhibition task  
5.6.2.2.1 First reaction times to correct GO trials 
Mean responses to GO trials were calculated as in Experiment 8. A mixed 
measures ANOVA with condition as the between participants factor and the 
three blocks as the repeated measure found no effect of condition F(1, 90) = 
0.002, p = . 957, ηG2 = 0.00003, showing that response times were similar 
between the two conditions (experimental condition: M = 717.55, SD = 161.78, 
control condition: M = 719.46, SD = 172.88. See Table 5.5 for condition by 
block descriptive statistics). There was a main effect of block, F(2, 180) = 28.69, 
p = < .001 (Huynd-Feldt corrected), ηG2 = 0.064, with mean reaction times 
decreasing over the course of the experiment (M = 779.44 SD = 175.58, for 
block 1, M = 716.03, SD = 220.73 for block 2, and M = 660.08, SD = 162.60 for 
block 3). Thus, participants displayed the expected learning. The interaction 
term in the ANOVA was not significant, F(2, 180) = 0.797, p = .452, ηG2 = 0.002. 
5.6.2.2.2 First response accuracy rates to correct GO trials  
Accuracy rates to GO trials were calculated as in Experiment 8. A mixed 
measures ANOVA with condition as the between participants factor and the 
three blocks as the repeated measure found no significant effect of block, F(2, 
180) = 1.70, p = .171, ηG2 = 0.01, suggesting that accuracy rates did not change 
over the course of the training. This is likely to be due to ceiling effects as 
accuracy rates were high (M = 99.26% SD = 0.82, for block 1, M = 99.36%, SD 
= 0.73 for block 2, and M = 99.50%, SD = 0.64 for block 3; Table 5.5 for 
descriptive statistics). There was a significant effect of condition, F(1, 90) = 
5.07, p = .027, ηG2 = 0.027, with accuracy being higher in the experimental 
condition (M = 99.54%, SD = 0.39) than in the control condition (M = 99.20%, 
SD = 0.60) .The interaction between condition and block was not significant F(2, 






5.6.2.2.3 First reaction times to correct CHANGE trials 
Response times to CHANGE trials were calculated as in Experiment 8. 
Participants with no data in a block were removed, with two participants 
excluded on this basis. I ran a mixed-measures ANOVA on the data with 
condition as the between factor variable and the three blocks as the repeated 
measure component. The main effect of condition was significant, F(1, 88) = 
23.98, p = < .001, ηG2 = 0.158, with response times being slower in the 
experimental group (M = 850.87, SD = 196.82) than in the control condition (M 
= 672.11, SD = 145.70. See Table 5.6 for condition by block descriptive 
statistics). There was a significant effect of block, F(2, 176) = 5.71, p = .006 
(Huynd-Feldt corrected), ηG2 = 0.02, with mean response times decreasing but 
then increasing slightly over the blocks (M = 802.55, SD = 262.56 for block 1, M 
= 734.56, SD = 193.82 for block 2, and M = 747.36, SD = 217.78 for block 3). 
Further analysis revealed that the difference between block 1 and 2 was 
significant, t(89) = 3.36, p = .001, 95% CI [27.83, 108.15], d = 0.35, with faster 
reaction times in block 2 than 1. The difference between 1 and 3 was also 
significant (at a uncorrected alpha level), t(89) = 2.19, p = .031, 95% CI [5.19, 
105.19], d = 0.23, with faster reaction times to block 3 than 1, while the 
difference between block 2 and 3 was not significant, t(89) = -0.72, p = .474, 
95% CI [-48.16, 22.57], d = -0.08. This indicates that whilst initially participants 
learnt about the task such learning plateaued. The interaction between block 
and condition was not significant, F(2, 176) = 0.12, p = .891, ηG2 = 0.0004. 
 GO trials block 1 GO trials block 2 GO trials block 
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Table 5.5. Descriptive statistics for GO trials for Experiment 9. SD given in 




5.6.2.2.4 First response accuracy rates to correct CHANGE trials  
Accuracy rates were calculated as in Experiment 8. I ran a mixed-measures 
ANOVA on this data with condition as the between factor variable and the three 
blocks as the repeated measure component. There was a non-significant effect 
of condition, F(1, 90) = 0.345, p = .557, ηG2 = 0.003, with accuracy rates being 
similar in the experimental condition (M = 73.87%, SD = 3.52) and in the control 
condition (M =  71.13%, SD = 3.07). There was a significant effect of block, F(2, 
180) = 4.62, p = .012 (Huynd-Feldt corrected), ηG2 = 0.005, with accuracy 
decreasing over time (M = 74.47% SD = 3.26 for block 1, M = 72.67%, SD = 
3.61 for block 2, and M = 70.33%, SD = 3.55 for block 3). The interaction term 
was not significant, F(2, 180) = 1.20 p = .303 ηG2 = 0.001 (see Table 5.6 for 
condition by block descriptive statistics). 
 
The results for the inhibition training phase are less clear than Experiment 8. In 
terms of GO trials, the significant decrease in response times between blocks 
shows that participants were learning about the task. However, due to the fact 
that response times were slower to begin with, compared to Experiment 8, it is 
hard to state if this learning effect was driven by the additional training block, or 
if it was always present and that the lack of ceiling effects gives more scope to 
detect such learning. As seen in Experiment 8 accuracy for GO trials was high. 
There was a significant effect of condition, yet in both groups’ accuracy was still 
very high for GO trials.  
Regarding the CHANGE trials the pattern of response times over the 
experiment demonstrates that, though learning was occurring, it was variable. 































Table 5.6. Descriptive statistics for CHANGE trials Experiment 9. SD given in 




One issue is that there was a significant effect of condition for reaction times, 
with those in the experimental group having slower reaction times. Clearly there 
is an effect of the cues (amber vs blue traffic lights). The fact that accuracy 
rates were similar between the groups suggest that changing to an amber light 
was much more difficult for the experimental participants. This type of behaviour 
would be expected if amber lights were indeed priming a going response. 
However, the two conditions differ in terms of response requirements for the 
CHANGE trials and it is likely that these differences are behind the effect. In the 
experimental condition, participants must move their right foot to the left-pedal, 
while those in the control bar just needed to press the spacebar with their right 
index finger. Thus, the response required for the control condition in change 
trials would be, prima facie, easier than that in the experimental condition.  
Focusing on the accuracy rates for CHANGE trials, the decreasing rates across 
blocks shows that participants were displaying less inhibition as the training 
progressed. This could either be due to fatigue, with participants responding 
with the most likely response (the GO response) in order to complete the task 
quickly. The effect could also be explained by reference to the task design. Due 
to the task being designed to assess reactive inhibition, the declining accuracy 
rates could indicate that, across the experiment, GO trials were eliciting a strong 
default go response, supported by the reducing reaction times to GO trials, and 
that participants were unable to inhibit responding. Another interesting feature 
of the accuracy rates in Experiment 9 is that they are much higher than those in 
Experiment 8. This could be evidence of a speed-accuracy trade-off (note the 
slower responses time in Experiment 9 than Experiment 8 for these trials), 
perhaps arising as an artefact of the changed delay times for the CHANGE 
trials. 
 Driving game analysis 
In this section I present the analysis of the driving game data. First, I present 
data showing that within the driving simulator both groups maintained safe 
driving throughout the experiment. These analyses were in effect manipulation 
checks to ensure that the experience of the simulator did not differ between 
groups. Next, I present a mixed-measures ANOVA to show the omnibus effects 
of the training. If the training was effective it would be expected that the 
interaction would be significant, with more stops post-training than pre- for the 
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experimental group. Finally, I present a more focused analysis on the pre- and 
post-training performance.  
5.6.2.3.1 Performance within the driving simulator  
The average z-axis (perpendicular to the road) lane position was -47.94 (SD = 
0.18) and -47.85 (SD = 0.42) for pre- and post-training scenarios respectively 
indicating that participants maintained a safe left-hand lane position, with values 
between -46 and -50 denoting a safe lane position. The average speed for the 
task was 15.48mph for the pre-training scenario (SD = 0.98) and 16.35mph for 
the post-training scenario (SD = 1.28), this increase in speed was significant, 
F(1, 90) = 13.21, p = < .001, ηG2= 0.03. Those in the experimental condition 
recorded a significant difference in speed between the two driving games, t(45) 
= -2.55, p = .014, 95% CI [-0.64, -0.07], d = -0.38, increasing from a mean of 
15.15mph (SD = 0.91) to 15.95mph (SD = 0.97). The same effect was 
witnessed in the control condition, t(45) = -2.61, p = .012, 95% CI [-0.76, -0.10], 
d = -0.38, increasing from a mean of 15.82mph (SD = 1.03) to 16.78mph (SD = 
1.52). There was no effect of condition upon speed, F(1, 90), 2.61, p = .109, ηG2 
= 0.023.  
5.6.2.3.2 Effect of training on stopping at amber traffic lights 
The data was analysed with a mixed 2 x 2 (condition x amber stops) ANOVA, 
with condition as the between-participant factor and the ‘number of stops at 
amber traffic lights’ as the dependent variable. There was a significant effect of 
time, F(1, 90) = 57.00, p = < .001, ηG2 = 0.08, with participants stopping at more 
amber traffic lights post-training (M = 12.54, SD = 2.65) than pre-training (M = 
11.13, SD = 2.32). There was a marginally significant main effect of condition, 
F(1, 90) = 3.67, p = .058, ηG2 = 0.03, with those in the experimental condition 
stopping at significantly more traffic lights than controls (see Table 5.7 for 
descriptive statistics). The interaction between time and condition was not 
significant F(1, 90) = 1.94, p = 0.166, ηG2 = 0.003. 
Further planned analysis showed that both conditions recorded a significant 
increase in stops at amber traffic lights, for the experimental group, t(45) = -
6.43, p = < .001, 95% CI[-2.20, -1.15], d = -0.95 and for the control condition, 
t(45) = -4.28, p = < .001, 95% CI[-1.69, -0.61], d = -0.63. As can be seen in 
Table 5.7, irrespective of type of training received, stops at amber traffic lights 
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increased in the second driving game compared to the first. Analysis found a 
non-significant difference between the experimental and control conditions for 
pre-training amber stops, t(90) = 1.35, p = .179, 95% CI[-0.31, 1.61], d = 0.28, 
but the difference was significant post-training, t(90) = 2.17, p = .033, 95% 
CI[0.10, 2.25], d = 0.45, where those in the experimental condition stopped 
more often compared to controls. This suggests that there was some effect of 
training, with the experimental group recording a greater increase in stopping 
than the control condition.  
Table 5.7. Descriptive statistics for stops at amber lights for Experiment 9. 
Stops out of 20.  
 Summary 
Experiment 9 found some rather weak evidence to suggest that inhibition 
training can increase stopping at amber traffic lights. Of course, the training was 
not completely successful with the interaction between condition and time not 
being significant. However, it is possible to argue that the results from 
Experiment 9 do show promise, particularly given the post-training results. 
Compared to the pattern of stopping seen in Experiment 8 the present results 
are quite different. In Experiment 8 all groups recorded a decline, but in the 
current study all groups witnessed an increase in stopping at amber traffic 
lights. The decline in Experiment 8 was hypothesised to occur as a result of 
participants learning that there was no penalty for crossing amber traffic lights, 
and so having less reason to stop in the second driving scenario. It seems 
reasonable to assume that participants did learn about this contingency in 
Experiment 9; after all, it was still impossible to crash if a participant crossed an 
amber traffic light. The fact that this learning was not witnessed in task 















 Control 11.96 0.38 
222 
 
performance (i.e. as a decrease in stops at amber lights at test) indicates that 
there were factors in the experiment that had a stronger influence upon 
behaviour than the in-game learning of amber = go. 
The lack of a decline suggests that the both versions of the training were able to 
counteract the learning in the game. This speaks to the general vs. specific 
inhibition training debate discussed in the Chapter 1 and the introduction to this 
chapter. Both groups received response inhibition training (as a component of 
the overall stop-change response), but for the experimental group this was cue-
specific, while for the control condition it was not specific. It may be the case 
that both forms of training had some effect e.g., priming ‘cautious behaviour’ (in 
a similar fashion to the gambling training of Stevens et al., 2015) but that the 
effects were greater in the cue-specific experimental group. Of course, it must 
be acknowledged that other accounts, that do not rely on learnt inhibition, could 
contribute to the witnessed effects. For example, it could be that the training 
task was priming rule-based knowledge of traffic lights. This argument would 
explain the significant post-training difference, with participants who received 
amber CHANGE trials having increased activation of the rules around amber 
lights than those who received blue CHANGE trials. Additionally, the difference 
post-training could be explained through demand characteristics, with those 
who saw amber CHANGE trials assuming that the experiment was focused on 
behaviour at amber traffic lights and so adjusted their behaviour accordingly. 
However, it can be questioned how different the amber CHANGE and blue 
CHANGE trials are. Given the ubiquitous nature of the traffic light sequence, 
even participants who saw blue CHANGE trials are likely to guess the nature of 
the task and to have rule-based knowledge primed. Thus, the difference 
between conditions post-training might reflect the small bonus granted by the 
cue-specific inhibition training to amber lights specifically, i.e. the retrieval of 
specific stimulus-response associations at test in addition to general rule 
priming. Overall, while it is likely that other factors confounded the results, the 
involvement of amber-specific response inhibition training cannot be entirely 
dismissed.   
In terms of the response times for the CHANGE trials the results do indicate 
some learning did occur. However, it was variable and the significant difference 
between conditions suggests task artefacts were influencing performance. The 
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accuracy rates for CHANGE trials are still low and this could explain the limited 
behaviour change (see discussion in section 5.7.3). Indeed, the results 
demonstrate that participants were displaying less inhibition over time. 
However, it is unclear if this was due to fatigue or arose from GO trials eliciting 
a strong go response. Of course, it could be a combination of both factors.  
One issue with the task is the driving simulator. While the results suggest that 
participants were engaging with the driving task, supported by the fact that one 
participant failed to stop at all red lights pre-training, it is clearly not the same as 
driving, and it might not be the most ecologically valid measure of driving 
behaviour. It could be the case that while the inhibition task has changed 
responses to amber traffic lights, such learning is not being expressed in the 
driving task. Given that the idea is to train associatively-mediated inhibition, for 
any behaviour change to be witnessed the behaviour measure must allow for 
the expression of such learning. It could be that due to the relative ease of the 
simulator participants are deploying propositional learning and thus preventing 
the expression of the associative learning (see McLaren et al., 2019). 
Therefore, to address this issue Experiment 10 is a replication of Experiment 9 
but with an improved driving simulator that takes the experiment closer to real-
world driving. 
 EXPERIMENT 10 
To increase the validity and to authentically recreate the ‘feel’ of driving, 
simulators need to encode multiple senses in a natural manner (Chalmers, 
Howard, & Moir, 2009). Specifically to increase the experiential validity of a 
simulator (Pinto, Cavallo, & Ohlmann, 2008) it is important to use large screens 
(Kemeny & Panerai, 2003) and to have participants in a natural body position 
(Melo, Rocha, Barbosa, & Bessa, 2016). Therefore, for Experiment 10 the 
simulator was updated to include larger screens and a car seat allowing the 
participant to assume a normal driving position in the scenarios.  
 Method 
 Participants 
As Experiment 10 was effectively a replication of Experiment 9 the same 
sample size was used. Again, recruitment focused on drivers, but rather than 
224 
 
staff this experiment was aimed at students who had driven in the last two 
weeks. This decision was made to overcome recruitment issues but also to see 
if the training was appropriate for younger drivers (who arguably would be of 
greater need of such interventions given their higher chance of being involved in 
a traffic collision; International Transport Forum, 2018). Recruitment was still 
limited to UK drivers only. 
 Design 
The design of Experiment 10 was identical to that of Experiment 9.   
 Materials  
5.7.1.3.1 Inhibition task 
The inhibition task was the same as in Experiment 9.  
5.7.1.3.2 Driving task 
All aspects of the driving task remained the same between Experiment 9 and 10 
bar the changes outlined below. The simulator now comprised of three 28-inch 
LED backlit monitors, each with a 1920x1080 screen resolution, a frame rate of 
60hz and an aspect ratio of 16:9. The same two Logitech speakers, G27 
Logitech steering wheel with force feedback and pedals where used as in 
Experiment 9. The simulator now included a RS driving rig that enabled 
participants to adopt a driving position with the distance between the seat and 













The same questionnaires outlined in Experiment 9 were used in the experiment. 
 Procedure  
The procedure was undertaken as described in Experiment 9.  
 Analysis and results 
Data was analysed in the manner described in Experiment 9. For Experiment 
10, a total of 108 participants were tested. Fifteen participants were unable to 
complete the experiment due to technical issues. Three participants withdrew 
due to motion sickness. Three participants jumped red traffic lights in the pre-
training driving task. Finally, two participants were outliers for mean GO trial 
response times. The final sample consisted of 43 participants in the control 
condition and 42 in the experimental condition. While the experiment had aimed 
for 46 per condition, recruitment difficulties meant it was decided to end the 
experiment early, and the sample size is still near to that of Experiment 9. Post-
hoc analysis using G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul et al., 2007) indicated that the 
experiment had a 95% chance of detecting an effect size of f = 0.20 for the 
interaction between time and group at an alpha level of 0.05.   
 Subject characteristics 
Missing data appeared to be non-systematic and seemingly occurred due to 
participants missing a question by accident rather than being the product of a 
deliberate non-answer. The specific instances and methods taken to deal with 
the missing data are displayed in Appendix H. Overall, missing data was low 
and therefore unlikely to affect the conclusions drawn about the sample. 
Randomisation checks revealed that two conditions were well matched across a 
range of variables (see Appendix I). 
 Response inhibition task  
5.7.2.2.1 First reaction times to correct GO trials 
Mean responses to GO trials were calculated as in Experiment 8. A mixed 
measures ANOVA with condition as the between participants factor and the 
three blocks as the repeated measure found no effect of condition F(1, 83) = 
0.34, p = . 562, ηG2 = 0.003, showing that response times were similar between 
the two conditions (experimental condition: M = 657.26, SD = 161.14, control 
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condition: M = 676.46, SD = 142.62. See Table 5.8 for condition by block 
descriptive statistics). There was a main effect of block, F(2, 166) = 25.81, p = < 
.001 (Huynd-Feldt corrected), ηG2 = 0.045, with mean reaction times decreasing 
over the course of the experiment (M = 713.91, SD = 188.90 for block 1, M = 
657.93, SD = 155.18 for block 2, and M = 629.08, SD = 146.60 for Block 3). 
Thus, participants displayed the expected learning. The interaction term in the 
ANOVA was not significant, F(2, 166) = 2.30, p = .103, ηG2 = 0.004. 
5.7.2.2.2 First response accuracy rates to correct GO trials  
Accuracy rates to GO trials were calculated as in Experiment 8. A mixed 
measures ANOVA with condition as the between participants factor and the 
three blocks as the repeated measure found no significant effect of condition, 
F(1, 83) = 0.61, p = .438, ηG2 = 0.003, showing that accuracy rates were similar 
across conditions (experimental condition: M = 98.77%, SD = 0.89, control 
condition: M = 98.54%, SD = 0.98). There was a significant main effect of block, 
F(1, 83) = 3.11, p = .047, ηG2 = 0.020, with accuracy varying across time (M = 
98.36%, SD = 1.49 for block 1, M = 99.04, SD = 1.02 for block 2, and M = 
98.57%, SD = 1.63 for block 3). The interaction term was significant, F(2, 166) = 
3.11 , p = .047, ηG2 = 0.020, with accuracy changing as a function of condition. 
Those in the control condition displayed an increase in accuracy between block 
1 and 2 and then levelled off for block 3, while those in the experimental 
condition had an increase in accuracy between blocks 1 and 2, but then 
recorded a decline in accuracy rates for block 3 (see Table 5.8 for condition by 
block descriptive statistics). As accuracy was still high overall no further 
analyses were run on this interaction. 
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Table 5.8. Descriptive statistics for GO trials for Experiment 10. SD given in 
parenthesis. RT = response times. A% = percentage accuracy. 
5.7.2.2.3 First reaction times to correct CHANGE trials 
Response times to CHANGE trials were calculated in the same manner as 
Experiment 8. Participants with no data in a block were removed, which resulted 
in five participants being removed. A mixed-measures ANOVA was performed 
on this data with condition as the between factor variable and the three blocks 
as the repeated measure component. As in Experiment 9, there was a 
significant effect of condition, F(1, 78) = 7.14, p = .009, ηG2 = 0.06, with faster 
responses in the control condition (M = 629.43, SD = 157.73) then in the 
experimental condition (M = 743.81, SD = 221.22), which, as before, is likely 
due to the different task requirements for the two conditions. The effect of block 
was marginally significant, F(2, 156) = 2.40, p = .094, ηG2 = 0.009, with a trend 
for faster responses over time (M = 707.79, SD = 229.44 for block 1, M = 
692.52, SD = 278.24 for block 2, and M = 655.26, SD = 194.51 for block 3). The 
interaction was also marginally significant, F(2, 156) = 2.59, p = .078, ηG2 = 
0.01, with the control condition showing a U-shape pattern of mean response 
times across the blocks, while the experimental condition had similar levels for 
blocks 1 and 2 and then a decline for block 3 (see Table 5.9 for condition by 
block descriptive statistics).  
5.7.2.2.4 First response accuracy rates to correct CHANGE trials  
Accuracy rates to CHANGE trials were calculated in the same manner as 
Experiment 8. I ran a mixed-measures ANOVA on these data with condition as 
 GO trials block 1 GO trials block2 GO trials block3 



























the between factor variable and the three blocks as the repeated measure 
component. There was a marginally significant effect of condition, F(1, 83) = 
3.06, p = .084, ηG2 = 0.030, with a trend for greater accuracy in the control 
condition (M = 72.87%, SD = 2.81) than in the experimental condition (M = 
64.47%, SD = 3.79). There was a significant effect of block, F(2, 166) = 11.72, p 
= < .001 (Huynd-Feldt corrected), ηG2 = 0.02, with accuracy increasing over time 
(M = 63.73%, SD = 4.19 for block 1, M = 70.13%, SD = 3.49 for block 2, and M 
= 72.27%, SD = 3.26 for block 3). The interaction between block and condition 
was not significant, F(2, 166) = 0.09, p = .911, ηG2 = 0.0002.  
Table 5.9. Descriptive statistics for CHANGE trials for Experiment 10. SD given 
in parenthesis. RT = response times. A% = percentage accuracy. 
 
Overall, the results suggest that the task was learnt by participants, but 
performance was somewhat variable. The response times for GO trials indicate 
that both conditions learnt the task equally well. The results for GO accuracy 
suggest that learning was variable, with accuracy not consistently improving 
over time as expected, and the significant interaction term reinforces this 
conclusion. However, it is worth noting that accuracy was still high overall. For 
the CHANGE trials, the significantly faster response times for the control 
condition compared to the experimental condition matches that found in 
Experiment 9 and is likely to be due to task differences. The fact that there was 
only a marginally significant difference in blocks suggests that learning was not 
strong. The interaction term also suggests that learning was variable. For 
accuracy rates the trend for higher accuracy in control conditions compared to 

































the experimental condition is also likely to be a task artefact, as it is easier to 
accurately press a spacebar one can see than move a foot between pedals 
under a desk. Unlike Experiment 9 accuracy significantly improved over time, 
suggesting inhibition was improving over time. However, accuracy rates were 
lower than in Experiment 9.  
 Driving game analysis 
The analysis presented here was undertaken in the manner described in 
Experiment 9.  
5.7.2.3.1 Performance within the driving simulator  
The average z-axis (perpendicular to the road) lane position was -47.99 (SD = 
0.18) and -48.00 (SD = 0.36) for pre- and post-training scenarios respectively; 
indicating that participants maintained a safe left-hand lane position. The 
average speed for the task was 15.77mph for the pre-training scenario (SD = 
1.13) and 16.51mph for the post-training scenario (SD = 0.95), this increase in 
speed was significant, F(1, 83) = 1.29, p = < .001, ηG2 = 0.03. Those in the 
experimental condition recorded a marginally significant difference in speed 
between the two driving games, t(41) = -1.87, p = .068, 95% CI [-0.61, 0.02] d = 
-0.29, increasing from a mean of 15.79mph (SD = 1.34) to 16.46mph (SD = 
1.08). Those in the control condition witnessed a significant increase in speed, 
t(42) = -3.67, p = < .001, 95% CI [-0.58, -0.17], d = -0.56, increasing from a 
mean of 15.73mph (SD = 0.88) to 16.55mph (SD = 0.81). There was no effect 
of condition upon speed, F(1, 83) = 0.0006, p = .981, ηG2 = < .0001.  
5.7.2.3.2 Effect of training on stopping at amber traffic lights 
The data were analysed with a mixed 2 x 2 (condition x amber stops) ANOVA, 
with condition as the between-participant factor and ‘the number of amber lights 
stopped at’ as the dependent variable. The interaction between time and 
condition was not significant F(1, 83), = 1.52, p = .224, ηG2 = 0.002, indicating 
that the training had a non-significant effect upon behaviour at amber traffic 
lights (see Table 5.10 for descriptive statistics). The analysis revealed a non-
significant main effect of condition on the number of stops at amber traffic lights, 
F(1, 90) = 0.11, p = .738, ηG2 = 0.001, suggesting that the groups were similar. 
A significant effect of time was found, F(1, 83) = 31.22, p = < .0001, ηG2 = 0.04, 
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with participants stopping at more amber traffic lights post-training (M = 12.38, 
SD = 3.11) than pre-training (M = 11.13, SD = 2.88). 
Further planned analysis revealed that both conditions recorded a significant 
increase in stops at amber traffic lights, for the experimental group, t(41) = -
4.51, p = < .001, 95% CI [-2.21, -0.84], d = -0.70, and for the control condition, 
t(42) = -3.33, p = .002, 95% CI [-1.57, -0.39], d = -0.51. As shown in Table 5.10, 
irrespective of type of training received, stops at amber traffic lights increased in 
the second driving game compared to the first. Analysis found a non-significant 
difference between conditions for pre training amber stops, t(83) = -0.11, p = 
.915, 95% CI [-1.32, 1.18], d = -0.02 and a non-significant difference at post 
training as well, t(83) = 0.71, p = .480, 95% CI [-0.87, 1.83], d = 0.15.  
 Summary 
Unlike Experiment 9, the results for Experiment 10 do not demonstrate anything 
that can be termed a significant improvement in stopping at amber traffic lights 
as a result of the training. However, numerically, there is weak evidence for the 
direction of effect supporting that in Experiment 9. Given that the training was 
identical between Experiment 9 and 10 the lack of a stronger effect is puzzling. 
One reason might be due to the type of participants. Experiment 9 used older 
more experienced drivers, whereas Experiment 10 used a student sample. 
Perhaps the training is more effective for those with more driving experience. 
With more driving experience the link between left-pedal and stop would be 
assumed to be stronger and this may have helped to increase transference 
between the inhibition training and the driving game. It could also be that the 
Game Condition Mean SE 
Pre-training 
Game 
Experimental 11.10 0.44 
 




Experimental 12.62 0.40 
 Control 12.14 0.54 
Table 5.10. Descriptive statistics for stops at amber lights for Experiment 9. 
Stops out of 20. 
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existing associative learning of amber=GO is stronger in more experienced 
drivers, leading to greater effects of training (i.e. as there is a stronger response 
to change). It would not be possible to tease out any effects from the samples 
here, but it is a thought for future research (see general discussion for further). 
In terms of the CHANGE trials performance the results suggests learning was 
more variable than in Experiment 9 and this could explain the poor training 
effects, with A. Jones et al. (2016) showing that for training to be effective 
learning must occur. Additionally, another cause of the lack of strong training 
effects might be because the CHANGE success was low, ranging between 60-
75% in Experiment 10. In the food inhibition literature successful inhibition is 
often around 90% or more, and A. Jones et al. (2016) has shown that tasks that 
have higher successful inhibition rates have stronger training effects. Indeed, 
Jones et al. argued that training needs to be highly accurate and employ 
consistent stopping for cue-specific training to be effective. It could be the case 
that the STOP-CHANGE task is too difficult for learning to occur sufficiently to 
affect behaviour change. 
 Bayesian meta-analysis 
Given that the three experiments used similar conditions in terms of the 
experimental and control 1 group it is possible to combine the experiments and 
undertake a Bayesian meta-analysis to assay the overall evidence for the effect 
of inhibition training. To enable comparisons between the experiments, I 
focused on performance between the experimental group and the first control 
group. I used the process by Zoltan Dienes on his website (see here: 
http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/inference/Bayes.htm) to 
create the prior for the Bayes analysis. This involved working out the mean 
difference score, and associated standard error of this mean, for the 
experimental and control 1 condition for the three experiments. Using a meta-
analytical approach, I computed a prior based on performance in Experiments 9 
and 10. I then undertook a Bayes analysis whereby I compared this posterior to 
the results from Experiment 8 (I used the calculator by Anupam Singh: 
https://medstats.github.io/bayesfactor.html). This analysis resulted in a Bayes 
Factor of 2.28. Bayes Factors range from 0 to infinity, with Factors above 3 
indicating support for a theory and Factors under 0.33 representing support for 
the null (Dienes, 2011). Thus, the meta Bayes Factor demonstrates only weak 
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evidence in favour of the theory in this case, i.e. that inhibition training increases 
the tendency to stop at amber traffic lights. This approach compares two 
experiments against the first experiment, another way to calculate the Bayes 
factor would be to calculate a Bayes Factor between each experiment (so 
Experiment 8 vs. 9, and Experiment 9 vs. 10) and multiply the two outputs to 
compute a combined Bayes Factor. Such an approach generated a Bayes 
Factor of 2.58.  
 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Inhibition training designed to train associatively-mediated stopping to amber 
traffic lights was assayed across three experiments. Experiment 8 found no 
evidence of an effect, with all conditions being numerically similar. Experiments 
9 and 10 showed some promise, with the experimental condition having 
numerically (though rarely significant) positive improvements in stopping at 
amber lights following training relative to the control condition. Combining the 
studies into a meta Bayes analysis indicated that overall, the training only had a 
weak effect.  
 Inhibition training in driving 
As mentioned in Chapter 1 there is only one other study looking at inhibition 
within driving, that of Hatfield et al. (2018). So far, discussion of this work has 
been conspicuous by its absence in this thesis. This was because the work 
reported here was developed separately from that of Hatfield et al. (2018) and 
therefore it felt logical to present my findings here before placing them into the 
context of the (limited) literature. Compared to the work here Hatfield et al found 
weaker effects of the training, but there are two key differences between their 
work and mine.  
Firstly, the inhibition training used images from the driving simulator to help 
overcome issues of transference between the training task and the simulator in 
Experiments 9 and 10. Hatfield et al. (2018) argued against such a design given 
their aim (and mine) of developing a task to address real-world driving. 
However, this approach is setting oneself up to fail as the experiment does not 
take place in the real-world but rather in a laboratory. Therefore, deliberately not 
matching the inhibition training as closely as possible to the simulated driving is 
233 
 
akin to showing computerised images in the inhibition task and then assessing 
real-world driving. Of course, once one moves to assessing real-world driving 
then it would be appropriate to use real-world images. On a related concept, in 
Experiments 9 and 10 participants used foot pedals in both the driving and 
inhibition tasks (though only those in the experimental condition used the foot 
pedal for CHANGE trials). This was to increase the likelihood of transfer 
between the two tasks. However, if one wishes to design a training task to be 
used in the real-world then it must be questioned how likely is it that people 
have access to foot pedals. Using keyboard (or even touchscreen) responses 
would more readily fit into people’s daily interactions with technology and might 
not be such a transference barrier as first thought. The use of such motor 
responses in online training has led to real-world reduced food intake and 
weight loss, indicating some transfer of a button-press or touchscreen response 
to the rather different act of picking up and buying or eating a food item (N. S. 
Lawrence, O'Sullivan, et al., 2015; Beurden, Smith, Lawrence, Abraham, & 
Greaves Van Beurden, 2019). However, specific motor responses are more 
important in driving, and it would be interesting to compare the effectiveness of 
the training developed here against similar training using keyboard presses.   
Secondly, as in Experiment 8 and 10, Hartfield et al. (2018) used a student 
sample. However, the results from Experiment 9 hint at stronger effects for 
participants that represent the wider driving population. While inhibition work in 
food has found success in students (N. S. Lawrence, O'Sullivan, et al., 2015) it 
can be argued that these populations already have a strong approach tendency 
to cake (that is, most people like to eat cake). Young drivers might not have 
such a strong amber – go link. Therefore, testing more experienced drivers 
(who one assumes have a strong go prime to amber) would bring the driving 
domain of inhibition training into line with the wider literature and might lead to 
strong effects, though of course ultimately any intervention would ideally 
improve driving of young people. Such an argument has support from work 
which has found stronger effects of go/no-go training in those with stronger 
impulses to go to food (Houben & Jansen, 2011; Veling et al., 2013a; yet see Z. 
Chen, Veling, Dijksterhuis, & Holland, 2018). 
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 Inhibition training across domains 
The experiments presented here indicate that response inhibition techniques 
might not fulfil the promise of easy and effective behaviour change. The fact 
that the Bayes Factor provided only weak evidence in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis despite including three large studies does sit at odds with the work 
into food and alcohol which suggest that, to varying degrees, the training is 
effective. However, the results do tie into recent findings by Bos et al. (2019). 
This study was a randomised control trial investigating the use inhibition training 
to reduce smoking. Those in the experimental condition were trained to no-go to 
smoking images, whilst those in the control condition saw control images. 
Similar to the findings reported here, both groups had a reduction in smoking 
and the differences between groups at each time point (post intervention, 1 
month, 3 months follow ups) were not significant. This suggests that there is 
some difference between tasks within the inhibition literature, in that either the 
mechanism underlying the effects, or the measurements used to assess 
behaviour change, are more valid/sensitive in the consumption research.  
 Future directions  
While the measure of driving behaviour, the simulator, was refined across the 
experiments it is still far from capturing the experience of real-world driving. It 
might be the case that the training did bring about changes in driving behaviour, 
but that the simulator did not give participants the correct environment to deploy 
the learning. That is, the training might be effective in the real-world but not in 
the simulator. As already discussed, driving is cognitively demanding and so is 
a rich environment for associatively-mediated processes to guide behaviour. 
Whereas in the laboratory the effort required to ‘drive’ is likely to be less than 
that for real-world driving (in a sense this is a similar argument to that of 
McLaren et al., 2019 on the need for the appropriate procedure to detect 
associative learning). Informally, one could compare driving in the simulator and 
driving in the real-world as being equivalent to, on the one hand, driving along 
an empty motorway and on the other, driving on your own in the middle of 
London. It's easy to see that in each condition the resources required are likely 
to be markedly different. Thus, performance in the simulator might be influenced 
by propositional rather than associatively-mediated processes. Furthermore, in 
the real-world there are genuine reasons (at least in the eyes of the driver) for 
235 
 
committing traffic violations and strong motivations to drive within the law (e.g., 
to avoid a fine). This behaviour algebra was missing from the experiments 
presented here undermining the realism of the simulator environment. 
Therefore, an obvious next step would be to explore the effects of the training in 
the real-world.    
Although participants seemed to learn about the inhibition task over time there 
are at least two ways the task could be improved. Firstly, the task could include 
multiple images of traffic lights to improve generalisation. Many inhibition 
experiments use multiple training images, e.g., Camp and Lawrence (2019) 
used eight different images of meat as no/go cues in their training task. 
Therefore, would seem sensible to redesign the current inhibition task to display 
multiple different images of traffic lights. Of course, given that traffic lights can 
be seen from many angles, in all lighting/weather conditions and in a myriad of 
physical contexts, this does suggest another avenue of enquiry surrounding 
how close to the real-world context would these images need to be. The second 
change would be to make the task adaptive. While many experiments in this 
field use fixed timing, including a tracking procedure such as that used in 
Experiments 1-7 would help tailor the inhibition training to each participant’s 
subjective level of task difficulty. An example of such a tracking procedure being 
applied to inhibition training comes from Johnstone et al. (2012), who used a 
tracking procedure in a go/no-go task with children with attention 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder. Of course, as noted earlier, success on inhibition 
trials predicts effect size of training and therefore it would be important to 
ensure that the tracking procedure was one that did not make the task harder.  
The task was developed in order to tackle associatively-mediated learning at 
UK traffic lights. It is also likely that there are instances where propositional 
learning guides behaviour (e.g., if there is a police car besides you at the lights). 
Therefore, it would be useful to combine such training as presented here with 
more traditional educational interventions to tackle both routes. Such an 
approach was taken by Veling et al. (2014) who in their research into food 
consumption combined go/no-go training and implementation intention (if-then 
planning) training; finding no added benefit of combining the interventions. Still, 
implementation intentions have been shown to have some success in changing 
real-world driving behaviour (Elliott & Armitage, 2006), and designing a program 
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that addresses both propositional and associatively-mediated learning could 
prove fruitful.  
 Conclusions 
From the perspective of developing an intervention to address real-world driving 
the experiments here do not indicate strong enough evidence to be of 
significance to road safety bodies. However, the discussion has highlighted 
several lines of enquiry that need to be explored before the use of inhibition in a 
driving context can be dismissed entirely. Therefore, it seems worthwhile for 
future research to explore ways to increase the effectiveness of the training – 




6 CHAPTER 6 
Conclusions 
he experiments in this thesis have implications for the study of associative 
learning, response inhibition, and most crucially, the development of 
driving safety programmes. In this final chapter I briefly summarise the 
preceding work and then draw out conclusions relating to the theories 
discussed in Chapter 1 and make suggestions for directions of future research.  
 THE EXPERIMENTAL WORK  
 Chapter 2: Associative learning at traffic lights  
In the first trio of experiments I sought to begin to understand the role of 
associative learning at UK traffic lights. Human factors have been found to play 
a significant role in road traffic incidents (U.S. Department of Transportation, 
2015), with non-compliance at traffic light signals making up a large segment of 
these incidents (Retting et al., 1995). Research has shown that associative 
learning happens in the background and can influence behaviour when control 
processes are weak (McLaren et al., 2019), and work in the driving literature 
has shown how cognitively taxing driving is (Walshe et al., 2017). This 
increases the likelihood that the associative learning that takes place in 
response to traffic lights will manifest itself upon driving behaviour. Therefore, it 
was important to explore the behaviour that associative learning might prime. 
The experiments in Chapter 2 also introduced the notion of the feature-positive 
effect and applied this to investigate how learning at lights was affected by task 
set. At a fundamental level, the act of driving can be seen as a dichotomy 
between going and stopping, and so it was important for the experiments to 
capture this aspect of the activity. A between experiments analysis confirmed 
that the change in task set between Experiments 2 and 3 had been successful, 
with the difference in the R vs. RA and I vs. IP discriminations shifting in line 
with the feature-positive effect. The effect on task set was also to modulate the 
learning of cue A. In circumstances where participants were using a stop task 
set, cue A seemed to be a go cue, yet when a go task set was in force, cue A 




design), a between experiment analysis, that was a first step in capturing the 
effects of both task sets, showed that overall cue A was a go cue. This runs 
counter to the rules of driving in the UK which dictate that amber is a neutral to 
stop cue. 
 Chapter 3: The role of sequences 
The experiments in Chapter 2 were designed in the style typical of cognitive 
psychology experiments in associative learning, rather than within a framework 
focussed on capturing the essence of the experience of UK traffic lights. 
Chapter 2 marked a shift towards to a greater focus on drivers' experience at 
traffic lights, specifically with regards to the role of sequences. The importance 
of sequences in learning is well documented (Ashe et al., 2006), and indeed, 
they are crucial to the traffic light system in the UK. Having found evidence to 
suggest that the contingency learning for amber lights might be inappropriate in 
a relatively simple design, the next step was to explore learning in a design that 
more closely matched that experienced in the real-world. The two experiments 
in Chapter 2 still retained the necessary cues to enable analysis of the feature-
positive effect, again finding good evidence to support the notion that the 
between experiment manipulations was having the desired shift in effective task 
outcome. Regarding the addition of sequences upon learning, while learning 
itself was noticeably stronger, the overall pattern of results was similar to that of 
Chapter 2. These results confirmed that associative learning at traffic lights 
could well be such as to encourage dangerous driving. The experiments also 
gave credence to the claim that the paradigm was addressing associative rather 
than propositional learning, with no evidence of participants’ ratings correlating 
significantly with learning about the cues. Though of course, the issues raised 
by Shanks and St. John (1994) and others apply to such claims. 
 Chapter 4: The effect of task set  
Until Chapter 4 the learning for each task set, that is if participants (and thus 
drivers) were looking for go or stop cues, was addressed at a between 
participants’ level. However, drivers are likely to shift task set depending on the 
signal the traffic light is displaying. Therefore, Experiment 6 implemented a 
design that embedded task set switching in a within participant’s design, 
enabling the experience of real-life traffic lights to be factored into the paradigm. 
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Overall, the results for Experiment 6 (and the training phase of Experiment 7) 
suggested that cue A was again a weak go cue and that, reassuringly (both in 
terms of road safety and the validation of the paradigm) cue R, which 
represented the contingences of a red traffic light, was a strong stop cue.  
With these results in mind, Experiment 7 introduced a form of inhibition training 
aimed to shift learnt responses to cue A from go to stop. However, the training 
did not prove successful, with the experimental group not showing the 
hypothesised shift compared to a control group.  
 Chapter 5: Effecting behaviour change  
Chapter 5 marked another transition in the focus of the thesis. Rather than 
exploring learning at traffic lights, this chapter focused on continuing the work of 
Experiment 7 and investigated whether any such pre-existing associative links 
could be changed. Given that my experiments undertaken so far indicated that 
amber lights primed a go response, and that driving seems to be a rich 
environment for such associative learning to take place, it seemed only natural 
to explore whether an intervention could be designed to amend the associative 
learning at amber traffic lights.  
While this chapter continued to draw upon associative theories, it adapted the 
experimental design to take into account the findings from applied work into 
reducing alcohol and food consumption and to better fit the real-life 
circumstances of driving. Across three experiments the inhibition task was 
developed and refined, along with the driving simulator used to assay evidence 
of behaviour change. Bayesian analyses found that across the three 
experiments there was weak evidence for the effectiveness of the training. As a 
result, future developments of the paradigm were suggested that might elicit 
strong behavioural shifts.  
 Summary 
To summarise the empirical work undertaken within this thesis; across a series 
of experiments I developed a paradigm that sought to capture an increasingly 
complete picture of the factors influencing contingency learning at UK traffic 
lights. These results suggest that associative processes are likely to prime a go 
response to amber traffic lights. With this knowledge, my attention then focused 
on investigating if a response inhibition training task could be developed to 
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adjust this associative learning to be less go and more stop. In this I was only 
partially successful, with further development clearly required. Having 
summarised the experiments in this thesis, this chapter now concerns itself with 
the broader theoretical and applied implications of the work.  
 ASSOCIATIVELY-MEDIATED LEARNING  
One clear outcome from the experiments in Chapters 2 and 4 is that evidence 
of associatively-mediated learning was observed to some extent. The go/no-go 
training resulted in slower reaction times and less probability of committing 
commission errors for stimuli paired with a stop response compared to those 
stimuli linked to a go response. Of course, what the experiments cannot do, nor 
were they designed to, is speak to the mechanisms that underpin this learning. 
However, they do speak to the ongoing debate in Psychology on the nature of 
human learning. 
 Dual process theories of human behaviour  
The findings from the test phases sit in direct contrast to the single propositional 
account of human learning (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2009), and the thesis can be 
seen as further evidence for a dual-process account of human learning. The 
50/50 test blocks allowed for the decoupling of associatively-mediated and 
propositional learning that could have developed in the training blocks. In 
training it is entirely possible that subjects had developed propositional rules 
regarding cues and responses in addition to associatively-mediated learning. 
Yet, at test, given that the blocks used 50/50 contingencies, performance based 
on previous learning would be uncertain, and so it is unlikely that participants 
were able to deploy any propositional learning. On this basis, the test blocks 
allow for the assessment of raw associative learning (similar logic was posited 
by McLaren et al., 2019). Therefore, the findings at test where cue G was often 
significantly faster than cue B suggests that associatively-mediated learning 
was affecting participant responses. Of course, results at test were often 
weaker than at training, with this likely arising as a fact that the test blocks were 
essentially extinction phases. Over time both associative learning and any 
propositional learning would lead to participants responding to cues uniformly 
given the 50/50 nature of the blocks.  
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I mention that propositional learning could develop through the paradigm and 
influence performance, and while this is true little evidence was found to 
suggest such learning did develop. Looking at the results for the awareness 
tests conducted in Experiments 4, 5 and 6 it is clear that while participants were 
able to learn that some cues denoted a go response more often than other 
cues, the correlational analysis demonstrated little evidence for participants 
using this knowledge to influence responding. Of course, such tests have many 
issues (see discussion in Chapter 3 7.3).  
One final comment on the nature of learning within the experiments.  Though I 
would argue that the results support an associative account of human learning, 
whether this occurs in the traditional sense of the phrase as used by McLaren et 
al. (2014), or through the two processes, one system of McLaren et al. (2019) 
cannot be fully ascertained. 
 Applying associatively-mediated learning paradigms 
One implication of the experiments in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 is that they 
demonstrate how it is possible to use existing learning paradigms and apply 
them to begin to understand associatively-mediated learning in a real-life 
setting. Though it is clear that the paradigm developed in this thesis does not 
capture all facets of the experience of traffic lights, the thesis shows how it is 
possible to use a relatively simple experimental design to start to highlight the 
role of associatively-mediated learning in specific human behaviours. The 
design could be applied to explore other traffic behaviours. For example, it is 
likely that there is a large associatively-mediated learning component in the 
response to the National Speed Limit sign in the UK. This sign indicates to 
drivers they are leaving an environment where speed restrictions were in place 
and can now drive up to 60 m.p.h. Given the strong GO response often made to 
this sign (placing one’s foot on the accelerator) it is likely that over time the sign 
could come to automatically cue a strong go response, even in circumstances 
when such a response would be inappropriate (such as traffic up ahead). 
Further insights into the strength or otherwise of associatively-mediated learning 
for a particular behaviour is likely to aid the development of more effective 




 IMPLICATIONS FOR ROAD SAFETY  
The evidence presented in this thesis indicates that associative learning at 
amber traffic lights is contrary to that expected by the Highway Code. This has 
several implications for road safety practitioners. Firstly, it suggests that a focus 
on using the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1992; see section 1.5) as a 
model to bring about behaviour change in the driving domain is not likely to be 
the most effective choice, given its focus on conscious thought processes to the 
exclusion of associatively-mediated learning. This conclusion is supported by 
work discussed earlier, such as Steinmetz et al. (2016), who found only small 
effect sizes for interventions using the Theory of Planned Behaviour to change 
traffic behaviour. Therefore, it is recommended that work is undertaken to 
develop new models that can address both associative and conscious routes to 
change driving behaviour.  
Secondly, the work highlights how associative learning can prime dangerous 
responses and thus the need for the road safety literature to consider the role of 
associative learning in other driving contexts. Indeed, this thesis demonstrates 
the need for interventions to be rooted to scientific work and the importance of 
using laboratory research to support and develop more effective interventions. 
More work aimed at uncovering the impact of associative learning on driving 
behaviours is needed to develop more holistic interventions. One aspect worth 
noting is that learning is specific to the contingencies in play within a particular 
system. For example, in New South Wales, Australia, the traffic light sequence 
is green – amber – red – green and therefore any associatively-mediated 
learning arising from experience of this sequence is likely to be quite different to 
that at UK traffic lights. Furthermore, the paradigm designed in Chapter 2 
through to Chapter 5 focused on traffic lights, and the learning to Pelican 
crossings (in which a flashing amber light replaces the Red and Amber signal) 
could be quite different. Arguably the flashing amber light is a strong stop signal 
and so the solo amber light at these crossings might be associated with stop to 
a greater extent than a solo amber at traffic lights. The point here is that it is not 
a simple case of exploring associative learning in one context and then 
assuming such learning holds true for conceptually-related situations.  
Lastly, as well as illustrating the likely role of associative learning in driving 
behaviour, this thesis provides a springboard to illustrate how interventions 
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could be developed to address dangerous driving. The thesis supports calls by 
Lheureux et al. (2016) and Fylan (2017) to include features in interventions that 
address associative learning in a driving environment. Associatively-mediated 
learning principles are often used in real-life for training, for example positive 
reinforcement techniques are a key part of the training programme for Guide 
Dogs in the UK (Dopson, 2018), but are largely ignored in driving interventions 
(Gardner, 2015b).  
One aspect of the real-world use of the response inhibition intervention 
developed here (and similar designs) is that it only targets the specific go 
response to amber traffic lights. While training amber to become a stop cue is 
an obvious step in reducing road traffic incidents at traffic lights, if a driver is 
going too fast, even if they do brake in response to an amber light, they might 
not be able to stop and so cross through the junction illegally. The point here is 
that a whole system approach is needed to successfully change behaviour. 
Successful behaviour change is likely to involve targeting a range of behaviours 
that form part of a ‘behaviour link’ that precedes the specific action of interest in 
a particular study. Therefore, in the driving domain this might entail using a 
combination of several theories and research domains to target all links in the 
chain. For traffic lights, in addition to the development of the intervention 
presented here, work could focus on speed reduction media campaigns or 
exploring the effects of road calming measures, such as narrowing of roads, or 
even how different colour tarmac might help reduce drivers speed and increase 
their preparedness to stop. Such a focus on both the individual, wider societal 
factors, and the environment, is likely to bring about the greatest behaviour 
change.  
 INHIBITION TRAINING 
As well as implications for the road safety domain this thesis also speaks to the 
response inhibition training literature. The results from Chapter 5 counter the 
notion in the popular press of the success and effectiveness of ‘brain training’ 
apps. The finding that the behaviour change resulting from the training was 
small suggests that more robust training paradigms are needed to bring about 
real-world change. The results from Chapter 5 lead to several practical 
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suggestions for those wishing to use inhibition training to deliver behaviour 
change. 
Firstly, the research in Chapter 5 indicated how the STOP-CHANGE task could 
be used within an intervention. This task is rarely used in the applied literature. 
However, it could be more appropriate than the oft used go/no-go training 
where the focus is on changing, rather than stopping, behaviour. For example, 
with regards to drug taking, to encourage individuals to take methadone rather 
than heroin. It could be the case that use of the STOP-CHANGE task rather 
than the go/no-go task would reduce the transfer gap between the training task 
and the real-world behavioural responses, and so increase the effectiveness of 
the intervention. One issue with the use of the STOP-CHANGE task in the 
current intervention was the low successful inhibition rates, with these likely 
being a key reason behind the limited success of the intervention developed in 
this thesis. Using a staircase design to tailor the intervention to individuals could 
help increase inhibition rates by reducing the difficulty of the task.  
Secondly, the experiments in Chapter 5 demonstrated the need to consider the 
length of training. While it is all too easy to focus on the benefits of shortening 
training tasks in order to increase their acceptability, this needs to be balanced 
against the impact on their effectiveness. The results in Chapter 5 
demonstrated that learning within the training task was variable, and it is 
suggested that increasing training length would be beneficial, despite the costs. 
Of course, it might not be simply the duration of the training that increases its 
effectiveness (by which I mean participants demonstrating learning within the 
task). The number and length of breaks, or the number of days over which the 
training is conducted, are all likely to be factors that can influence the success 
of the training (see Bakkour et al., 2018 for further).  
Thirdly, the importance of using ecologically valid measurements of behaviour 
change cannot be understated. The changes to the driving simulator introduced 
for Experiment 9 correlated with improved effectiveness of the intervention. 
Given the ultimate desire of all inhibition tasks to change behaviour in the real-
world it is crucial that the experiments reflect their real-life counterparts as 
closely as possible. A related issue is the idea discussed in Chapter 5, that the 
simulator did not give participants the appropriate environment to display the 
behaviour change. As McLaren el al. (2019) note, procedure is key. Given the 
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focus of inhibition training to change associatively-mediated learning it is crucial 
that the methods used to asses behaviour change enable the behaviours 
arising from associative learning to be expressed.  
Lastly, the work in Chapter 5 highlights how elusive the effects of inhibition can 
be. The fact that across the three experiments varying degrees of (limited) 
successful behaviour change was found demonstrates that a range of factors 
beyond the specific training design implemented play a role. In the case of 
driving, age, experience, past driving history are likely to be key determinants 
on behaviour. Therefore, it is not merely enough to design the training task, but 
rather researchers need to consider the characteristics of participants as well. 
Such a focus is especially important for meta-analysis or review papers where 
the effects of inhibition training across studies could be explained by differing 
sample pools. The limited effects of the inhibition task developed in this thesis 
also speak to a wider issue in the field, that of weak effects. Throughout this 
thesis one narrative arc has been the uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness 
of inhibition training, with training seemingly effective for one domain but not 
another. For example, while research (N. S. Lawrence, O'Sullivan, et al., 2015) 
has supported the real-world effectiveness of response inhibition upon food 
consumption, this has not been consistently found for alcohol (A. Jones et al., 
2018; yet see Strickland et al., 2019). The work in Chapter 5 can be seen as a 
microcosm of this issue, with the meta Bayes Factor suggesting the training had 
some effect, but that this was weak. This conclusion is certainly consistent with 
the work discussed in Chapter 1.  It suggests that as a whole inhibition training 
is entering a new phase where the focus should be on marginal gains to 
improve and understand mechanisms behind current training tasks. 
 CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has clearly demonstrated the need to consider the role of 
associative learning within a driving context. Importantly, the thesis takes 
associative theories and applies them to a novel domain. The thesis also makes 
an important contribution to developing a paradigm that could help address the 
maladaptive behaviour that associative learning at traffic lights primes, but 
clearly these are first steps and much more by way of development is needed. 
The exact nature of the role of associative learning at UK traffic lights, and how 
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exactly this manifest itself in the expression of driving behaviour is still unclear; 









Appendix A: Non-Significant Reaction Time Contrasts 
for Test for Experiment 3  
In terms of the experimental contrasts, A vs. B was non-significant, t(432) = 
0.85, p = .396, 95% CI [-7.99, 20.23], d = 0.08. The A vs. G contrast was not 
significant, t(432) = 0.08, p = .940, 95% CI [-13.56, 14.65], d = 0.01. The A vs. 
R contrast was also non-significant, t(432) = -0.24, p = .814, 95% CI [-15.80, 
12.41], d = -0.02. For the contrasts against R, R vs. B was not significant, t(432) 
= 1.09, p = .278, 95% CI [-6.29, 21.93], d = 0.10. The R vs. G was also non-
significant, t(432) = 0.31, p = .756, 95% CI [-11.87, 16.35], d = 0.03. The 
difference between R- vs. RA+ and IP- vs. I+ was non-significant, t(54) = -1.44, 

















Appendix B: Non-Significant Commission Error 
Contrasts for Test for Experiment 3 
The A vs. B was not significant, z = 1.23, p = .217. The A vs. G contrast was not 
significant, z = 1.23, p = .217. The A vs. R contrast was not significant, z = 0.58, 
p = .564. Focusing on the R cues, the R vs. B contrast was not significant, z = 






















Appendix C: R-RA Contrast on Data from Experiments 
2 and 3 
In Chapter 3 I performed a contrast looking at the difference between R and RA 
to assess for evidence of a feature-positive effect. This was because in 
Experiment 5 R vs. RA was the feature-positive contrast (R- RA+), while in 
Experiment 4 it was the feature-negative pair (R+, RA-). The same logic holds 
for Experiments 2 and 3 in Chapter 2, were in Experiment 2 the R RA contrast 
was the feature-negative pair (R+, RA-), while in Experiment 3 the R vs. RA was 
the feature-positive contrast (R- RA+). Therefore, it is possible to undertake the 
same analysis presented in Chapter 3 upon the data in Chapter 2. A standard 
alpha level was applied to this set of analysis.  
The result from response times at training were marginally significant at the 
standard alpha level, t(108) = -1.91, p = .006, 95% CI [-15.97, 0.29], d = -0.37, 
with enhanced learning to RA compared to R in Experiment 3 (mean difference 
of 6.70, SD = 24.37) compared to Experiment 2 (M = -1.14, SD = 18.20). This 
demonstrates that the changes made between the Experiments 3 and 3 
successfully changed the nature of the discriminations experienced by 
participants, that is the effective outcome changed from stopping to going. 
However, the results from test were not significant, t(108) = 0.14, p = .886, 95% 
CI [-18.70, 21.62], d = 0.03.  
As it was not possible to conduct the R RA contrast for training commission 
errors in Chapter 3, I did not undertake it for Chapter 2 data, but I did perform 
the analysis for test data. This contrast was not significant, t(108) = 1.34, p = 









Appendix D: Tables of Missing Data Decisions for 
Experiment 8 
Scale/ question Total number of 
missing cells 




Gender                                No missing data    
 
Age 2; 1 control 2, 1 
control 3 
5% for control 2 
and 4% for 
control 3 
Took mean of 





Crash history 2; 1 control 2, 1 
control 3 
5% for control 2 







Type of driving 
licence 
3; 1 control 2, 2 
for control 3 
5% for control 2 
and 8% for 
control 3 
Data included as a 




Length of time 
full driving 
licence held 
5; 1 control 1, 2 
control 2 
5.26% for control 
1, and 6.67% for 












Scale/ question Total number of 
missing cells 




Impulsivity 4; 1 
experimental, 2 
control 2, 1 
control 3 
3.70% for the 
experimental 
group, 10% for 
the control 2, and 
4% for control 3  
Two participants 
did not complete 
any questions in 
the scale and so 
were removed 
from the analysis. 
The other two had 
missing data 





2; 1 control 2, 1 
control 3  
5% for control 2 
and 4% for 
control 3 
These participants 
did not complete 
any questions in 
the scale and so 
were removed 














Appendix E: Group Characteristics Comparisons for 
Experiment 8 
Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. p values in bold 
represented fisher exact test values. Those with missing values for a particular 











Length of time 
full driving 
licence held 
< 3 months 
< 6 months 
< 1 year 
































































F(3, 90) = 
0.18, p = 
.908 
 
F(3, 90) = 
























   Female 















F(3, 92) = 










F(3, 90) = 
1.17, p = .326 
 
Crash history 
   Yes 















F(3, 90) = 
3.40, p = .021 
 
Type of driving 
licence 
   Full 
   Provisional 























χ²(6) = 4.21,  




Appendix F: Tables of Missing Data Decisions for 
Experiment 9 
Scale/ question Total number of 
missing cells 
% missing cells 
of group mean 
Replacement 
strategy 
Gender                                No missing data    
 
Age                                No missing data    
 
Type of driving 
licence 
 
                               No missing data    
 




                               No missing data    
 











2.17% 0 replacement 









0 replacement  












Scale/ question Total number of 
missing cells 
% missing cells 
of group mean 
Replacement 
strategy 
Driver Behaviour    
jjjjjjAggressive                       
jjjjjjviolations 
5; 2 experimental 




6.52% for control 












8.70% for control 










8.70% for control 










8.70% for control 
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Appendix G: Group Characteristics Comparisons for 
Experiment 9 
Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. p values in bold 
represented fisher exact test values. Those with missing values for a particular 








    Female 








t(90) = -0.65, p 
= .520 
    
Type of driving licence 
    Full 








t(90) = 0.73, p = 
.465 
If a full licence how long 
have you been driving for? 
    Less than one year 
    1-2 years 
    3-5 years 
    6-8 years 
    9-10 years 








































Behaviour Questionnaire  
    Aggressive violations 
     “Ordinary” violations 
    Errors 






Simulator Sickness  
    Oculomotor 
    Disorientation 
    Nausea 










































t(88) = -0.26,  p = .798 
t(87) = 0.55,  p = .584 
t(87) = 0.35,  p = .725 
t(87) = 0.99,  p = .325 
 
t(90) = 0.25,  p = .803 
 
t(90) = 0.35,  p = .725 
 
 
t(90) = 1.50,  p = .138 
t(90) = 1.03,  p = .304 
t(90) = 0.41,  p = .690 
t(90) = 1.11,  p = .269 
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Appendix H: Tables of Missing Data Decisions for 
Experiment 10 
Scale/ question Total number of 
missing cells 
% missing cells 
of group mean 
Replacement 
strategy 
Gender                                No missing data    
 
Age                                No missing data    
 
Type of driving 
licence 
 
                               No missing data    
 




1 in the 
Experimental 
condition 
2.38% Missing data 
dropped from 
analysis 
Impulsivity score 4; 1 experimental, 
3 control 
2.38% in the 
experimental 
group, 6.98% in 
the control group 
Mean 
replacement 
    
Sensation-
seeking scale 












Scale/ question Total number of 
missing cells 
% missing cells 
of group mean 
Replacement 
strategy 
Driver Behaviour     
jjjjjjAggressive                       
jjjjjjviolations 
                No missing data    
 
 







6.98% for control  
 














2.38% in the 
experimental 
group, 4.65% for 
control 









4: 1 experimental, 
3 control 
 
2.38% in the 
experimental 









6.98% for control 
 
0 replacement  
jjjjjjNausea  2; both 
experimental 





Appendix I: Group Characteristics Comparisons for 
Experiment 10 
Means are presented with standard deviations in parentheses. p values in bold 
represented fisher exact test values. Those with missing values for a particular 










Behaviour Questionnaire  
    Aggressive violations 
     “Ordinary” violations 
    Errors 






Simulator Sickness  
    Oculomotor 
    Disorientation 
    Nausea 









































t(83) = -0.80,  p = .427 
t(83) = -0.10,  p = .917 
t(83) = 1.00,  p = .320 
t(83) = 1.01,  p = .317 
 
t(83) = -0.55,  p = .583 
 
t(83) = -0.02,  p = .985 
 
 
t(83) = -0.41,  p = .874 
t(83) = -0.30,  p = .765 
t(83) = -0.16,  p = .874 















    Female 








t(83) = -0.57, p 
= .573 
    
Type of driving licence 
    Full 









If a full licence how long 
have you been driving for? 
    Less than one year 
    1-2 years 
    3-5 years 
    6-8 years 
    9-10 years 
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